City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan

Khartoum case study

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January 2011
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Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Carla Martínez and Maysaa Alghribawy of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for generously seconding staff members to the study. Thanks also to Margie Buchanan-Smith (independent) for her support during the planning phase of the study and particularly with the recruitment of research team members. We are grateful to Agnès de Geoffroy (independent) for her generous help with contextual knowledge, recruitment of research staff and revision of drafts. We are extremely grateful to George and Nora Pagoulatos of the Acropolis Hotel in Khartoum, whose help with logistic issues was instrumental to the success of the fieldwork.

We would like to thank Dr. Tajelsir Mahjoub of the National Council for Strategic Planning for his support to the research and for his efforts in facilitating the research permits. We also gratefully acknowledge Dr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Khidir, the Wali of Khartoum, for his support to the study and for granting the research team the permits to undertake work in Khartoum. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Sharaf Bannaga, general manager of Bannaga Consult and former Minister of Engineering Affairs and Housing, Khartoum State, for his generous support to the study, provision of material and reviews of the manuscript.

We are especially grateful to the communities in Khartoum and interviewees from a wide range of stakeholders who generously gave their time to take part in this study.

The authors would also like to thank the many people who contributed in numerous ways to the study, including research support and the provision of documents and revisions of drafts, particularly Mustafa Babiker (University of Oman), Elisabetta Brumat (UNHCR), Mark Duffield (Bristol University), Asha Elkarib (SORD), Salah Mahmoud (Managing Director, Khartoum State New Structure Plan), Carla Martínez (IOM), Don McPhee (Plan International), Fernando Murrillo (UN-Habitat) and Liz Alden Wily (independent).

Special thanks go to Victoria Metcalfe and Sara Pavanello (HPG/ODI) for their help with finalising various sections of the report. The authors would also like to thank Matthew Foley for his expert editing of the paper.

ODI gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect DFID’s official policies.
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# Acronyms/abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>Administrative Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>community-based organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDEJ</td>
<td>Centre d’Études et de Documentation Économiques, Juridiques et Sociales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COR</td>
<td>Commission of Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Peace Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVHW</td>
<td>Commission of Voluntary and Humanitarian Workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSRSG/HC/RC</td>
<td>United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDGE</td>
<td>Environment and Development Group Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGC</td>
<td>Female Genital Cutting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoS</td>
<td>Government of Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoSS</td>
<td>Government of Southern Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPR</td>
<td>Guiding Principles on Relocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Affairs Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPWG</td>
<td>Khartoum Protection Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoE</td>
<td>Federal Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoH</td>
<td>Ministry of Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPPPU</td>
<td>Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>National Congress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSO</td>
<td>Resident Coordinator’s Support Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECS</td>
<td>Sudan Environmental Conservation Society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORD</td>
<td>Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNJLC</td>
<td>United Nations Joint Logistics Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1: Map of Khartoum
Chapter 1
Introduction and methodology

This case study of urbanisation in Khartoum is part of a wider study on urbanisation in Sudan, commissioned by the Department for International Development (DFID). The study aims to explore the growing phenomenon of urbanisation in the country, focusing in particular on Nyala, Khartoum, Port Sudan and Juba. The overall aims of the study are as follows:

1. To deepen understanding of the drivers of urbanisation in different parts of the country, in relation to the broader economic, political and security context.
2. To analyse the consequences of rapid urbanisation, socially, economically (paying particular attention to urban livelihoods) and environmentally, and in terms of urban infrastructure and the provision of services.
3. To assess the implications of rapid urbanisation in terms of the vulnerability of urban populations to future hazards and shocks, as well as development opportunities.
4. To identify how the international aid community can best engage with changing settlement patterns in Sudan, and the implications for humanitarian and development programming in the future.

While many cities in Sudan are experiencing much faster rates of development and much steeper population growth (for example Nyala and Juba), Khartoum is undergoing a very different form of urbanisation. The city is a patchwork of wealth and poverty, demographic density and sprawl and robust and atrophied infrastructure. It is, in short, a microcosm of the contradictions that mark Sudan as a whole.

This case study begins with an overview of the process of urbanisation in Khartoum, exploring the main drivers and describing overall settlement patterns. Chapter 3 describes the current policy context, and Chapter 4 examines issues of governance and leadership, ranging from formal governance mechanisms to the Native Administration and more informal leadership roles among Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and other migrant communities. Chapter 5 discusses the urban economy, how this is changing and what this means for urban livelihoods. Rapid urbanisation often raises fraught land issues – these are explored in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 describes the current state of urban infrastructure and service provision in Khartoum, and the environmental consequences of urbanisation. Chapter 8 looks at the social aspects of urban life, and people’s vulnerability to threats and hazards, while Chapter 9 assesses how the international community has engaged with and responded to urbanisation in Khartoum. The final chapter draws overall conclusions and makes recommendations for key stakeholders.

1.1 Study details and methodology

The methodology behind this study combined secondary data, gathered through an in-depth literature review of English and Arabic sources on urbanisation, displacement and vulnerability in Khartoum, with primary data collected through six weeks of fieldwork. Fieldwork took place between June and July 2010, and was carried out by a team of 15 international and national researchers, many seconded by the University of Khartoum, as well as from international organisations and state government ministries. The team was led by an international researcher with long experience of Sudan. The list of team members is on the inside cover of this report. The research benefited from the support of the National Council for Strategic Planning, which provided advice and facilitated the release of research permits.

The fieldwork was carried out through the following steps:

1. A profile of the different quarters of the city was created, including a mix of poor and middle-class neighbourhoods, informal settlements, IDP camps and relocation areas according to when the area was settled and why, the socio-economic status of residents in the area and residential classification. From this profile a number of locations were selected for detailed fieldwork. The sample selected is presented in Annex 1.
2. A stakeholder mapping exercise was carried out by the research team to analyse the relationship between formal institutions (e.g. government departments, Chamber of Commerce, Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (MPPPU)) responsible for aspects of urbanisation such as urban planning, economic development and the provision of services, and informal and community-based institutions. These were mapped using Venn diagrams to indicate the links between institutions, with the size of the circles representing the relative power of different institutions. These were subsequently used to identify key informants.
3. Secondary data and information were collected from state government departments and international and national humanitarian and development organisations. This included policy-related documents, other studies relating to urbanisation and data on service provision. A review of the available academic literature on urbanisation, in English
and Arabic, was also carried out, including unpublished MSc and PhD theses from Sudanese universities.

4. Key informant interviews were conducted with government officers, private sector organisations and entrepreneurs, union representatives and representatives of national and international agencies. Interviews were based on a basic checklist of guiding questions. See Annex 2 for a list of key informant interviews.

5. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) in the sample locations were conducted, where possible with men, women and young people separately, and with different population groups (e.g. IDPs, migrants, refugees and residents). These were also carried out according to a guiding checklist of questions.

6. Data analysis: once most of the fieldwork had been completed, the research team spent two days carrying out a joint analysis of the main findings from the research. This analysis provides the core of this report.
Chapter 2
History, drivers and patterns of urbanisation in Khartoum

2.1 Context and history

Khartoum was established as an outpost of the Egyptian army and as a regional trading post in 1821, and was proclaimed the capital of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium in 1899. Following independence in 1956, Khartoum's population grew from 250,000 to an estimated 3.3 million in 1990 (Assal, 2008; Bannaqa, 1996). By 2005, official estimates put the capital's population at 4.5m, though unofficial estimates quote more than 7m (Assal, 2008). The latest census in 2008 found that Khartoum's population had fallen to 5,271,321 (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2009), but these figures are contested and have not been officially released. Whatever the actual figure, Khartoum is Sudan's primary city, not only in terms of absolute population, but also politically, economically and socially.

Greater Khartoum today consists of three cities in one: Khartoum, Omdurman and Khartoum North (Bahri). Khartoum, south of the Blue Nile, is often identified as the commercial hub, while Bahri, on the northern bank, is traditionally considered the industrial centre; Omdurman, to the west of the White Nile, is known for its political history and agricultural links. Khartoum's downtown centre, characterised by its colonial architecture, has until recently been the commercial heart of the city. The recent relocation of the central bus station and associated markets further out has diminished its importance and resulted in changing market habits and greater commercial competition in upper-class areas of Amarat and Al Riyadh, as well as in Mayo, El-Salama and Haj Yousif. Omdurman and Bahri are both expanding, with low-level housing, infrastructure development and associated planning challenges. The old Mahdist capital, Omdurman, with a UNESCO world heritage site marketplace at its centre, retains its traditional character, with narrower streets and houses built with local materials. Around the city, the urban poor and displaced people are concentrated in camps and settlements often referred to pejoratively as Khartoum's 'Black Belt' (de Waal, 2007), due to the high proportion of Southern Sudanese living in these areas.

Meanwhile, there has been increasing gentrification in some neighbourhoods, driven both by the sizable international aid and diplomatic communities in the capital, and by recent waves of Gulf-based real-estate investment in what has been billed as 'Dubai on the Nile'. Khartoum's economic boom, largely driven by oil exports, has been accompanied by the development of a sort of 'Gulf flavour' to the city, with sun-reflective high-rise towers coupled with the emergence of gated properties and Sudan's first golf course. For Khartoum's small wealthy elite, this investment represents long-overdue development in the capital. At the top of Khartoum society, improvements in inner-city traffic circulation and road conditions, access to luxury goods and an ever-increasing choice of restaurants are all positive results of urbanisation. Yet these benefits rarely trickle down to circles outside the better-off segments of the population.

2.2 Settlement patterns in Khartoum

Khartoum can sometimes appear to have a split personality. Strict Islamic behavioural codes and the veneer of control that the city exudes mean that Khartoum is often touted as one of the safest capitals in Africa. Yet beyond the inner city is another, hidden world of frustration, desperation, poverty and crime. Even so, Khartoum's people manage to live side-by-side, despite glaring injustices and tense identity politics. As de Waal (2007) puts it:

*is there something peculiarly Sudanese about how the extraordinary extent of urbanisation has been handled with remarkably low levels of evident friction? What has made it possible for Sudanese to live together in peace in the city ... while war rages in the peripheries?*

Settlement patterns in Khartoum have long been influenced by political, economic and tribal or family factors. Specific areas of the city have historically been associated with, or were even designated for, particular elements of the workforce, such as industrial labourers, the military and civil servants. During the colonial period, the *duyum* (suburbs) of Omdurman and Khartoum were classified as Native Lodgings for the lower working classes, and some have retained this identity. Much of the land close to the Nile has long been inhabited by farming communities, and previous governments have periodically allocated land to specific groups for political reasons. Many migrants and IDPs traditionally used relatives as an entry point into Khartoum, not least for social protection and employment support, and this further compounded the phenomenon of ethnic concentration in different areas of the city.

As Khartoum has significantly expanded over the last three decades, these settlement patterns have also changed. New settlements, mostly unregulated but also resulting from ill-
conceived urban plans, have sprawled in the peripheral
neighbourhoods of the city. Today, wealthier residents are
largely located in specific neighbourhoods such as Manshia,
Riyad, Taif, Amarat, Khartoum 2, Garden City, Kafuri,
Mohandiseen and a few other wealthy suburbs, such as Soba
Hilla's Golf Course and the gated communities emerging there
and in Burri. The urban poor of Khartoum, which a recent
study led by UN-Habitat puts at approximately 60% of the
total population (Murillo et al., 2008), are instead scattered
in and around the city in low-density areas, squatter areas,
older villages in the outlying areas of the city, crowded spaces
near markets and in formally designated IDP camps. A recent
study estimated that IDPs in Khartoum comprise between
18% and 23% of the population (Jacobsen, 2008). Figures
released by the Government of Sudan (GoS) in April 2010
indicate that 623,667 IDPs live in Greater Khartoum. This is
in addition to 2m residents of Khartoum are thought to
be IDPs (Delhaas, 2006).

IDPs and poor migrants have concentrated in particular areas
(see Table 2 and Figure 2 below). Four sites – Wad El-Bashir,
Omdurman El-Salam, Jebel Awlia and Mayo Farm – are officially
designated as IDP camps, in addition to several unplanned
areas which the authorities regard as squatter settlements.
IDP camps were created in 1991 but since then they have
become an indivisible part of the city, which has grown over
and around them. Populations in the camps, irregular sites
and ‘relocation areas’ such as El-Fatih (discussed in Chapter
6.1 below) now comprise a mix of IDPs, poor migrants and

---

### Table 1: Breakdown of urban poor populations living in Khartoum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IDP camps</th>
<th>Squatter areas (plus renting)</th>
<th>Villages (plus renting)</th>
<th>Low-income neighbourhoods</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Estimated area</td>
<td>Estimated population</td>
<td>Density/inhabited hectare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18km², 1,800 ha</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15km², 1,500 ha</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38km², 3,800 ha</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12km², 1,200 ha</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94.5km², 9,450 ha</td>
<td>2,100,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Murillo et al., 2008.

### Table 2: Khartoum areas with high concentration of IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Formal IDP camps</th>
<th>Irregular settlements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1) Mandela, Mayo Farm</td>
<td>1) Haj Yousif</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2) Qor El-Salam Jebel Awlia</td>
<td>2) Soba area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3) Wad El-Bashir, Omdurman</td>
<td>3) El-Fatih City, Khartoum N.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4) Dar El-Salam, Omdurman</td>
<td>4) Dar El-Salam, Omdurman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5) Marzoug</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6) Abu-Zeid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7) Dar El-Salam, Khartoum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8) El-Bugaah, Omdurman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Bannaga, 2002.

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3 A third category includes old ‘middle’ housing areas such as Sahafa, Shajara, Sajjana, Thawrah, Shaabiya, Mazad, Imtidad, Fitaihab, Umbadda and Kalakla. These constitute a category of their own that cannot be included among either ‘wealthy’ or ‘poor’ neighbourhoods.
other urban poor. In response, new relocation sites have been designated alongside the old planned areas. Such sites, ostensibly designed to relieve pressure on the overcrowded camps by allocating plots on the furthest edges of the city, have often received IDPs forcibly relocated from areas where they had originally settled.

The painful and complicated history of camps and irregular sites in Khartoum is often reflected in the names given to these locations by the communities that live there. One example is El-Salam Camp, which is invariably referred to as ‘jabarona’, meaning ‘we were forced’. The government has sought to replace pejorative names. One example is Karor (‘rubbish’), which now goes by the name of Al-Baraka (‘blessing’). A detailed list of old and new names is provided in Table 3 (page 6).

Limited official tracking and the lack of a system of IDP registration in Khartoum have made the identification of IDPs as a distinct category an impossible task. Census results provide no clearer picture. UN figures are around 1–1.2m (Brumat, 2010), but this represents a conventional estimation rather than a precise statistical reference. In addition, several interviewees conventionally defined as ‘IDPs’ did not see themselves as such. This protracted, complex, urban situation raises important questions particularly in relation to whether an exclusive ‘internal displacement lens’ is still appropriate, or whether it would be more appropriate to pay attention to broader structural issues of urban poverty, with a focus on all communities, including women, minorities and others lacking representation in the planning and management of their lives. At the same time, however, given the widespread vulnerabilities affecting these communities it would be premature to terminate assistance to IDPs in need of protection. The reality is that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between supposedly different categories of unprotected persons.

Figure 2: Map of IDP camps in Khartoum State

Khartoum’s population also comprises a large number of refugees (UNHCR, 2007). During the 1960s and 1970s the Eritrean war of independence pushed a large number of Eritreans and Ethiopians into Sudan, many of them to cities and towns including Khartoum (Kibreab, 1996). By 1984 over 1m Ethiopian refugee families were thought to be living in Khartoum (Weaver, 1985). Today refugees are scattered around several areas of Khartoum. Neighbourhoods such as Deim host a large number of refugees of Eritrean and Ethiopian origin.

2.3 Drivers of urbanisation

Throughout the first half of the twentieth century Khartoum attracted a growing number of people from rural areas thanks to the economic and educational opportunities it offered. Migration significantly accelerated after Sudan’s independence, when colonial restrictions on freedom of movement were lifted. The Passport and Permits Ordinance of 1922, which treated the migration of Southern Sudanese to the North as a punishable offence, was repealed, allowing the movement of large numbers of people from the South to Khartoum.

Seasonal migration to Khartoum also brought many thousands to the capital. However, since the 1970s the city's population growth has largely been driven by internal displacement. A series of natural disasters, including a severe drought and famine in the 1970s and early 1980s in the west and east, resulted in the arrival of thousands of IDPs, including as many as 120,000 from Darfur and Kordofan in the mid-1980s. Meanwhile, during the North–South civil wars of 1956–1972 and 1983–2005, millions of IDPs from the South and the Three Areas moved northwards, with many seeking refuge in Khartoum (Assal, 2008). The conflict in Darfur has generated a further influx of IDPs, but little accurate information is available on how many have fled to the city since the outbreak of the war in 2002. The conflict in Eastern Sudan between 1995 and 2006 did not result in large-scale displacement to the capital; most displaced people sought refuge in Eastern urban centres, particularly Port Sudan, Kassala and Atbara in River Nile State.

The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005, ending the conflict between the North and the South, saw intense efforts to help displaced populations in Khartoum return to their areas of origin through a large-scale programme led by the UN, the Government of National Unity (GNU) and the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). However, limited access to services, as well as economic and security reasons, meant that many who did return to the South after the CPA have since moved back to Khartoum, or are maintaining multi-spatial families and assets in both Khartoum and their areas of origin (Pantuliano et al., 2008).

Sudan has also received large numbers of migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries, many of whom have made their way to Khartoum. While the volume of refugees in general has decreased in recent years, in 2007 UNHCR estimated that there were still 31,900 refugees and asylum-seekers in the city, mainly Eritreans and Ethiopians (UNHCR, 2007). Somali refugees are also reported to be on the increase (Brumat, pers. comm.).

### Table 3: Names of camps and irregular sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Karor</td>
<td>Rubbish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Bugaah Karor</td>
<td>Rubbish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jabarona</td>
<td>We were forced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>Named after the May revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zagalona</td>
<td>They threw us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Niyan</td>
<td>The father of fair</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duium Bahri</td>
<td>The Bahri ‘hoods’/’ghettos’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eshash Fallata</td>
<td>Eshash means shanty houses and Fallata is a collective Sudanese designation for West African tribes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahri Kober</td>
<td>Bahri near Kober prison</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Baraka</td>
<td>Blessing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Manarah</td>
<td>Lighthouse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Salam</td>
<td>Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Nasr</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thawra 15</td>
<td>Revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Rashideen</td>
<td>Wise men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Engaz North and South</td>
<td>Salvation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Nozha</td>
<td>Picnic or one-day getaway/excursion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omer El-Mokhtar</td>
<td>Named after the leader of the Libyan revolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Study data.
Chapter 3
The policy context

Sudan’s rapid urbanisation is heavily influenced by the policy context in which it is taking place. This chapter reviews the policies put in place by the government to deal with the concentration of people in specific cities and towns, particularly with regard to infrastructure, land acquisition, poverty alleviation, employment creation and safety net mechanisms. While drawing on Khartoum’s experience, the issues and analysis highlighted in this section are also of relevance to other parts of the country.4

3.1 Urban development plans in Khartoum

Several national strategic plans have been developed over the past six decades. These include the Fifteen-Year Plan (1977–82); the Comprehensive National Strategy (1992–2002); and the Sudan 25-Year Strategy (2007–2033), which is broken into five-year phases. None of these plans has directly addressed the question of urbanisation.5

Specific urban development plans for Khartoum have also been developed, with the first dating from the early years of the twentieth century, during the British colonial administration. The first post-independence master plan was drawn up in 1960 by an international agency, Dioxidais, which later became involved in the third master plan in collaboration with Abdelmonem Mustafa Associates. The intervening master plan of 1975 was written by the Italian company MEFFIT, and another master plan was drawn up in 2000. None of these different plans has been implemented. A fragile economy, ineffective government institutions, environmental problems, conflict and vested economic and political interests are among the key factors behind their failure. The inability to implement plans has led to uncontrolled urban sprawl and land misuse. A former State Governor of Khartoum, Ismail Al-Mutaafi, tried to develop a new plan to put an end to irregularities in land use in Khartoum, the Khartoum Structural Plan (2007–2033). The MPPPU was entrusted with the preparation of the plan, which was designed by MEFFIT between 2007 and 2010. The plan was developed on the basis of wide consultations and in collaboration with academic institutions in Sudan. The main aim of the plan is to integrate different neighbourhoods by connecting the various parts of the city with road networks and transport systems.6 A key government aim is also to ensure that current patterns of ethnic concentration in the city are broken up.

The plan’s main objective is to ease congestion in the centre, remove squatter settlements and replace them with so-called ‘popular housing’, and relocate government institutions, military barracks and educational institutions to the city’s periphery. Additionally, the plan emphasises the importance of extending services to rural areas on the fringes of the city, to accompany investment to increase the efficiency of agricultural production, microfinance support for urban families and support to key industries. The plan also aims to curb the environmental pollution generated by population growth, including stipulations that no new project can be approved unless an environmental impact assessment is carried out. Longstanding land issues are expected to be tackled through the incorporation of provisions for legal reform and prioritising land use and allocation. However, the plan targets the economic development of certain areas but fails to address the underlying causes of urban poverty and the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable. Although the cost of housing is expected to fall under the plan, land prices will remain unaffordable for the urban poor.

The plan has been approved by Khartoum’s State Cabinet. The second step is to have it approved by the federal cabinet, and finally the national parliament. Once it is approved by parliament, the plan will become law. This is the first time that a master plan will have been officially endorsed at executive and legislative levels. While the plan is a long-term strategy, the government has already started to implement projects that address immediate and short-term needs, including water, roads and other services. In theory, no projects in the city can be undertaken outside of the plan, but according to the Executive Director of the MPPPU-Khartoum Urban Development Planning Strategy, a number of projects currently being implemented were not originally included in the plan, and it will be difficult to reconcile them with the plan later on. Furthermore, the government itself is hampering implementation, often as a result of conflicting interests between different government institutions, and at times within the same institution, particularly in relation to land use. Some residents will inevitably be unhappy with certain aspects of the plan, particularly as they see their land (residential or agricultural) being expropriated to build roads and bridges and for large agricultural schemes. While the MPPPU Executive Director has stressed that demolition of residential areas will be avoided as far as possible, in the immediate term communities in Al-Giraif East, Al-Halfaya in Bahri, Al-Salha and Al-Hattana in Omdurman, and parts of Khartoum including the historic residential centre of Tuti Island and the Nile Bank areas of Al-Shajara, will be directly affected by the construction of roads and bridges. While

4 There are ambitions to replicate the Khartoum Master Plan in other states (interview with Faiz Abbas, Khartoum State’s Advisor for Structural Plan, June 2010). A Master Plan for Nyala has already been developed and has been endorsed by the South Darfur Legislative Council.
5 Interview with Dr. Gamal Mahmoud Hamid, Dean, Faculty of Architecture, University of Khartoum, June 2010.
6 Interview with the Executive Director of the MPPPU, June 2010.
the government intends to offer compensation, this usually does not reflect current market prices for land. The Ministry of Urban Development is establishing a Conflict Resolution Unit that will negotiate with affected residents and look at compensation modalities.

Harmonisation will also inevitably be a challenge. To address problems, Implementation Offices are envisaged in every locality to coordinate MPPPU activities with local authorities and other ministries, as well as with the Popular Committees (see Chapter 4), but most interviewees were sceptical about the capacity of the Implementation Offices to effectively coordinate between bodies with very different interests and agendas. Another major challenge concerns the financial cost of implementation. The overall budget for the plan is estimated at $9 billion. Khartoum State is supposed to provide funding, with some central government support, but it is unrealistic to expect the whole amount to be mobilised rapidly. Interviews with the relevant authorities emphasised that help from the international community would be essential, but donors in Khartoum seem reluctant to offer support.

3.2 Refugee and IDP policies

Given the key role that displacement has played in urbanisation in Khartoum, the policy framework for addressing the issue has, to date, been insufficient. With respect to refugees, the main policy document is the 1974 Refugee and Asylum Act. This is an outdated document. The Commission of Refugees (COR) acknowledges the deficiencies in the Act, and a committee representing the ministries of Justice and Humanitarian Affairs, COR and Sudan Intelligence has been formed to review it. New legislation is with the presidency for approval.

Currently, the COR categorises refugees as follows:

- Refugees who are accommodated in camps, particularly in Eastern Sudan (Kassala State). The camps are managed by UNHCR, which provides health, water and education services and cooperates with other actors to support community and area-based livelihood interventions.
- Urban refugees who live in the towns of Eastern Sudan (Kassala, Aroma and Khashm El-Girba and Port Sudan) and Khartoum. Urban refugees share limited services with nationals in the towns where they live, and since UNHCR does not provide services and assistance to urban refugees, this category is seen as a burden on urban residents. COR does not allow NGOs to work with refugees, either directly or through UNHCR.

Since 2004, the number of asylum-seekers has significantly increased. An estimated 43,600 people between 12 and 30 years of age have sought asylum in Sudan, a large number of them to escape compulsory military service in Eritrea. The COR considers asylum-seekers illegal and they are subject to periodic round-ups by the police as part of operations aimed at curbing illegal migration. If caught they are detained and then deported. Through COR, UNHCR has access to detention centres and is often able to intercede on behalf of individuals who have a UNHCR/COR registration card. This represents only a very small minority of the asylum-seekers and migrants who are forcibly deported. Arab nationals are not considered refugees under the Cairo Declaration of 1991, though in recent years the Sudanese government has started to rethink its policy, mainly because of the situation in Iraq.

Although Sudan is party to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1969 African Union (AU) Protocol, the GoS has ratified a formal reservation on Article 26 rejecting freedom of movement for refugees. Refugees are expected to reside in camps in the east of the country or in Darfur, and it is illegal for them to travel to cities without the permission of the COR. Even so, interviews with UNHCR conducted for this study indicate that only an estimated one-third of refugees stay in camps, while the rest find their way to urban areas, particularly Khartoum, Kassala and Port Sudan. Because the state authorities consider their presence in the cities illegal, urban refugees are particularly vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Without legal papers they are unable to sign leases, open bank accounts, cash cheques or seek formal employment (Jacobsen, 2008). Indeed, respondents told us that refugees have not been formally allowed to work since the issuance of a Labour Decree in 2008, which makes the attainment of a work permit extremely difficult. Work permits for refugees are now issued by the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) instead of the Labour Office. When refugees apply for a work permit, they are asked to present their qualifications and supporting documents, only to be told that their skills and qualifications are widely available and that there are no job opportunities. This leaves many qualified refugees working in menial jobs in the informal sector.

Refugees invariably present a subset of vulnerability amid the urban poor. They are often dispersed throughout the capital and are visible only in the informal service sector, where many are bound by exploitative ties to the agents who secured their employment or the families which employ them. Interviews with refugees suggest that Ethiopian and Eritrean women are particularly at risk, and are forced to work for very long hours for little pay. Some are sexually harassed by their employers. Women refugees told us they would rather not seek support from the authorities for fear of being harassed by unscrupulous policemen or officials.

As the mandated UN agency, UNHCR is responsible for the provision of assistance and protection to all refugees in the country, including those living in the urban centres of Sudan. However, the lack of a country-wide policy on urban refugees leaves them without effective protection. For example, UNHCR lawyers who interview refugees detained in urban centres to ascertain their status are not able to intervene to any significant degree to provide or advocate for better protection.
Sudan’s policy stance on IDPs is more developed. Although the government has not recognised the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998), high-level policy discussions and policy documents have outlined the rights of IDPs in a manner that is consistent with the Guiding Principles. Sudan is also a signatory to the International Conference of the Great Lakes Pact and its protocols, including the Protocol on Protection and Assistance to IDPs (2006), and has endorsed, though not signed and ratified, the AU Convention on Protection and Assistance to IDPs in Africa (2009). Between the end of 2008 and May 2009, possibly due to its participation in the Kampala AU convention meeting, the Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs drafted a ‘National IDP Policy’ that was eventually approved by the Cabinet. The policy is broad and gives little consideration to local integration (Brumat, pers. comm.).

One of the problems facing policy-makers in Khartoum is that no one knows how many displaced people there are in the city. While the UN puts the figure of IDPs still in Khartoum at around 1–1.2m (Brumat, 2010), this is as we have seen very much an estimate. Moreover, many people who might conventionally fit the category of ‘displaced’ do not in fact regard themselves as such. IDPs find themselves in a variety of different situations – some are registered in camps, some are unregistered in squatter settlements, some are in newly planned areas and relocation sites and some have been in the city for a generation or more.

As noted in Chapter 2, following the CPA in 2005 a large number of IDPs returned to the South and the Three Areas. Limited services, growing insecurity, restricted livelihoods opportunities and difficulties in accessing land have forced a large but unknown number back to Khartoum. Many, particularly young people born in Khartoum, who speak fluent Arabic and are used to the lifestyle of the capital, are reluctant to start a new life in the South and have decided to remain in the city. Following the referendum on the South’s future due in January 2011, there is a possibility that Southerners in the North may effectively become stateless. The official status of IDPs is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.1.

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8 The HAC-SRRC agreement on IDPs (HAC-SRRC, 2004). The IOM and GoS Management Coordination Mechanism (MCM) To Verify and Monitor Voluntary Returns (2004) and the Joint Verification Mechanism from October 2009 apply to Darfur only.
Chapter 4
Governance and leadership in urban areas

4.1 Formal governance

4.4.1 Structure and duties of the Khartoum State government

According to the Local Government Act of 1991, amended in 2003, the formal local government system of Khartoum State is composed of the following four main levels (adapted and updated from Hamid, 2002):

1. The Wilaya (state). This is the main power base at the sub-national level. It is led by a Wali (governor). Khartoum State has an elected legislative assembly which approves its legislation and budgets and oversees the performance of its various ministries and departments.

2. The Mahaliya (locality). This is the second level down and is headed by a Muatamad (commissioner). There are seven localities in Khartoum State: Khartoum and Jebel Awlia in Khartoum City, Sharq El-Nil and Bahri in Khartoum North City and Omdurman, Umhadda and Karari in Omdurman. The functions of the Muatamad range from political oversight to coordination and security. The Muatamad has no direct executive or legislative functions or intrinsic powers other than coordination between the units of the administration or those delegated from the Wali. The Mahaliya’s executive functions are in the hands of the executive director, who is assisted by technocrats and civil servants who may not necessarily be residents of the Mahaliya, but are seconded from their agencies at the Wilaya or national level to oversee local health, education and public works systems.

Every Mahaliya has an official sub-budget coming from its own revenues, as well as some funds allocated by the Wilaya. In most cases, however, very few funds are transferred from the Wilaya to the Mahaliya. The Mahaliya’s funding sources include property taxes, sales taxes, 40% of locally generated income taxes, taxes on locally manufactured products, income from investments, rents, licences and permits, donations and transfers from the state government. Furthermore, the Mahaliya can also raise additional funds from its residents through specific charges, taxes, rents or land sales. Throughout the 1990s, most of the Mahaliya’s funds were collected from charges imposed on essential commodities such as sugar. When the GoS removed sugar from the list of rationed goods in 1999 the Popular Committees and most Mahaliyaat lost an important source of revenue.

The revenues generated by the Mahaliya are almost always insufficient to cover expenditures, either because the Mahaliya has a thin resource base or because of inefficient tax collection and evasion. In the absence of adequate and timely transfers from the Wilaya, or even the national government, all seven localities of Khartoum State struggle to perform their functions and sometimes even to pay their employees. Some Mahaliyaat receive grants or donations directly from the Sudanese president, his deputies or the central government for particular projects or on special occasions.

3. The Alwiha al-Idaria (Administrative Unit). These are the levels of government administration that deal directly with communities. Each Mahaliya is composed of a number of urban and rural Administrative Units (AUs). Each AU has an elected legislative council, which in turn elects an executive body. The AU is entrusted with a wide range of responsibilities: political, security, economic, financial, educational, social, public works and public health.

4. The Lajna Sha’biya (Popular Committee) is an elected body of volunteers that administers the affairs of a neighbourhood within an AU. At this lowest level of the administrative-political structure, each geographical unit forms a public forum in which adult residents can discuss local affairs, elect a Popular Committee composed of 20–30 members for a two-year term and approve its programmes. Broadly speaking, Popular Committees can be seen as the expression of the main political parties, notably the SPLA and the National Congress Party (NCP), and in some areas there are informal ‘power-sharing agreements’. The forum has two regular annual meetings. However, the neighbourhood may call for a special meeting to address an emergency or to vote to replace an ineffective committee.

Popular Committees have numerous responsibilities, including monitoring and supervising the performance of agencies and service departments operating within their boundaries, service provision, community mobilisation for self-help projects and encouraging people to participate in political events such as rallies and the collection of donations for the Popular Defence Forces. Through surveillance and regular reporting Popular Committees also assist the police. Popular Committees are not executive agencies, and have no implementation mechanisms. Their role is largely limited to supervision and surveillance, issuing residency certificates and mobilising communities.

9 The last elected wali for Khartoum State was chosen in April 2010.
The Popular Committees work in tandem with the AUs and the localities and are used by them to collect and disseminate information, collect charges and fees and distribute rationed goods and zakat (obligatory Islamic alms) to the needy. To finance their activities, Popular Committees depend on funds raised locally from fees on residency certificates, income from their own investments or compulsory donations collected from local businesses and households.

4.2 Effectiveness of Khartoum’s governance system

Sudan’s highly decentralised governance system does not appear to result in greater effectiveness in terms of basic services and urban development in Khartoum. Progress in these areas largely depends on how locality leaders respond to the issues facing their constituencies. In FGDs in Al-Thawrah and Al-Buqaa in Omdurman, Jabel Awlia in Khartoum and Haj Youssif in Khartoum North, people observed that Popular Committees, and even the Mahaliyaat, did not seem to care for the people they were supposed to serve. Interviewees saw them as political bodies chosen by the government according to political affiliation, and therefore more interested in political organisation than community issues. The Committees were also perceived as playing a role in facilitating control over communities and maintaining security.

The Popular Committees are uniquely placed to work as a trait d’union between communities and the government at locality and state levels, given that they operate in close contact with both. This should enable them to raise local issues with the government. However, communities interviewed felt that important environmental, health and education issues were being ignored. They listed examples such as the presence of mosquitoes, lack of garbage collection, lack of drainage and leaking of the water network as instances where the Popular Committees had failed. It is however worth mentioning that delays in the transfer of resources from the Wilaya or the national government leave the AUs and the Popular Committees with inadequate resources to perform their functions. Communities felt that the multiplicity of local entities had also resulted in exceptionally high costs in terms of office space, salaries, vehicles and equipment and operating and running costs.

4.3 Informal systems of governance

4.3.1 Native Administration

The waves of displacement into Khartoum generated by the wars in the South and in Darfur have seen the emergence of dual governance structures. IDPs are often accompanied on their journey by their Native Administrators. Native Administrators in Khartoum have frequently found themselves in dispute with the formal local government administration over the control of IDPs. The government cannot afford to grant them the authority they had enjoyed in their areas of origin and cannot afford to pay them as formal administrators. The Native Administration was introduced by the colonial regime. Abolished in 1970, the system was reintroduced in the 1990s, albeit with important changes. Native Administrators today are political appointees and are often seen by their communities as elitist and oblivious to the concerns of the tribe.
The Native Administrators have therefore continued to perform their traditional duties without pay. This has left them overburdened, as many have had to find additional sources of livelihoods (although some community leaders do receive a salary from the locality).

Despite the lack of clarity over functions and budgets, the Native Administration system in Khartoum plays a significant role, both in IDP areas and in old neighbourhoods such as El-Gireif Shariq in Khartoum North and Tutu Island in Khartoum. The Sultan of Angola in Mandela, Mayo, told us that the Native Administration was an integral part of the community, and that its role was to resolve social problems and settle disputes, and organising and offering counselling in matters of marriage and divorce. In Hilla Jadida, Omdurman, the Native Administration has its own court to resolve disputes. The role of the Native Administration's courts is widely acknowledged, to the extent that the police occasionally send people to them as cases can be dealt with more rapidly.

4.3.2 Community organisations

Community organisations are important social assets in Khartoum State, particularly in peripheral areas and in IDP camps. Communities have become increasingly reliant on these organisations as basic service providers. Members of community organisations interviewed during the study felt that they had a responsibility to develop safety nets for their own communities. CBOs and NGOs (youth and women's organisations, religious bodies and Native Administration systems) largely focus on the immediate needs of the communities in which they work, and their activities usually revolve around public health, education and training programmes. CBOs are often managed by active local individuals and are recognised as autonomous bodies.

CBOs and local NGOs are found in all areas of the Three Cities. In El-Fatih youth and women's groups act as mediators to resolve local conflicts and as informal paralegals. They are active in each block (30 in total), and are supported by a UNDP-funded programme implemented by the local NGO Co-existence. In Hilla Jadida informal committees such as mosque building committees and traders' associations work closely with Mahalyia officials, and unofficially collect taxes on their behalf.

Local NGOs focus on interventions aimed at improving living conditions through infrastructure investment and education. Over the years these efforts have attracted development assistance. Many NGOs are organised into local networks, such as the Sudan Micro-Finance Network (which includes 100 local NGOs), the Sudan Educational and Development Network (16 NGOs), the Southern Sudan Civil Society Organisations for Peace and Reconciliation and the Sudan Aid Network.
Chapter 5
The urban economy and livelihoods

Oil exports and real estate are the two main drivers of Khartoum's economy. By 2006, levels of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Sudan, particularly from the Gulf states, were among the highest in Africa. A significant proportion of this was focused on Khartoum (Abdel Ati, 2009). Since the discovery of oil in the 1980s, oil exports have acquired increasing prominence. In 2008 oil accounted for a staggering 95% of Sudan's total exports (ibid.). China, Malaysia and India have significant stakes in the oil industry (Switzer, 2002). Whilst the oil and real estate industries offer employment opportunities and sustainable livelihoods for a limited number of skilled and educated Sudanese, the manual jobs that these sectors could potentially have generated for unskilled Sudanese are generally in the hands of foreign workers, especially Chinese.

Khartoum has long been Sudan's primary industrial, commercial and manufacturing hub. Agriculture (in Khartoum State) is also a significant part of the economy, alongside industries and services including transport, telecommunications and management consultancies (Abdalla, 2008). In the early 1980s over 75% of industrial activity was located in Khartoum and Central regions (ILO, 1987; in UNDP, 2006). During the 1990s, 73% of national industries, 75% of the overall industrial labour force, 85% of commercial enterprises and 80% of banking services were concentrated in Khartoum (Ali, 1990: 82; Ahmed, 1997, in Eltayeb, n.d.). In 2001, two-thirds of Sudanese manufacturing establishments were in Khartoum (UNDP, 2006). Local manufacturing industries have however been performing poorly, significantly limiting their capacity to generate employment (UNDP, 2006). Heavy taxes increase production costs and make it difficult for local industries to compete with imports (Abdalla, 2008). Many factories are operating below full capacity (ibid.).

Massive influxes of displaced people into Khartoum since the 1980s have put a huge strain on an already poorly performing urban economy, and have increased competition for the scarce opportunities in the labour market. At the same time the cost of living in Khartoum has risen substantially (ibid.). Commodities, food and services costs have soared. Subsistence costs have also been steadily increasing. Whereas in the early 1990s SDG 4 ($1.60) would have been a sufficient daily subsistence income, the findings of our study indicate that an average family now needs around SDG 15 ($6.20) to cover basic necessities. The average daily wage is between SDG 10 ($4.10) and SDG 20 ($8.20). The majority of the people interviewed for this study said that household expenditures for health and education generally exceeded spending on food. While malnutrition levels in Khartoum are better than in the country as a whole, with the average for severely underweight under-55 reportedly at 3.7%, against 9.4% nationwide (SHHS, 2007), food insecurity is a hidden feature of urbanisation. Many interviewees said that, compared to the rural areas from which they had come, the urban environment was much more insalubrious and the quality of their diet much worse.

5.1 Urban livelihoods

5.1.1 Subsistence livelihoods and the informal sector

The exponential growth of the informal sector has been a natural response to escalating unemployment rates and poorly performing local industries. Recent estimates suggest that the informal sector accounts for around 45% of the urban labour force in Khartoum (Abdalla, 2006). Men in the Deim area (Khartoum City), for example, work in car repair or blacksmithing, drive rickshaws or taxi or sell goods in local markets. In the outlying and more impoverished neighbourhoods, particularly Qur El-Salam (Jebel Awlia), El-Salam (Omdurman) and Mayo (south Khartoum), informal work seems to be on the increase. Male participants in FGDs spoke of being ‘self-employed’ or working irregular hours over several days to earn a single day's wage. Women appear to be increasingly the primary breadwinners for their families, and are often involved in multiple income-generating activities ranging from food sales and domestic labour to the production of araki and marissa (home-brewed alcohol) and prostitution. Interviews in Mandela, the market centre of Mayo, and in Soba Aradi revealed that alcohol production, which under Sharia law is illegal, leaves women vulnerable to harassment and raids by the police, who demand on-the-spot fines (bribes, essentially) and confiscate stock in exchange for letting the brewer off.

Prostitution, which is still perceived in Khartoum as the domain of Ethiopian refugees, has become increasingly prevalent among Southerners in the capital, as well as in other groups including Northern tribes. In the more remote camp areas of Omdurman, interviews with communities indicated that women engaging in commercial sex work earned an average of SDG 5 (approximately $2.30) per sexual encounter. One informant spoke of an increasing trend of ‘survival prostitution’, in which women receive money and goods or food in exchange for sex. The study team was also told that in some cases university students are starting to turn to sex work to fund their studies.

Unskilled Sudanese face increasing competition from foreigners in the job market. Sudanese law in principle prohibits the employment of foreigners in any job that can be filled by local workers. However, the government has adopted a policy of

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11 This average figure disguises disparities between the centre and outskirts of Khartoum (Asha Elkarib, pers. comm.).
allowing foreigners to work as unskilled labourers. The impact on the livelihoods of the urban poor, including the displaced, was highlighted repeatedly during the FGDs conducted for this study, particularly in Al-Thawrah, a historically middle-class area of Omdurman. Participants highlighted a sudden massive influx of Egyptians working in skilled trades such as plumbing, carpentry and in the construction sector following the Four Freedoms Agreement between Sudan and Egypt in 2004. Similar concerns were raised by informants in El-Shajara, a neighbourhood on the east bank of the White Nile, who were especially concerned about the recent influx of Ethiopian workers to fill jobs previously held by Sudanese. Their employers believed that Sudanese workers lacked the work ethic of foreign labourers, and only stopped employing foreign workers when tensions between Sudanese and their Ethiopian counterparts threatened to escalate. Residents in the area, particularly those working in the agricultural strips along the Nile, reported that a growing number of Chinese labours were being employed in infrastructure projects.

As far as skilled labour is concerned, there has been considerable national and international investment aimed at improving the educational infrastructure and increasing the number of college graduates overall. However, educational opportunities have not been matched with jobs for graduates. Despite government investment in higher education facilities (26 universities were built during the mid-1990s, both the private and public sectors struggle to absorb graduates, and the majority are forced to find employment in the informal sector. The large number of mini-van taxi (amjad) drivers with a university education is a stark reminder of this reality.

Control and access to power and economic opportunities were consistently linked to the ruling party. Many interviewees in poor neighbourhoods mentioned NCP membership as one of their main survival strategies. Certain neighbourhoods are known to provide government supporters for rallies, in exchange for food. Their employers believed that Sudanese workers lacked the work ethic of foreign labourers, and only stopped employing foreign workers when tensions between Sudanese and their Ethiopian counterparts threatened to escalate. Residents in the area, particularly those working in the agricultural strips along the Nile, reported that a growing number of Chinese labours were being employed in infrastructure projects.

Poor communities living in Khartoum have developed a variety of self-reliance strategies. One such, which is also widely used by lower-middle class groups, is the establishment of Takafol Sandouqs or currency pools, into which each member pays a certain amount. Members have sequential access to the pool, which they usually access to start a small business, pay education fees or in the event of ill-health or loss of income. The idea of sandouq is built on trust and the mechanism collapses if any member fails to honour their obligation to pay back money in time for the next member to access the funds. As such a sandouq is usually created by a group of people who know and trust each other; members are often related or close friends. The level of organisation of sandouqs varies, from local women's groups to structured savings accounts in better-off areas. Contributions reportedly vary from SDG 10 ($4.10) to SDG 30 ($12.30) a month. Tribal support mechanisms also provide an important safety net.

For the most vulnerable, survival strategies include scavenging for food in dumps. One dump south of Mandela (Mayo camp, Khartoum Locality in Khartoum City) known as ‘Kosha’, has reportedly become a source of food for many poor people. The dump, created in 2008, was intended as a site for the destruction of expired food. Interviews indicated that access to the site depended on payment of an entrance fee of SDG 0.5 ($0.20); a trolley of foodstuffs costs approximately SDG 5 ($2.07). There were also reports that expired food from the site was being sold in markets, particularly in Souq Alfarin and Souq Ghaboush. Children are regularly seen scavenging in the dumps.

5.1.2 Remittances and financial linkages
Families with marginal livelihoods often support, and are supported by, a complicated network of remittances, both within Khartoum and internationally. For refugees with families living in other countries, particularly Eritrea and Ethiopia, the trend is to send remittances back to the country of origin. Conversely, Sudanese families rely heavily on remittance payments from relatives working in more affluent countries. Of the families interviewed, however, the vast majority who practiced any form of remittance were sending money from Khartoum to their areas of origin, mostly in Southern Sudan.

Both refugees and IDPs rely on credit networks such as Hawala and Dahabshiil. Although international pressure on these financial networks, because of their presumed ties to terrorism, has made them increasingly difficult to access, they retain a central role in remittance economies. Many families told us that they purchase mobile phone credits, which can be transferred from mobile to mobile, and which receiving family members can then sell. This relatively new, informal mode of transfer has the dual benefit of being non-taxable and difficult to trace. It also allows for the easy transfer of funds to rural areas, where banks and wire services are not readily available. In recent years, this practice has caught the attention of several mobile service providers and relief agencies like WFP, who are working to launch systems through which mobile telephones could be used officially as a monetary instrument, sending and receiving payments without the need for cash transfers. WFP is also considering launching a food voucher programme, whereby vouchers would be sent directly to cellular telephones, and

12 The agreement gives Egyptians and Sudanese freedom of movement, residence, work and ownership in either country.

13 Hawala is an informal, trust-based transfer system widely used by Somalis worldwide for business transactions and remittances (Savage and Harvey, 2007; Horst, 2002).

14 Dahabshiil is one of the largest African money transfer and bank services businesses; see http://www.dahabshiil.com.
used to buy staples from designated merchants. Such forms of international assistance are however rare in Khartoum.

There have been attempts to provide microcredit and microfinance to small entrepreneurs engaged in subsistence livelihoods. These microcredit schemes have been met with mixed reviews. In Khartoum, recipients felt that the requirement to repay loans saddled them with an unjust financial burden, as they were used to receiving direct assistance from international NGOs without such conditions. Another major hurdle facing microfinance has been that the neediest are essentially barred from taking out loans. Technically, to receive credit from any official institution in Sudan one needs a national identity card, a birth certificate and an individually assigned credit identification number from the central bank. For many IDPs and refugees these preconditions are either impossible to fulfil or extremely expensive. Many displaced communities originating from rural areas are simply unaware of the importance of documents such as birth certificates.

Under the National Strategic Plan of 2007 the Central Bank of Sudan is supposed to establish a Microfinance Unit in order to provide microcredit for individuals and groups. However, the requirement to provide collateral against loans defeats one of the central purposes, namely to support populations that have no collateral to put up against a loan. Similarly, zakat (a government fund, although monies are drawn from communities) pays minimal amounts to recipients, and takes a long time to do so. For some zakat is seen as a burden. Petty traders complained that they had to pay zakat in order to renew their trading licences. In addition, people interviewed for this study generally felt that zakat was being collected from the poor to be given to the poor, thus defeating the redistributive philosophy underpinning the mechanism.

The degree to which microcredit is an appropriate intervention for impoverished neighbourhoods in and around Khartoum State remains questionable. In Mayo and Qur El-Salam (Jebel Awila), interviews with informants and FGDs indicated that their economic activities were not monetised, meaning that the limiting factor was not access to cash. Women in Mayo estimated that approximately half of their economic activity consisted of trade-in-kind or mutual assistance. As such, the provision of microcredit may be counterproductive.
Chapter 6
Land and housing

Land questions in Khartoum have been analysed in detail in a recent long-term study carried out by UN-Habitat in Khartoum State, which focused on spatial planning, land, housing, basic urban services and local economic development (Murillo et al., 2008). This chapter complements that study, building on the extensive fieldwork carried out by the research team with communities throughout Khartoum.

6.1 Managing Khartoum’s urban sprawl

As noted in Chapter 3, the government has tried to regulate the growth of Khartoum several times since independence, commissioning detailed master plans to update the original spatial plan drafted by the British colonial administration in 1912. As discussed above, however, these plans have all failed to contain urban sprawl and effectively regulate land use in the city.

Residential planning in Khartoum and other cities in Sudan has traditionally consisted of four zoning categories, now reduced to three. Criteria for categorisation reflect the economic status of an area’s inhabitants (Bannaga, 1996). Class 1 corresponds to affluent areas with large plots, Class 2 to a middle-class group using permanent and modern materials and Class 3 to low-income groups using sub-standard materials. This system was inherited from the colonial administration, which used it to implement social segregation policies that kept the poorest on the outskirts of the city. The abolition of the fourth grade in 1957 meant that people living in areas reclassified as three had to be able to build houses according to Class 3 specifications (e.g. with permanent materials) in order to keep their plot.15 The timing of the land lease for third-class plots (ten years, renewable for a further ten) has generally discouraged investment by the poor, who instead often decide to keep their plots empty. The timing restrictions seem particularly unfair when compared to those that apply to upper-income groups, who have respectively 30- (second class, renewable for another 20) or 50-year (first class, renewable for another 30) land leases.

The government’s urban planning strategy has three main components: replanning of squatter areas, preparing sites for communities affected by the replanning process and relocation of communities (Bannaga, 1996). Replanning and relocation may have potential long-term benefits as they ultimately aim to open up roads, expand services and spaces for social functions and markets and regularise housing through the granting of a land title, either in the replanned area itself or in the relocation site (ibid). However, in practice these processes have often carried immediate negative repercussions for the lives and livelihoods of a large number of urban poor. Furthermore, limited attention has been paid to preparing sites to host communities affected by the replanning process.

Relocations of communities and demolitions of houses are usually followed by the sale of land plots by the local authorities. Those who are unable to pay are relocated. de Geoffroy (2007) sees this as a way of legalising land ownership and moving the poorest populations further out to the outskirts of the city. Land in Khartoum is considered a public asset which only the government can lease out. This gives the state the opportunity to dispose of the land according to its goals for social development (Murillo et al., 2008). It is estimated that more than half of the urban poor living in camps or informal settlements have moved or been forced to move at least once since their arrival in Khartoum, and some up to three times as a result of government relocations. A 2008 study in Khartoum reported that, of 212

Table 4: Classification of residential areas in Khartoum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land class</th>
<th>Minimum plot size</th>
<th>Minimum standard of building materials</th>
<th>Maximum built-up area</th>
<th>Width of roads</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class 1</td>
<td>500m²</td>
<td>Permanent (bricks, cement, mortar)</td>
<td>2/3 of plot</td>
<td>10–40m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2</td>
<td>400m²</td>
<td>Bricks, cement, mortar, gishra (outer façade permanent materials, inner façade mud bricks)</td>
<td>2/3 of plot</td>
<td>10–40m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3</td>
<td>300m²</td>
<td>Gishra, galaose (mud)</td>
<td>2/3 of plot</td>
<td>10–40m</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4</td>
<td>200m²</td>
<td>Wood, cartons, grass</td>
<td>2/3 of plot</td>
<td>20m</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted from Bannaga, 1996: 9.

15 Construction on Class 3 plots technically has to take place within one year. The short period allowed for construction makes it difficult for the urban poor to acquire ownership of tenure over their plot, as most cannot afford to upgrade their houses in such a short time, and could potentially open people to the risk of expropriation if construction does not take place within the statutory time. The rule is however very rarely enforced by the authorities.
Repeated evictions, housing demolitions and relocations of IDP communities since 1991 (Jacobsen, 2008; Interagency Report, 2004: 14) have further disenfranchised and impoverished large sections of an already vulnerable population:

- 1994: replanning of Angola camp and demolition of about 16,000 homes. 8,000 households received plots, while the remaining 8,000 either settled in a squatter area near Salahin or moved elsewhere in Khartoum.
- 1998: replanning of Haj Yousif and subsequent demolition of all houses. Some 80% of residents whose houses were demolished received plots, and the remaining 20% had to move to squatter areas.
- 2003: start of replanning of IDP camps by the government. By November 2004, 40,000 homes had been demolished, as well as thousands of latrines.

A 2008 study reported that, of the estimated 665,000 IDPs who had been forcibly relocated since 1989, more than half were moved after 2004. The intensification of this trend in the run-up to the signing of the CPA in 2005 prompted the UN to press the government to adopt specific guidelines. In April 2007, the Governor of Khartoum State and the United Nations Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/HC/RC) co-signed the Guiding Principles on Relocation (GPR). These reaffirmed the commitment of the Khartoum State government to respect international laws and standards in the demolition and replanning of squatter settlements and IDP areas in Khartoum. The application of the guidelines was monitored by members of the Khartoum Protection Working Group (KPWG). Since the signing of the GPR there have been improvements in urban replanning and land allocation. In particular, the authorities have notified residents ahead of scheduled relocations and have largely refrained from using force in conducting demolitions (UNHCR, 2009a). In addition, they have avoided demolishing existing public infrastructure, such as schools and religious buildings, and have increased the involvement of communities in the replanning process.

The last large-scale relocation and demolition operation was carried out in Mayo between November 2008 and July 2009, both in the official IDP site (Mandela) and in the surrounding areas (Wehda). In 2009, UNHCR estimated that as many as 10,000 households had been affected. Many families had been living in the area for 20 years or more, though others had arrived more recently. A third of the families were allocated plots within the replanned area in Mayo, while other families were relocated to distant areas such as El-Fatih. Those households that were not eligible for land (see Section 6.2 below) were excluded from the allocation process. The slow pace of land allocation has created temporary homelessness (lasting up to seven months) and has caused a significant deterioration in living conditions for thousands of people, including a large number of children, particularly with regard to shelter and sanitation (UNHCR, 2009a).

Sites such as El-Fatih are a clear example of the impact that relocations have on the lives and livelihoods of affected communities. Perched on the very edge of the city, people in El-Fatih have often been relocated from squatter sites or IDP camps much closer to the city centre, and, as a result, have lost access to jobs and social networks. During FGDs people that had been relocated invariably reported a decline in their quality of life compared to their former squatter settlements. Those moving from areas in the south-west of the city, such as Soba, felt at a particular disadvantage because of the high transport costs they now face in order to access the city centre, amounting on average to 20–40% of daily income,\(^{18}\) with a staggering 95% of the population commuting for work. This has led to a growing trend whereby men stay in Khartoum during the week and return to the periphery only at weekends. Relocation areas also tend to lack access to basic services, despite the provisions of the GPR, which stipulates that people should not be relocated to new areas before basic services and adequate shelter are in place. Since most localities lack the funds to provide new services, this provision often remains unmet. As a result, many of those who have relocated to distant parts of the city return to their original squatter areas to continue livelihood activities within their pre-existing networks. Ironically, some end up squatting in social housing schemes newly built on the land they had to vacate.

The GPR have the potential to improve urban replanning in line with international standards and to reduce tensions between the authorities and affected communities. However, concrete steps to ensure the full adoption of the GPR remain lacking and, in the absence of any enforcement mechanism, the guidelines are unable to ensure that minimum standards in demolitions and replanning are met. To give them full effect, bolder efforts are clearly needed.

### 6.2 The land allocation process

De Geoffroy (2007) links the intensification of the relocations to the significant increase in commercial value of much of the land on which IDP camps and squatter settlements are located. The price of a plot of land in Haj Yusif, Khartoum North, for instance, has increased from SDG 100 ($41.30) during the early 1990s to SDG 30,000 ($12,390) today. Class 3 areas such as Gereif, Dar El-Salam, Halfaya, Kalakla and Salha have all seen the price of land increase substantially as

\(^{16}\) The KPWG is chaired by UNHCR, and includes UN agencies with a protection/human rights/rule of law mandate (UNHCR, UNICEF, IOM, UNDP) and NGOs supporting IDPs and other urban poor in Khartoum.

\(^{17}\) There was also an attempted relocation of portions of Soba Aradi in 2008, but it was met with aggressive resistance by the inhabitants and was abandoned.

\(^{18}\) The bus fare for a return trip from El-Fatih to El Salama (their previous location and also the site where their livelihood base is) via Sabreen and Khartoum centre is SDG 4.20 ($1.74).
a result of the nearby construction of transport infrastructure such as bridges.

Relocations are not limited to IDP camps and squatter areas. Residents in Halfaya, an old neighbourhood along the Nile where indigenous people mainly have freehold tenure, risk losing their land, including their farms, as the government plans to undertake investments in tourist infrastructure in this area, as per the Khartoum Structural Plan. Land has also been expropriated from freeholders in Shajara, also along the Nile, to allow for the construction of the Dibaseen Bridge and more investment for the tourist industry. Residents interviewed for this study felt that the compensation that they had been offered was inadequate. By contrast, residents in Salha considered generous the compensation they were offered for land expropriated for the new airport, although the process of receiving money from the Airport Compensation Committee had been delayed.

Many IDPs and migrants welcome urban planning decisions as they hope to be able to finally own land through plot allocations in relocation areas. People often move into an IDP camp or an unplanned settlement and set up a rakuba – a shelter made of branches, plastic sheets and cardboard – just before demolitions begin in the hope of getting access to legal title (Jacobsen, 2008). The process of receiving land is however costly, cumbersome and unclear. During interviews, communities complained of confusion surrounding charges and eligibility criteria. The issue of eligibility is closely connected with the official status of IDPs and other migrants. The government considers anyone registered up to 1997 an IDP and deems them eligible for a plot. In the eyes of the government, the distinction between IDPs and post-1996 arrivals helps separate those who are in real need of land from those who want to profit from the situation. This has raised questions with regard to the legal status of those who have not been classified as IDPs by the government, and their right to a plot of land (Inter-Agency Report, 2004).

Eligibility is predicated on the ability to provide official documents, including a Nationality Certificate, birth certificates for dependants, a marriage certificate, a death certificate in the case of widows inheriting their husband’s entitlement to land or children inheriting from their parents. However, most IDPs are unable to provide these documents, either because they have been left behind in their areas of origin or, more commonly, because they have never possessed them. For example, the great majority of heads of household born in rural areas in Western or Southern Sudan do not have birth certificates. The same applies to nationality and marriage papers. While all Sudanese can obtain a Nationality Certificate (essential to formalise land titles) in Khartoum, the procedure is long and expensive. In addition to paying SDG 40 ($16.50) for the certificate itself, people need to pay a local chief to stand as witness on their behalf. Marriage certificates are easier to obtain and cost SDG 30 ($12.40); age assessment certificates are SDG 40 each ($16.50).

Before 1997, many resident families received an official paper from the government called a dibaja (‘token’ or ‘badge’), which serves as proof of residence and land entitlement. The dibaja entitles the holder to participate in the allocation process, but s/he has to have given all other necessary documents to the Popular Committee, which maintains records of families provided with the dibaja. Those in possession of a dibaja and with all official documents in order can participate in a lottery organised by the MPPPU. The lottery entails additional costs, as families have to pay administrative fees amounting to a total of SDG 461 ($190.40) (SDG 200 or $82.60 to enter the lottery, a fee of SDG 161 or $66.84 for the MPPPU surveyor to demarcate the plot, and SDG 100 or $41.51 for the surveyor’s allowance). Those who lose their dibaja can have it replaced for an additional SDG 200 ($82.60). Other fees have to be paid to obtain the official deed from the MPPPU (reportedly between SDG 1,200 and 1,500 or $498.20 to $622.76, though interviewees quoted an average of SDG 3,000 or $1,245.52 and up to SDG 5,000 or $2,075.87 in El-Fatih, which were reportedly paid in instalments). Once the lottery has taken place, plots of about 220m² are demarcated by MPPPU surveyors, who then give the family a certificate called the shihadat misaha (surveying certificate).

In addition to the administrative costs attached to obtaining access to land, relocated families also have to shoulder all the costs for the construction of the building on the new plot. UN-Habitat estimates that more than 300,000 plots have been allocated in the last 50 years in Khartoum, with more than 273,000 going to residents of IDP and squatter areas (Murillo et al., 2008). However, almost 52% of these plots are uninhabited, largely because people cannot afford to build on them. People who have received a shihadat misaha often try to build something on the land, even if it is only a rakuba or a fence, to prevent the plot from being illegally occupied by others.

There are frequent allegations of corruption within the allocation process. In 2001 the Commissioner of Omdurman stopped land allocations in Salha because of irregularities, mainly duplications of land sales, and there are reports of deeds being misappropriated by Popular Committees and Land Office officials in El-Fatih and Mandela. People often sell their shihadat misaha or even the dibaja, a trend accelerated by the return of IDPs to the South following the signing of the CPA. Only those whose name is on the original documents can finalise land transactions and obtain a deed. This means that those who have purchased a shihadat misaha or a dibaja from someone else have to track down the original owners to act on their behalf. Likewise, people who have moved back to the South but have not sold their original documents need to return in person to see the process through. Those who cannot track down the original owners are placed in a special category called mulaji talab (literally ‘he who is submitting a request’), for whom a special solution has to be

19 Interviewees in El-Fatih mentioned that the SDG 161 fee has been replaced by a downpayment of 30% on the overall cost of the plot.
20 Other analysts consider this figure an underestimate and put the number of plots allocated in the last 50 years at 1.2m (Bannaga, pers. comm.).
negotiated. Another complicating factor for Southerners is that Christian names are often wrongly transliterated into Arabic on the dibaja or the shihadat misaha, leading to disputes over the validity of the document. Furthermore, the eligibility criteria are unclear for land plots for families who have been relocated but do not hold a dibaja.

During interviews for this study, no clarification could be obtained from the Land Office on the allocation process for post-1997 IDPs and other migrants being relocated. Some respondents said that the government had changed its policy after the CPA and had tried to facilitate access to plots for Southerners, in a bid to discourage their return to the South. Special Mobile Nationality Teams were reportedly put in place ahead of the elections to speed up the process of acquiring ID cards for IDPs. The promise of land and Sudanese nationality was apparently repeatedly made ahead of the elections in May.

Many Southerners indicated that the promise of a plot of land is a strong incentive for them to stay in Khartoum, especially given the obstacles to accessing new land in the South.21

6.3 Housing provision

If the internationally recognised measures (status of ownership, building materials, number of rooms, number of people per unit, existence of latrine, kitchen, external fence) are used to assess housing conditions, then Khartoum falls short, with 60% of existing housing in poor condition (UN-Habitat, 2008). UN-Habitat reports an overall deficit of more than 1.2m housing units in the city (equivalent to 22% of requirements) (ibid.), although this figure is seen as an exaggeration by others (Bannaga, pers. comm.). The vast majority of buildings go up without a permit; UN-Habitat reports that only 4,500 building permits are issued a year, against an annual demand of 60,000 units (Murillo et al., 2008).22

The majority of Khartoum’s urban poor rely on their own resources to construct their shelters, resulting in a proliferation of poor housing, sometimes legal, often illegal, based on varying degrees of self-help by the inhabitants. However, if such settlements are to contribute effectively to the resolution of the housing problem, they need to fit into a larger overall housing policy. Such a policy should ensure that sites for housing meet needs and are integrated into an overall pattern of land use, with access to employment, services and social opportunities. Access to housing finance is equally important, since it dictates how many people can obtain financing, and therefore who can build better housing.

Institutions that are capable of funding housing projects, such as the Central Bank, prohibited loans for this purpose until 2005 (Murillo et al., 2008). As a result, the overwhelming majority of the population (93%) live in simple houses, based on individual construction, 43% of which are shacks and mud rooms built with non-durable materials. The dangers of these weak constructions are most obvious in periods of heavy rain. Only 6.2% of the population of Khartoum live in flats and an even smaller percentage (0.3%) live in villas and luxurious houses (Murillo et al., 2008). Another noticeable trend is the high prevalence of empty plots, as people are unable to pool resources to start construction (UNHCR, 2009a). This is the case in relocation settlements and in camps. In both cases, IDPs and squatters can usually only afford to construct a single room, which keeps occupancy levels exceptionally high, at 1.2 to 1.4 rooms per family (ACORD, 2000).

For people in low-paid jobs in central locations and for those who earn an income from casual work or work that requires them to move constantly, renting is a better alternative to buying or constructing a house as it is cheaper and more flexible, given that it is possible to rent a room in a multi-storey building or even just a bed. In Haj Yousif (Khartoum North), renting a room costs SDG 150 per month ($60) and renting a house between SDG 400 ($150) and SDG 1,000 ($375) per month, whereas purchasing a house of zoom2 – the smallest size allowed – costs SDG 23,000 ($9,000). It is common to find

inner-city tenements and houses on illegal subdivisions, either for tenants or for owner-occupiers. Prices vary according to location, size, physical condition and form of tenure (Murillo et al., 2008). Many middle-class families rent out houses in desirable locations, usually to foreign companies, the UN and INGOs, and move to outlying areas. International organisations usually prefer to take over an entire building, leaving no room for the owners, but they pay high rents. Short-term renting is also increasingly common in middle-class areas. In Al-Thawrah, families rent out their homes while they travel abroad to Egypt and elsewhere. With the rental market in the area revitalised by the influx of Egyptian and Bangladeshi workers, rents range between $400–$600 and $5,000 per month. A growing number of middle-class families rely on rent to fund the completion of their own houses. Reversing the traditional habit of living in the lower floors and renting the upper, families instead rent out the completed lower floors and live on the floors above or elsewhere while the building is finished. In high-end areas and residential complexes like Arac, Saba’a and Rahaf, the cost of a house of about zoom3 is around SDG 1,000,000 ($370,000).

The urban poor tend to manage the construction of their homes on their own and rely heavily on family and communal relations, both human and financial, for help with construction. The same method is employed for the building of communal facilities, whether schools, markets or rain-water drainage channels (Murillo et al., 2008). In Wad Bashir, Gireif al-Gharb and Haj Yousif, for instance, the main water tanker was constructed by the community and is managed by the local Popular Committee. These networks are not available to all. IDPs often struggle to build such alliances in time to construct their shelters. The same applies for newly created neighbourhoods or relocation sites, particularly where ethnic

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21 Interview with manager of Western Soba Unite.
22 Other estimates put the figure lower, in the range of 45,000 units (Bannaga, pers. comm.).
groups without an urban background are inter-mixed. ACORD (2000) reports that, in El-Salam camp, 51% of the houses were built by joint efforts, 41% by the household head alone and 8% by paid labourers. In relocation settlements like Dar El-Salam, however, joint help decreases and is replaced by an increase in paid labourers (38% joint efforts versus 28% paid labourers, with 34% by household heads only).

NGOs provide very little help in the relocation settlements. They concentrate most of their support in camps, despite the fact that people in relocation areas are equally in need of assistance, if not more so given that their homes have been demolished and their investment in them has been lost. NGO support for housing in the camps usually includes building materials, tools and food incentives to encourage the construction of pit latrines.

The government offers three types of support. The first and most common is 'site and service', followed by state-built public housing and upgrading programmes. Tables 5 and 6 show the number of plots granted between 1997 and 2000 in Omdurman, Khartoum and Khartoum North, and between 2000 and 2010 in Wadi Akhdar, Khogalab and Al-Thawrah, as part of the 'site and service' scheme. To complement housing upgrading programmes the government has sought to restructure other urban functions with the aim of promoting sustainable urban development. Functions that have been prioritised include urban renewal, land use revitalisation, traffic management projects and the expansion of urban utilities (Bannaga, pers. comm.).

With regard to state-built housing, the Sudan Estate Bank has constructed apartment blocks for the middle classes as an investment, with the aim of using the revenues for public housing projects (eliskan) at a later stage. Most public housing projects have however targeted low-income government workers and not the poorest, who are usually unable to pay the minimal fees they need to keep their house (between SDG 17,000 ($7,074) and SDG 28,000 ($11,650)), and who also do not have sufficient official papers and collateral to begin the process. Land and housing policies are also not gender-sensitive. For example, land can only be leased under the name of the family head (the husband). Land allocation policies discriminate against unmarried women even when they can support themselves. Professional women cannot be the sole landowners, but deeds must include husbands as co-owners (Asha Elkarib, pers. comm.).

Table 5: ‘Site and service’ scheme plots (1997–2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of plots allocated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman First Class</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman Second Class</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman Third Class</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum First Class</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Second Class</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum Third Class</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum North First Class</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum North Second Class</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum North Third Class</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of plots granted 1997–2000</td>
<td>122,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6: ‘Site and service’ scheme plots (2000–2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Akhdar First Class</td>
<td>8,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Akhdar Second Class</td>
<td>6,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Akhdar Third Class</td>
<td>25,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khogalab First Class</td>
<td>9,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khogalab Second Class</td>
<td>5,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khogalab Third Class</td>
<td>16,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Thawrah First Class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Thawrah Second Class</td>
<td>1,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Thawrah Third Class</td>
<td>1,1282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of plots granted 2000–2010</td>
<td>84,458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 7
Infrastructure, services and the environment

This chapter describes the current state of urban infrastructure and basic service provision in Khartoum and discusses the gaps and bottlenecks that hamper effective service delivery. Addressing this issue is complex due to a number of factors including accelerating urbanisation and the increase in demand for all kinds of infrastructure and services, including water, housing, roads, electricity, education and health care, in a context of limited administrative capacities and financial resources, weak institutions and poor governance and deepening social and economic insecurity.

7.1 Education

Sudan’s school system consists of eight years of primary school, followed by three years of secondary school. The education curriculum underwent major reform in the early 1990s, when the current regime came to power. Today the primary school curriculum is based on five themes: language (with Arabic as the language of instruction), religion, mathematics, man and the universe and expressional and applied arts. The secondary school curriculum focuses on culture, the arts and theoretical and applied sciences (MoE, 2004). Schooling is generally segregated by gender, with different schools for boys and girls. However, there are a large number of co-educational schools in the outskirts and in low-income areas, because resources are insufficient to provide for separate schools.

The Federal Ministry of Education (MoE) is responsible for planning and policy, coordination of teachers (and in some instances the teachers’ payroll), planning and coordination of examinations and secondary school certification, and the development of school curricula, supported by Bakht Al-Ruda University. Issues such as school resources and fees are under the authority of the locality.

According to the Planning Office of the MoE, there were 1,693 government primary schools in 2010.23 As Table 7 shows, there are more primary schools in Khartoum North, particularly Sharg El-Nil Locality, with 333. Omdurman locality has the fewest, with 170. There are very few secondary schools in the city outskirts.

The State MoE reports an increase in the rate of public school enrolment in Khartoum State of about 5% a year over the last four years, which is largely attributed to population growth. Enrolment is uneven, with lower rates in poorer neighbourhoods, as shown in Table 8. Class sizes tend to be

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Localty</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number of schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel Awlia</td>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharg El-Nil</td>
<td>Khartoum North</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahri</td>
<td>Khartoum North</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbadda</td>
<td>Khartoum North</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karari</td>
<td>Omdurman</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman</td>
<td>Omdurman</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,693</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Kindergartens</th>
<th>Primary schools</th>
<th>Children expected to attend basic education</th>
<th>Children accessing basic education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Soba Aradi</td>
<td>22 (private)</td>
<td>9 (4 public, 4 run by CBOs, 1 private)</td>
<td>~15,000</td>
<td>~4,500 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Shigla, Haj Yousif</td>
<td>7 (5 public; 2 private)</td>
<td>9 (7 public, 2 private)</td>
<td>~9,000</td>
<td>~4,020 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel Awlia</td>
<td>15 (private)</td>
<td>15 (10 public, 5 private)</td>
<td>~24,000</td>
<td>~6,900 (29%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Fatih El-Moubin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 (1 run by UNICEF, 1 run by CBO)</td>
<td>~6,000</td>
<td>~112 (1.8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Save the Children UK, 2005.

large, with around 90–150 students in each class in low-income neighbourhoods. State schools differ considerably in high- and low-income areas. In Khartoum’s better neighbourhoods, such as Banat (Omdurman Locality) and the new part of Kober, merging into Kafori (Sharg El-Nil Locality), class sizes are around 37–53 students, whereas in the peripheries and in low-income areas such as Qur El-Salam (Jebel Awlia Locality), Rasheed (Jebel Awlia Locality) and El-Fatih (Karari Locality) class sizes regularly exceed 100, with students often having to sit on the floor, with no desks or chairs.

The quality of teachers in Khartoum State is generally inadequate. Many, especially in low-income areas, are not formally trained, and some only have a secondary school education and are unqualified to teach the curriculum properly. Over the past decade or so there has been a significant decline in the number of teachers, largely because state budgets are unable to finance teachers’ salaries. According to the MoE, teachers earn on average SDG 300–400 ($124–165) a month, which is a very low salary for a family living in Khartoum. In general, the localities are responsible for paying the salaries of primary school teachers, and in many instances the costs are borne by the students themselves (through parent–teacher committees), while the MoE is in charge of paying secondary school teachers.

Low-income communities are particularly short of teachers, perhaps because they also lack basic services, making living in their neighbourhoods an unattractive proposition. According to a Planning Officer interviewed at the MoE, the average student/teacher ratio should be 10–15/1. However, the findings of our study point to a much higher ratio, particularly in the poorest areas. For example, in El-Fatih (North Omdurman), we found an average of between three and eight teachers for a whole school, with many classes hosting up to 150 students. Communities throughout Khartoum State interviewed for this study mentioned the issue of teachers’ scarcity.

Although public schools are supposed to be free, in reality they are not. Government spending on education amounts to less than 2% of Sudan’s GDP (MoE, 2009). Localities are responsible for allocating budgets to schools, for maintenance and, in the case of primary schools, also for teachers’ salaries. It is estimated that 80–85% of the localities’ education spending goes on salaries, with the rest spent on other educational activities (MoE, 2008). In most areas of Khartoum State, registration fees are paid at the beginning of primary and secondary school, ranging from about SDG 50 ($20.75) in Duium (Bahri Locality) and Gereif East (Sharq El-Nil Locality) to SDG 80–90 ($33.21–37.36) in Haj Yousif (Sharq El-Nil Locality) and El-Fatih (Karari Locality). Most low-income households pay between SDG 2 ($0.83) and SDG 10 ($4.10) per month for each child attending a state school. School fees are meant to cover books, uniforms, resources such as water and school supplies, examinations and in many cases teachers’ salaries. In areas such as Al-Thawrah (Karari, Omdurman), residents said that school fees ranged from about SDG 10 ($4.10) to SDG 30 ($12.30) a month, an unaffordable amount for most low-income households. Transporting children to and from school further adds to the cost. Children in Dar El-Salam South (Umbadda Locality), for instance, have to travel for about an hour to get to the closest secondary school, adding SDG 360 ($149) to annual school fees of around SDG 100 ($42.30), for a total expenditure of SDG 460 ($190) a year.

Drop-out rates are high, particularly in low-income neighbourhoods. According to a recent MoE survey the highest drop-out rate is at the 8th grade, with little difference between drop-out rates for boys and girls (MoE, 2009). The main reasons are linked to the household economy: either their parents need them to work (38.1%) or they cannot afford to feed their children at home and at school (28.2%) (ibid). Prior to 2009, Save the Children UK and some other NGOs provided assistance in the form of cash contributions towards school fees and teachers’ salaries in poorer communities, but this assistance, already limited due to the small number of NGOs operating in Khartoum, ended with the NGO expulsions in 2009 (see Chapter 9).

In many of the areas visited by the study team it was reported that children must present their birth certificates before sitting for the secondary school qualifying exam. This regulation constitutes yet another obstacle for many students, especially those in low-income and IDP households. A third of births in Khartoum are unregistered, according to a 2006 study by the Sudan Household Health Survey (SHHS). Many children from low-income households never received birth certificates, and the process of acquiring one at an older age (13 or 14) is significantly more expensive than at birth (SDG 200 or $83, as opposed to SDG 25–30 or $10.37–12.45 at birth). The process is also complicated as midwives have to be traced. Girls were said to be disproportionately affected. In many cases low-income families told us that they cannot afford to purchase birth certificates to enable their children to sit for the examination, forcing them to leave school.

The demolition of homes, replanning and the relocation of many families cause further disruption to children’s education. New settlement areas can lack a functioning school for some time, meaning that children may miss several years’ schooling. Cultural practices may also be an obstacle, particularly for girls. Many low-income families tend to see their children as a source of wealth, to assist in generating income for the household and taking care of their parents when they are old. There is also a preference for educating boys over girls, as a girl’s duty is to assist at home, taking care of children and helping with household activities while their mothers are out working.

On average, fees for private schools are SDG 200–1,000 ($82.3–413) per year. In El-Shigla, Haj Yousif (Sharq El-Nil Locality) residents stated that some private schools cost around SDG 1,000 ($415.17) a year, while in El-Fatih (Omdurman) the cost of private school ranges from about SDG 300 to SDG 413. According to the MoE survey 343 girls quit, and 321 boys (MoE, 2009).
Church-run Comboni schools cost about SDG 170 ($70.20) a year. Although technically private institutions, in practice they fall somewhere between a state and a private school since they are non-profit and slightly cheaper than private schools. Finally, there are several very expensive private schools offering British and American curricula. Fees for the Khartoum International Community School begin at SDG 40,000 ($16,607) per year for children starting their primary education, a luxury available only to the richest of the rich, diplomats’ children or families whose companies finance their children’s education.

7.2 Health

Historically, the public health system in Sudan was virtually the only provider of health services, and the major source of funding for these services was through taxation. Services were offered free of charge until the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, however, the government has strongly encouraged private sector involvement in health service provision and has increased user contributions to meet the cost of public health expenditures. Although vulnerable groups are supposed to be exempted from paying some user fees, in practice this is not the case. In addition, public health facilities are so poorly equipped that users often have to pay for emergency services such as ambulances, some of which have been privatised, even though emergency care is supposed to be provided free of charge. International organisations have repeatedly drawn attention to the low level of government funding for health services in Sudan over the past decade, and the resulting deterioration of the health system (World Bank, 2005). Figure 4 sets out the structure of the health care system in Sudan.

Primary health services are offered in all localities of Khartoum State. The largest share of funding for these services (around 82% in 2008 and 2009) comes from the State Ministry of Health (MoH) through its regular budget. The Locality’s Health Office also depends on an allocation from the State Ministry of Finance, which itself receives fees charged by the health centres and hospitals in the Locality. Funds are allocated to localities by the MoH on the basis of a number of criteria, including income level, wealth generated by the locality and population. Hospital staff in Sharq El-Nil Locality indicated that their hospital typically does not receive the full amount of the already inadequate funds allocated to it in the locality budget; on average, no more than 25% of the allocation is received.

Article 46 of the Interim National Constitution states that all primary healthcare and emergency services are free of charge. In practice, however, fees are charged for visits to health

Figure 4: Sudan’s healthcare system

Source: Study data.

centres and for various services at public hospitals. Simply accessing a health centre can cost SDG 3 ($1.23), before any tests are performed or medications administered. Urine and general blood tests start at SDG 3 ($1.23) at the very minimum, and more specialised tests such as ultrasounds up to SDG 150 ($61.96). Only middle- and high-income households can afford healthcare in private hospitals, which are concentrated in Khartoum and Omdurman localities. For low-income households public healthcare fees and charges represent significant financial barriers, while the cost of accessing private health services is simply prohibitive.

The quality of public health services is often compromised by lack of staff, equipment and supplies. In the whole of Sharq El-Nil Locality, one of the poorer localities in the State, there is only one doctor for every 26,000 people; in Khartoum, the richest locality in the State, there is one doctor for every 8,400 people (study data). According to a Medical Director in Umbadda Locality, most of his staff are unavailable most of the time because their low salaries force them to take on other jobs to make ends meet. Most health centres visited during fieldwork, in particular in Karari, Sharq El-Nil and Umbadda localities, were attended by medical assistants rather than doctors, despite MoH guidelines stipulating the presence of a qualified physician at all times. Health centres in peripheral areas of Khartoum State also generally lack adequate equipment and supplies. This is particularly apparent in the provision of emergency services. If somebody needs an urgent operation they have to travel to a hospital in the centre of town.

While maternal and newborn health has been identified as a priority area in the federal government's reproductive health policy (MOH, 2006), maternal mortality remains high. An MoH survey put the maternal mortality ratio in the country at 1,107 per 100,000 live births, and 311 per 100,000 in Khartoum State (SHHS, 2006). The main causes of maternal mortality are hypertensive disorders during pregnancy, haemorrhage, infections, obstructed labour and complications from unsafe abortions. For each maternal death, there are ten cases of maternal morbidity and birth-related disabilities such as fistula, and injuries to the pelvic muscles, internal organs and spinal cord are also common (ibid). During the fieldwork for this study, the issue of high fertility rates and short gaps between pregnancies were highlighted as serious health risks for women living in Khartoum. A nurse interviewed in Mandela cited recurrent pregnancies, sometimes only 40 days after birth, as one of the main reasons for women's precarious health and a compounding factor for malnutrition.

The MoH survey found that the neonatal mortality rate in Khartoum State was an estimated 32 per 1,000 live births, infant mortality 69 per 1,000 live births and under-5 mortality 87 per 1,000 live births (MoH, 2006). As Table 9 indicates, the highest rates are found in Sharq El-Nil Locality, followed by Umbadda Locality.

Malaria, bilharzias and pulmonary tuberculosis morbidity in Khartoum State is reportedly high, as shown in Table 10. The incidence of disease is made worse by unclean water and poor hygiene conditions in most poor neighbourhoods.

### Table 9: Nutritional status of children under five in Khartoum State localities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality</th>
<th>All registered cases</th>
<th>Severe Frequency</th>
<th>Moderate Frequency</th>
<th>Mild Frequency</th>
<th>Normal Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum</td>
<td>104,015</td>
<td>1,696</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jebel Awlia</td>
<td>202,890</td>
<td>4,568</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4,549</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omdurman</td>
<td>117,510</td>
<td>1,702</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2,407</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karari</td>
<td>131,288</td>
<td>2,493</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3,463</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umbada</td>
<td>189,587</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahri</td>
<td>149,560</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharq El-Nil</td>
<td>199,819</td>
<td>2,096</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3,948</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khartoum State</td>
<td>1,094,660</td>
<td>16,708</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>22,309</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.3 Access to water

Rapid urbanisation in Khartoum State has put huge pressure on water supplies, even in better-off areas. In all our FGDs and interviews, including in Class 1 and 2 areas such as El-Mohandseen in Omdurman, Al-Amarat in Khartoum and Alsafia in Khartoum North, people complained of serious problems with water flow and purification.

Box 2: Unclean water in Umbadda

One woman interviewed in Umbadda said that she had no access to piped water, despite paying monthly fees for a water line. She therefore had to purchase water from street sellers on donkey carts. The water is dirty as the tankers are not properly cleaned and the donkeys are often injured. The woman linked her children’s frequent diarrhoea to the dirty water they were drinking.

The government has made some efforts to resolve water supply problems. A water purification station, Al-Mogran, was established in 1974, with a capacity of 72,000 cubic meters per day. However, the station supplies old Khartoum and Omdurman only, via a connecting line that passes through the White Nile. There is another water purification station in Khartoum North, with a capacity of 36,000 cubic meters per day, and another station in the Bahri industrial area is for storage and repumping (a high-pressure station). The Tuti water purification station was completed in 1984. It has a capacity of 2,000 cubic meters per day. Finally, the Beatalmal water purification station was expanded in 2002, bringing its capacity up to 27,000 cubic meters per day. There are also 280 groundwater wells across Khartoum State, with a total capacity of 27,000 cubic meters per day.

Fixed tariffs were introduced in 2006. These vary according to use and residential class, as detailed in Table 11.

7.4 Sanitation and waste treatment

Khartoum’s drainage and sanitation systems are in poor condition, cover only a portion of the population, lack regular maintenance and often turn into a waste disposal mechanism, heightening the risk of disease during the rainy season (Murillo et al., 2008). Only 28% of Khartoum is connected to the sewage system, and most residents use pit latrines and other basic systems such as septic tanks (UNEP, 2007), though others believe that the percentage of those connected to the sewage system is as low as 5% (Bannaga, pers. comm.). Either way, the sewage system is clearly overstretched, old and no longer working properly (Hamid et al., 2009). In the Salha area of Omdurman, the Omdurman Islamic University’s sewage system ends in the middle of an open space, creating a large waste basin. The Miyah wa Khadamat (Water and Services Company), subcontracted by the government, is working in collaboration with a Turkish company, 3B-Plan, and

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**Table 10: Malaria, bilharzias and pulmonary tuberculosis mortality**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Pulmonary tuberculosis</th>
<th>Bilharzias</th>
<th>Malaria</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mortality</td>
<td>Registered cases</td>
<td>Mortality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>2,094</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>2,206</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 11: Fixed piped water tariffs**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Residential class/use</th>
<th>Tariff in SDG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1/2 &quot; third class – Domestic</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3/4 &quot; second class – Domestic</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 &quot; first class – Domestic</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cafeteria – Farms – Launderettes</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restaurants</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire stations</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workshops</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local bakeries</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 1/2 &quot; Domestic</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 &quot; Domestic</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated bakeries</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


SDG 2 and SDG 6 ($0.83–$2.49) per barrel. In informal settlements and relocation areas a family requires an average daily amount of 64 gallons of water. Up to 40% of the daily income of the urban poor is reportedly spent on purchasing water (UNEP, 2007).
the MPPPU to develop plans to expand the sewage system. Interviews with the MPPPU reveal that these plans do not cover poorer areas. The company also plans to build treatment stations in Haj Yousif and Soba, so that water can be reused for irrigation, tree planting and increasing green space.

The inadequacies of Khartoum’s sewage and drainage systems are of particular concern given the city’s propensity to flooding. As discussed in Chapter 8, during the rainy season severe flooding ruins houses, disrupts transport and impedes movement. Pools of stagnant water raise the risk of waterborne diseases, the prevalence of which tends to increase at the start of the rainy season as rains activate the faecal matter and pollution that has built up during the dry season. There are recurrent outbreaks of cholera during the rainy season, and stagnant water also creates a favourable environment for malaria. The Commission of Voluntary and Humanitarian Workers (CVHW), the MoH and the Civil Defence department track health problems and rain damage in vulnerable locations.

Rapid urbanisation has also created enormous pressure on Khartoum’s capacity to manage solid waste. Most informal settlements and relocation areas do not have garbage disposal services. Although Khartoum State established a solid waste cleaning project in 2002, low-income areas were omitted, either because they are unplanned or because they do not have paved roads (Hamid et al., 2009). Officially, the waste disposal company commissioned by the State, Khartoum Cleaning Project, uses four main landfills on the outskirts of the city to dump garbage. These should be three kilometres away from the nearest residential area. However, there seem to be informal garbage dumps near one of the relocation areas in El-Fatih (Karari Locality) and in the planned area of El-Izba (Khartoum North). Residents interviewed in these areas told us that pollution is a major problem; nearby garbage dumps attract flies and smell foul.

7.5 The environmental consequences of urbanisation

Perhaps the most prevalent environmental risk in Khartoum is flooding. Many informal settlements and relocation areas are situated in the most flood-prone areas of the State, which is largely why they were left unoccupied in the past. Some informal settlements also block drainage corridors and retain water (UNEP, 2007). During the rainy season, the flooding, characterised by flash floods, is so severe that houses are ruined, transport cannot enter affected locations and movement is greatly impeded. Many residents leave their usual work areas to avoid the worst of the floods. Flooding also has a major impact on health as pools of stagnant water, coupled with poor sanitation, result in regular outbreaks of waterborne and other diseases such as cholera and malaria.

The poorest are most at risk, since they live in areas where flooding is most frequent. In 2009 floods resulted in extensive damage in the poorest squatter areas and informal settlements in Khartoum. Approximately 12,000 houses were lost in Soba Aradi alone, when six out of eight blocks were inundated in the immediate aftermath of torrential rains. Efforts were made by HAC in Khartoum State to resurrect the Flood Task Force to improve the response this year, but few international humanitarian actors were available to respond (see Chapter 9.3).

7.6 The environmental consequences of economic development

Thanks to expanding foreign and local investment, Khartoum State’s economy is thriving. New investment is modernising and transforming the face of the capital, but this is often to the detriment of the environment. One example is the Mogran development project, a grandiose high-rise complex which will include a large golf course (Sudan’s second; the first recently opened in Soba Hilla). This project alone is expected to consume around 2.3m litres of water every day. The development will also encroach on the Sunut forest, a reserve protected by law. The case is currently being debated in a State court.

Large-scale real estate plans on the Nile bank may also present a major environmental concern. Older hotels with poor sewage systems already contribute to pollution in the Nile, which in turn increases the incidence of waterborne diseases downstream (Hamid et al., 2009). The environment along the Nile has already been affected by the brick-making industry, which uses fuel wood to operate its kilns, resulting in significant pollution. This is a particular problem in Gereif East (Khartoum North), where residents complain that the perpetual smoke is affecting their health. Brick-making has also contributed to the deforestation of surrounding areas. Legislation is in place to protect the environment. Article 18 of the Environmental Protection Act of 2001 stipulates that water sources, air and soil should all be protected from pollution and industrial waste. However, most of the institutions responsible for combating environmental harm lack the capacity to enforce relevant legislation, and the general public remains largely ignorant of the long-term consequences of environmental degradation (Hamid et al., 2009).
Chapter 8
The social consequences of urbanisation and urban vulnerability

8.1 Cultural changes, feelings of hopelessness and rising insecurity

Urbanisation has had a major impact on cultural attitudes and practices amongst migrant and IDP groups, particularly younger generations, who increasingly question traditional values and customs. A case in point is marriage, where the role of elders in choosing suitable partners has been eroded and youngsters are being allowed more freedom to choose their partners. In some communities the nature of bridewealth has changed to reflect the absence of livestock in the city. Whereas previously cows would have been the normal bride price, money is now considered an acceptable alternative. The cost of marrying more than one wife is also seen as more onerous in the city than in rural areas, encouraging a tendency towards monogamy. Women also enjoy more freedom than in rural areas and increased access to education, even though high drop-out rates amongst secondary school girls because of early marriages are still common.

Social occasions such as weddings play an important role in providing spaces for communities to come together. Interviewees mentioned intermarriage between tribes as a source of social integration. At the same time, however, divorce rates are increasing, including among groups like the Dinka who have no cultural history of divorce. This trend is resulting in large numbers of households being headed by single women. Sexual relations outside marriage were also reported to have increased, creating tensions and at times sparking violence between families. Native Administration and tribal elders still have a role to play in settling disputes and providing marriage counselling, though their influence over young people was said to be decreasing. A loss of faith in traditional healers – kujurs – was reported, linked to increasing access to modern medicine. Traditions such as tooth breaking (common among the Dinka in particular) and scarification have declined considerably.

The desire to conform to Northern ways has led to a number of undesirable practices among immigrants and IDPs from the South. Female Genital Cutting (FGC) in its more extreme form (Pharaonic or infibulation, involving the sewing of the labia majora of the female genital organs), as opposed to clitoridectomy (limited to the excision of the clitoris) is increasingly common, particularly in rural areas outside Khartoum. Southern communities, traditionally alien to this practice, have increasingly been resorting to it as a sign of assimilation. The same concern leads women to use creams to whiten their skin. Overuse and mixing of the creams cause skin conditions and disfigurement. For similar reasons, the use of indigenous languages is reported to have declined considerably amongst young people.

The realities of urban life have also exacted a psychological and emotional toll, especially amongst poor migrants and IDPs. Depression is common, as are feelings of inferiority and lack of self-confidence (Interagency Report, 2007). Communities living on the edge of town were acutely aware of the low levels of respect in which they were held. Communities reported feeling hopeless and demoralised, often ill, anxious and edgy. These feelings were particularly palpable amongst those who perceive themselves as IDPs. One interviewee noted that 'you cannot erase IDPs', yet the assimilation of many longstanding IDPs into the urban fabric challenges this view.

A worrying new phenomenon in Khartoum is increasing violent crime, particularly by youth gangs. Groups of young people known as ‘Nega Gangs’ were widely reported to be operating in Khartoum’s poor areas. Gang members mimic US street culture, with names like Tupac, West Coast, Outlaws, Back Street Boys, B12, Ruff Riders and Lost Boys. Reports of attacks with knives and cleavers, reprisals, rapes and general insecurity were linked to these gangs, with attacks both on communities and amongst gangs themselves as rivals vie for

Box 3: Profound changes in Tuti Island

Special mention must be given to the changing nature of life on one of the oldest sites in Khartoum – Tuti Island – which sits at the confluence of the Nile River. Home to a traditional, indigenous tribal community of farmers (the Mahaas), with a long tradition of contributing to the arts, their island has been transformed by the opening of the first Tuti Island traffic bridge in 2009 and the consequent investment interest in this strategic location at the centre of the city. Communities reported that, while attempts had been made to collectivise decision-making regarding investment offers, it was inevitable that some individuals would sell their assets to outsiders. Changing land use and increased traffic are only one indicator. Native Administrators on the island expressed concern about the recent acquisition of large tracts of land on the island by an Egyptian investor, who plans to develop luxury vacation compounds in partnership with the Tuti Development Corporation. Tuti residents recently engaged in a partnership project with USAID to photograph and publish their unique way of life before it disappears.
influence. Gang warfare in Mayo in 2008 led to killings, and the subsequent arrest and imprisonment of the gang leader. These gangs reportedly derive an income from extortion, robbery, racketeering and selling tickets to illegal parties. Communities have responded by offering young people alternative ways to spend their spare time. Night patrols by the police in Mandela have reportedly improved the situation, though women in particular still refrain from moving around after dark.

8.2 Urban vulnerability

Place of residence, gender, age, identity and legal and social status all play a role in determining types and levels of vulnerability in Khartoum. Several interviewees observed that a large number of IDP households in Khartoum are headed by single women. Interviewees told us that men are often absent due to labour migration, including within Khartoum. Many others were said to have been killed in conflict. Abandonment was also frequently mentioned. Other forms of vulnerability, particularly amongst women, relate to the increasing demand for domestic workers among the growing middle class, and the resulting increased trade in the trafficking of females from Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as from Asian countries such as the Philippines. Young girls are a particular target. Vulnerability also extends to children, with child labour and unaccompanied street children of most concern (UNMIS, 2010). Child labour was reported to be widespread, particularly among the most vulnerable, with many working as water distributors, on transportation or selling metals and plastics. Seasonal work is often undertaken during school holidays, and it is common for both boys and girls to work after school. Large numbers of unaccompanied street children were also observed, particularly near suqs and vegetable markets. These children are stigmatised and regularly harassed by the police, and drug use among them is common.
Chapter 9
External assistance in Khartoum

Compared to the rest of the country, international attention to humanitarian issues in Khartoum State is scarce. There seems to be a prevalent misconception that the wealth accumulating in Khartoum is translating into better living conditions for all of the city’s residents. In the words of one informant well-versed in assistance policies to IDPs and refugees in Sudan: ‘the assumption is that if they made it to Khartoum, they must be all right’. This misconception is compounded by a steep decline in international programming in Khartoum State. Access to camps around Khartoum has become increasingly difficult. According to the government, 62 local and international NGOs are working in camps in Khartoum State, though this seems to be an overestimation.

International responses in Khartoum can be traced back to August 1988, when rains and subsequent floods of unprecedented intensity destroyed an estimated 127,000 dwellings housing approximately 750,000 people, most of them IDPs (CDC, 1989). During the 1990s several international agencies significantly increased their operations in Khartoum, especially in the four official IDP camps, where they provided basic services and food assistance (De Geoffroy, 2005). However, as humanitarian needs in other parts of the country became increasingly acute, attention and funding to urban areas diminished and a number of international NGOs ended their operations in Khartoum. Capacity was further reduced with the expulsion of 13 international NGOs in March 2009.

The core of the international response is the Khartoum Protection Working Group (KPWG), comprising UNHCR, the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), the IOM, UNDP and other national and international NGOs. The most recent meetings of the KPWG have focused on contingency plans to deal with the possibility of forced returns and the potential for violence in areas with high concentrations of Southerners around the capital. However, implementing concrete programmes is difficult for international NGOs, most of which rely on local partners to execute their work. Broadly speaking, there are three areas of active intervention:

1. Advice and advocacy to the government on the GPR (see Chapter 4), and on contingency planning for floods in camp areas during the rainy season.
2. Vocational training and access to credit for the urban poor.
3. Contingency planning for various post-referendum scenarios.

9.1 Relocations and replanning

Both the KPWG and the European Commission supported the GPR, and the European Union undertook to meet the costs of the first relocation carried out according to its principles. However, international agencies have had very little leverage to ensure compliance. Attempts by KPWG actors to organise awareness sessions amongst ministerial and local authorities, as well as information campaigns within the local population, have largely failed. A Spanish Red Cross clinic in El-Salam Camp in Omdurman faces a government demolition order to accommodate the construction of a road. There are ongoing discussions between the Spanish Red Cross and relevant government authorities, but the future of the clinic remains uncertain.

With the phasing out of OCHA in Khartoum State in 2007, UN-Habitat has been liaising with the government and providing support to the UN Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCSO) in relation to evictions and relocations. UN-Habitat’s coordination role has however never been formalised, and the office does not have the capacity or resources to take on this function (Murillo, pers. comm.). The RCSO has been acting as a coordinator for flood response. Most UN agencies and NGOs interviewed remarked upon the poor level of coordination by these two agencies.

UNHCR is the chair of the KPWG, which is responsible for IDP protection. UNHCR has been one of the few actors seeking to maintain attention on the problems of IDPs and the urban poor in Khartoum through monitoring, limited programmatic interventions and advocacy within and outside the UN. The agency regards the problem of displacement in Khartoum as an issue with humanitarian repercussions, especially during natural disasters such as flooding. At the same time UNHCR has repeatedly advocated within the UN system and with donors for more substantial involvement from development actors, including UN-Habitat, UNDP, the UN Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO). UNHCR officials note that many of the protection issues affecting the urban poor in Khartoum, particularly Southerners, are to do with human rights and rule of law problems. The agency has thus advocated for a more prominent role for human rights and rule of law bodies, including UNMIS.

Given the length of time many IDPs have been resident in Khartoum, these ‘old caseload’ populations are no longer seen as displaced. Meanwhile, very little time or resources have been available to respond to new IDPs from Darfur. Several interviewees told us that, having made it to Khartoum, these IDPs were somehow self-sufficient, and by implication not in need of help. Darfuri displaced have not been allowed to concentrate in specific areas in Khartoum; as a result they are scattered all over the city, and their numbers are unknown.
9.2 Vocational training and credit provision

The ILO, in cooperation with Don Bosco, VIS and Nweda (a Nuba Mountains women’s organisation) offers vocational training programmes for young people. International NGOs rely heavily on local partners to implement this training, to the extent that almost all international programmes are carried out through a local partnership. ACORD and the Fellowship for African Relief (FAR) have spearheaded a microfinance initiative to address the obstacles preventing the displaced and urban poor from obtaining credit (See Chapter 5) through a combination of advocacy to change government policy regarding loans, and by acting as a loan guarantor. UNDP works with the Coexistence Organisation to provide paralegal services in El-Fath, helping residents to negotiate the bureaucratic labyrinth governing access to credit and land titles.

Local NGOs have been active with small-scale community-based income-generating projects targeting women arrested for illegal alcohol brewing. These projects have aimed to provide vocational training and grants and loans to enable women to engage in alternative ‘safer’ livelihoods.

9.3 Disaster management

International NGOs such as Oxfam GB have been involved for a number of years in flood preparedness work. Since the NGO expulsions, however, little appears to have been done in this area, with the exception of Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which is working with national partners in emergency flood preparedness, targeting vulnerable populations in Jebel Awlia, Dar El-Salam, Wad El-Basheer Omdurman and Soba Aradi. The aim is to promote good hygiene practices and install sandbags to protect houses. A key concern is to bolster mud housing, using plastic sheets in place of dung. CRS is also working with communities and localities to clear sewage canals, offering a small incentive to encourage participation.

As noted earlier, the UN RCSO is the main actor coordinating flood preparedness work between NGOs and the government. The joint flood task force includes the HAC, the Sudan Meteorological Authority, the Ministry of Irrigation, Civil Defence, the Early Warning Department and UN agencies including UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the United Nations Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). The task force was established in 2007 and is operational in all Northern states, including Khartoum. It aims to assess the impact of the rainy season and foster collaboration with relevant sectors such as health and nutrition, food security and livelihoods, water and sanitation, non-food items, basic infrastructure and education. The assessment involves evaluating populations at risk, conditions in flood-prone areas and preparedness at the state level, including prepositioning stocks such as food, chlorination, pesticides and non-food items. The state government was reportedly preparing contingency plans during our field visits, but very few international implementing partners were in a position to join these efforts.

9.4 Contingency planning for the January 2011 referendum

The findings of our study indicate that the issue that most preoccupies both camp residents and the agencies working with them is the impending referendum in Southern Sudan. The international community has created a series of cross-border dialogues, and IOM is registering and monitoring voluntary returns. Still, even as contingency plans and an overall strategy towards the referendum are developed, it is striking that international agencies are beginning to pay attention to the problems of Khartoum’s IDPs only as they are preparing to leave the State. As long as they are resident in Khartoum, IDPs and the urban poor are not treated with nearly the same attention as other vulnerable populations around the country.
Chapter 10
Conclusions and recommendations

As in the other urban centres of Sudan covered in this study, Khartoum has experienced significant population growth in recent decades, more than doubling from approximately 3m in 1990 to 7m in 2008 (Assal, 2008; Bannaga, 1996). As with the other cities, the key drivers of urbanisation have been forced displacement, including influxes of refugees and IDPs, seasonal and economic migration from all parts of the country and the concentration of wealth and services in Khartoum.

The city has undergone significant geographic expansion as a result of this rapid population growth. Approximately 60% of Khartoum’s population are poor (Murillo et al., 2008), living in low-density areas, squatter areas, older villages in the outlying areas of the city, crowded sites near markets and formally designated camps. Whilst successive federal and state governments have developed strategic plans for urban development, in practice implementation has been extremely limited, resulting in the increasing marginalisation of the urban poor.

The current Khartoum Structural Plan 2007–2033 incorporates some key elements aimed at improving the living conditions of all urban residents, including easing congestion in the centre, improving transport infrastructure, extending basic services to outlying areas, mitigating the environmental impact of the city’s expansion and poverty alleviation through micro-finance schemes. However, the findings of this study indicate that the plan is already running into problems, not the least of which is insufficient financing and competing priorities between government departments. These two elements – poor governance and lack of investment – are at the heart of the current failure to tackle the challenges of urbanisation in Khartoum. They are also symptomatic of a wider failure to capitalise on the opportunities that urbanisation presents.

Despite efforts to decentralise the governance system in Khartoum, there has been no improvement in municipal services. Insufficient and delayed funding from the central and state budgets has meant that localities are unable to invest sufficiently in the provision of existing basic services, let alone extend services to new and expanding areas of the city. Consequently, where services are available to the urban poor, they are irregular, exorbitantly expensive and often of poor quality.

The economic boom in the capital in recent years appears to have largely bypassed the majority of the population. Whilst the rising elite are benefiting from growth in the oil and real estate sectors, the poorest residents continue to struggle with limited livelihood opportunities. The day-to-day battle for survival is exacerbated by adverse policies and government actions, notably policies around foreign workers, demolitions and relocations and the constraints IDPs face when seeking to acquire land. Efforts to support livelihoods have centred on micro-finance projects, but a lack of analysis of the needs of the people these programmes are targeting has limited their impact.

As in other contexts, land has been a major factor in urbanisation. As the value of land has increased, the urban poor have been pushed further and further away from the centre towards the peripheries of the city, far away from services and jobs. At the same time, getting hold of land, even in these outlying areas, is a costly, cumbersome and confusing business. Lack of clarity regarding administrative fees and selection criteria, and the costs of building within an unrealistic timeframe, are effectively excluding most of the urban poor from land ownership.

Urbanisation has also had a major impact on cultural attitudes and practices amongst migrant and IDP groups, particularly younger generations. The impact on families has also been significant; whilst there are now perhaps greater educational and livelihood opportunities for women (particularly compared to the rural areas from which many have come), men reported limited access to regular employment and, as a consequence, many feel increasingly under pressure or have actually abandoned their families. A rise in FGC is reported amongst communities who had not previously engaged in this practice. The realities of urban life have exacted a significant psychological and emotional toll, especially amongst poor migrants and IDPs.

Finally, international engagement with the poorest and most vulnerable population groups in Khartoum is limited and has significantly decreased from pre-CPA levels. There have been efforts to support state government policy relating to relocations, and some targeted programmes to support vocational training and contingency planning. However, given the scale of need amongst this large urban poor population, the programming and advocacy efforts of international development and humanitarian organisations, as well as engagement from donors, have been wholly insufficient.

In summary, the urban poor of Khartoum, as in many of Sudan’s urban centres, have been effectively left to fend for themselves. In response, they have demonstrated a creative and self-sufficient approach to their problems – forming civil society organisations to support service provision, initiating their own credit transfer systems and drawing on traditional governance systems to resolve disputes and support social cohesion. However, extraordinary as these efforts are, they cannot address the fundamental challenges that urbanisation has presented. A
major shift in the approach of the federal and state government, as well as the international community, is needed.

10.1 Recommendations

**Government authorities**

- Further research on urbanisation in Khartoum is needed to help correct distortions and direct future sustainable urban growth. Adequate data are essential to better understand urbanisation processes and support the livelihood needs of the different groups of urban poor living in Khartoum. Studies could also help identify the financial resources available to local government, and clarify federal/state competences and responsibilities.
- Increased financial investment is essential to upgrade existing services and infrastructure, and to facilitate the much-needed expansion of services in the peripheral areas of the city. Appropriate policies and resources should also be put in place to facilitate greater access to credit and self-reliance strategies for the neediest groups.
- Greater clarity is needed in the land allocation process, alongside work to address the legal and economic obstacles to land ownership for the urban poor.
- A clear commitment is needed by all levels of the State authorities and line ministries to adhere to the GPR and minimise the negative impact of demolitions and replanning of squatter settlements and IDP areas in Khartoum.
- In line with Sudan’s international legal obligations, the government should ensure that refugees are granted freedom of movement throughout the country. Conversely, the government also needs to recognise that thousands of refugees have taken up permanent residence in Khartoum. At the same time, urgent steps should be taken to provide refugees with documentation that guarantees freedom of movement, and to make the necessary legal changes – such as amendments to the 2008 Labour Decree – to allow them to work.

**Humanitarian and development organisations**

- The international community must abandon the assumption that the urban poor in Khartoum are better off than poor people elsewhere in the country. The large-scale development and shorter-term humanitarian needs highlighted in this study require urgent attention, commitment and support from international actors. Following the expulsion of international NGOs in March 2009, the role of the UN agencies and international actors that remain in the country has acquired increasing prominence, and should where possible be expanded.
- Greater engagement with the state government at both policy and technical levels is required to support a more effective urban development strategy for Khartoum. The Office of the UN DSRSG/HC/RC needs to strengthen its leadership of this engagement on behalf of international actors in Khartoum.
- The vital role that civil society organisations have played during the past decades should be given more recognition, and their involvement in programme strategies, design and implementation should be made more prominent. With support from international donors, INGOs should make financial help and capacity-building to civil society organisations a priority. In addition, more efforts should be made to advocate with the government for more strategic and operational involvement of civil society organisations.
- Targeted livelihood support is necessary, based on an in-depth analysis of the needs, risks and vulnerabilities of Khartoum’s various groups. In collaboration with the government and civil society organisations, INGOs and NGOs could support cash for work programmes as part of preparedness activities before the rainy season, clearing drainage systems in flood-prone areas and supporting general cleaning campaigns.
- NGOs working in IDP sites and squatter areas should explore opportunities to expand their operational activities in relocation settlements. Support is needed for interventions such as contributions of building materials and construction tools and food incentives to encourage the construction of pit latrines, in collaboration with the government.
- Given the significant caseload of refugees in Khartoum and other urban centres, UNHCR should build on the momentum created by the development of the ‘Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas’ at the global level in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009b) and formulate a policy for urban refugees and other displaced communities. In line with its global responsibility for the protection of IDPs, UNHCR, together with UNMIS, UNDP and UN-Habitat, should increase its strategic focus to address the widespread needs of the thousands of IDPs in Khartoum.

**International donors**

- International donors should increase their strategic focus and financial support for humanitarian programming in Khartoum. Together with the specialised UN agencies and local and international NGOs, donors should develop a coordinated advocacy strategy that prioritises poor urban communities.
- Financial and technical support should be made available to enable the government to implement the Khartoum Structural Plan. This should be part of a long-term strategy to strengthen federal and state governance to ensure better services and livelihoods opportunities for the urban poor.
References


Murillo, F., S. Osman and A. Mustafa (2008) Diagnosis Studies on Urban Sector, Khartoum State, UN-HABITAT with the MPPPU.


## Annex 1
### List of fieldwork locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood name</th>
<th>Indication of the socio-economic status of population</th>
<th>History of arrival</th>
<th>Zoning category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duyum Sharquia</td>
<td>A/B – Mixed ethnicity, lower class</td>
<td>Old lower class Khartoum families, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haj Yousif</td>
<td>A/B – Mixed ethnicity, lower and middle class</td>
<td>Neighbourhood of family settlement, as well as drought and conflict migration</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deim, Khartoum North</td>
<td>A/B – Mixed ethnicity, lower and middle class</td>
<td>Old lower class Khartoum families, Ethiopian and Eritrean refugees</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuti Island</td>
<td>A – Residents and IDPs in camp</td>
<td>Descendants of the Mahas settlements</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shajara</td>
<td>B – Predominantly army personnel, working class, some agriculturalists along the Nile</td>
<td>Gishlag (military barracks), Older Khartoum areas</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayo</td>
<td>A – Predominantly IDPs from the South and some Darfurians displaced by conflict</td>
<td>Displaced by conflict</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soba</td>
<td>A – IDPs, settlement during droughts and conflict</td>
<td>Displaced by drought and conflict</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar El-Salaam, Jebel Awlia</td>
<td>A – IDPs in camp</td>
<td>Displaced by conflict from South; some from Darfur</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Thawrah</td>
<td>B/C – Old middle and upper class Omdurman families</td>
<td>Neighbourhood of family settlement in Omdurman</td>
<td>Class 2 Some freehold, some leasehold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Gireif</td>
<td>B – Mixed ethnicity lower and middle class</td>
<td>Very old settlement (before Almahadia, 300 years ago, descendants of the Mahas, Jaalien and Danagla settlements), new extensions from neighbourhood of family settlement and newcomers</td>
<td>Class 1/2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Halfaya</td>
<td>B – Mixed ethnicity lower middle class</td>
<td>Very old settlement (Albdalab Kingdom, 600 years ago), new extensions from neighbourhood of family settlement and newcomers</td>
<td>Class 2/3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(continued)
### Annex 1 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood name</th>
<th>Indication of the socio-economic status of population</th>
<th>History of arrival</th>
<th>Zoning category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kafoori</td>
<td>B/C – Old middle and upper class families from different areas of Sudan, mostly the new rich and higher government employees</td>
<td>New areas of well-off families</td>
<td>Class 1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Hizba</td>
<td>B – Mixed ethnicity lower and middle class</td>
<td>New planned area of neighbourhood of family settlement and newcomers</td>
<td>Class 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilla al Gedida</td>
<td>A/B – Part of Al Salaam camp area which is mostly planned, but Hilla al Gedida is one of the few areas which is unplanned. Mixed population originating mainly from Darfur, Gezira and Kordofan. The largest tribal populations are Jawama’a followed by Bargo.</td>
<td>Habitation began 2001. A large proportion of residents moved here from Umbadda because they could not afford the rent, or were forcibly relocated from the Samrab Area of Khartoum North</td>
<td>Class 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Fatih</td>
<td>A – IDPs and urban poor migrants of mixed origin (including Southerners, Darfurians, but also migrants from the East and Jezera State)</td>
<td>Relocated, including by force, from other IDP sites and squatter areas</td>
<td>Class 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haj Yousif El-Imtidad</td>
<td>B – Most residents are middle-class traders, work in private businesses and/or government officials/police</td>
<td>Inhabited during 1960s, when land was distributed to civil servants. Predominantly Northerners, but also Nuba and a few Southerners</td>
<td>Class 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(extension)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salha</td>
<td>B – new area of construction</td>
<td>Mainly Northerners, associated with government</td>
<td>Class 2/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dar El-Salaam, Omdurman</td>
<td>A – conflict-displaced</td>
<td>Mainly Southerners and Westerners</td>
<td>Class 3/4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key to socio-economic status:
A  IDP/urban poor
B  middle class (*al tabaga al wasta*)
C  well-off
Annex 2
List of key informants

Central government
- Bureau of Statistics
- Civil Registry
- Ministry of Environmental and Physical Development
- Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs
- Ministry of Interior (Higher Council for Civil Defence)
- Ministry of International Cooperation
- Ministry of Labour
- Ministry of Roads
- Ministry of Social Welfare
- National Council for Physical Planning
- National Council for Population
- National Electric Corporation (NEC)
- National Forestry Corporation
- Transport Corporations

State government
- Chamber of Commerce
- Commission on Refugees
- Humanitarian Aid Commission
- Khartoum Council for Strategic Planning
- Locality Commissioners and Administrators
- Ministry of Agriculture and Forests
- Ministry of Education
- Ministry of Finance
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Industry
- Ministry of Infrastructure (road building, water, sanitation, bridges)
- Ministry of Investment
- Ministry of Physical Planning and Public Utilities (MPPPU)
- Police authorities
- Registrar Office (judiciary responsibility) working with MPPPU
- Wali’s Office

National organisations
- Al Manar
- Amel
- Azza
- Babiker Bedri Foundation
- Co-existence Organisation
- Dawa Islamiyya
- Don Bosco Vocational College
- EDGE (Environment and Development Group Expertise)
- Islamic Council for the New Sudan
- Lokita
- Mutawinaat
- Nuweda
- Sabah
- SECS (Sudan Environmental Conservation Society)
- SONAD
- SORD (Sudanese Organisation for Research and Development)
- Sudanese Council of Churches
- Sudanese Red Crescent
- Sudanese Women’s Network
- Tuti Cultural Forum

International organisations
- ACORD
- AEC
- CRS
- DFID
- European Union
- FAR
- GOAL
- ICRC
- ILO
- IOM
- Marie Stopes International
- MSF (Spain & Belgium)
- OCHA
- Plan International
- Practical Action
- Save the Children
- SIDA
- Spanish Red Cross
- UNDP
- UNEP
- UNESCO
- UN-HABITAT
- UNHCR
- UNICEF
- UNIDO
- UNIFEM
- UNMIS
- UNMIS RRR
- UN RCSO
- USAID
- WFP
- Windle Trust
- World Bank
- World Vision

(continued)
Private sector
- Agents for Foreign Staff
- Central Bank
- DAL Group
- Family Bank
- Keer Group
- Land Agents
- Market stall-holders and merchants in Suq al Shaabi, Suq Lybia and Suq Saad Gishra
- MEFFIT Consultants

Private security company
- Private transportation companies
- Western Union
- Zein

Academic institutions/other
- CEDEJ
- University of Khartoum: Departments of Anthropology, Geography and Architecture.
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Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Carla Martinez and Maysaa Alghribawy of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) for generously seconding staff members to the study. Thanks also to Margie Buchanan-Smith (independent) for her support during the planning phase of the study and particularly with the recruitment of research team members. We are grateful to Agnès de Geoffroy (independent) for her generous help with contextual knowledge, recruitment of research staff and revision of drafts. We are extremely grateful to George and Nora Pagoulatos of the Acropolis Hotel in Khartoum, whose help with logistic issues was instrumental to the success of the fieldwork.

We would like to thank Dr. Tajelsir Mahjoub of the National Council for Strategic Planning for his support to the research and for his efforts in facilitating the research permits. We also gratefully acknowledge Dr. Abdul-Rahman Al-Khidir, the Wali of Khartoum, for his support to the study and for granting the research team the permits to undertake work in Khartoum. Special thanks are also due to Dr. Sharaf Bannaga, general manager of Bannaga Consult and former Minister of Engineering Affairs and Housing, Khartoum State, for his generous support to the study, provision of material and reviews of the manuscript.

We are especially grateful to the communities in Khartoum and interviewees from a wide range of stakeholders who generously gave their time to take part in this study.

The authors would also like to thank the many people who contributed in numerous ways to the study, including research support and the provision of documents and revisions of drafts, particularly Mustafa Babiker (University of Oman), Elisabetta Brumat (UNHCR), Mark Duffield (Bristol University), Asha Elkarib (SORD), Salah Mahmoud (Managing Director, Khartoum State New Structure Plan), Carla Martinez (IOM), Don McPhee (Plan International), Fernando Murrillo (UN-Habitat) and Liz Alden Wily (independent).

Special thanks go to Victoria Metcalfe and Sara Pavanello (HPG/ODI) for their help with finalising various sections of the report. The authors would also like to thank Matthew Foley for his expert editing of the paper.

ODI gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect DFID’s official policies.
City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan

Khartoum case study

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January 2011