The author uses the case of Aguas del Illimani, a consortium headed by Lyonnaise des Eaux, in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, to explore how typical concession agreements (i.e. monopoly private service supplier) can be designed to best serve poor neighbourhoods.
| Title | Designing pro-poor water and sewer concessions : early lessons from Bolivia |
| Publication Type | Miscellaneous |
| Year of Publication | 1999 |
| Authors | Komives, K |
| Secondary Title | Policy research working paper series / World Bank |
| Volume | no. 2243 |
| Pagination | ii, 33 p. : 6 tab |
| Date Published | 1999-11-01 |
| Publisher | World Bank |
| Place Published | Washington, DC, USA |
| Keywords | bolivia la paz el alto, case studies, low-income communities, piped distribution, policies, sdipol |
| Abstract | The author uses the case of Aguas del Illimani, a consortium headed by Lyonnaise des Eaux, in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, to explore how typical concession agreements (i.e. monopoly private service supplier) can be designed to best serve poor neighbourhoods. She states that this can be achieved by: providing clear contract objectives, financial incentives and a range of service connection options; by eliminating policy barriers that exclude the poor; and by allowing new service providers to enter the market. Despite the initial success of Aguas del Illimani, it is still too early to conclude that it will be sustainable or to predict how privatization will ultimately affect poor households in La Paz and El Alto. |
| Notes | 14 ref. |
| Custom 1 | 202.2, 205.42, 827 |
