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**"TRAINING IN TRANSITION"  
FROM DONOR FUNDED PROJECT TO  
NATIONAL NGO**

**A Study in Sustainability of  
"TRAINING, RESEARCH AND NETWORKING FOR DEVELOPMENT" (TREND)  
KUMASI, GHANA**

**AND**

**INSTITUTE FOR WATER AND SANITATION DEVELOPMENT  
(IWSD)  
HARARE, ZIMBABWE**

**Sponsored by**

**UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program**

**SEPTEMBER 1996  
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## FOREWORD

UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program commissioned this study of two training centres in Ghana (TREND) and Zimbabwe (IWSD) which are parts of the International Training Network.

Both Centres have been going through two critical transition processes:

- (a) from donor initiated projects placed within a University structure to independent national NGOs, and
- (b) from projects dependent on general donor support to centres generating their own income striving towards financial sustainability.

The two centres are widely considered as successful and provide as such unique opportunities to identify factors affecting the transition from donor-funded projects to self-sustainable NGOs. Hence, this is a study in the transformation of two organisations, and in lessons learnt about determinants of long term sustainability.

We will thank UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program and the East and Southern (RWSG-EA) and Western Africa (RWSG-WA) Offices for sponsoring this study, and also for the active support from TREND and IWSD staff and partners in Ghana and Zimbabwe.

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## **ACRONYMS**

<b>COWAP</b>	Community Water Project
<b>CWSD</b>	Community Water and Sanitation Department
<b>GOH</b>	Government of Ghana
<b>GWSC</b>	Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation
<b>IDRC</b>	International Development Research Centre.
<b>IDWSSD</b>	International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade
<b>IRWSSP</b>	Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme
<b>IWSD</b>	Institute for Water and Sanitation Development
<b>ITN</b>	International Training Network (for Water and Waste Management )
<b>KMA</b>	Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly
<b>KSP</b>	Kumasi Sanitation project
<b>NAC</b>	National Action Committee
<b>NCU</b>	National Co-ordination Unit
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>NMWP</b>	National Master Water Plan
<b>RWSGA</b>	Regional Water and Sanitation Group - East Africa (EA) and West Africa (WA)
<b>SIDA</b>	Swedish International Development Agency
<b>SIRDC</b>	Scientific Industrial Research and Development Centre
<b>TCWS</b>	Training Centre for Water and Sanitation
<b>TNC</b>	Technical Network Centre
<b>TREND</b>	Training, Research and Networking for Development
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UST</b>	University of Science and Technology, Kumasi
<b>WATSAN</b>	Water and Sanitation

## **1. TRAINING CENTRES IN TRANSITION:**

### **1.1. Background: The ITN Centres in Ghana and Zimbabwe**

The International Training Network for Water and Waste Management (ITN) was established in 1984 as a joint initiative of UNDP, the World Bank, and a number of bilateral donors in support of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD). The objective was to establish specialised centres in selected countries and regions for training, research, and information dissemination on appropriate water supply and sanitation technologies suitable for low-income population groups in rural and urban fringe areas of developing countries. The idea was that the centres would function not as isolated entities in their countries and regions, but as a global network for exchange of information and experience and mutual collaboration with support from the UNDP-World Bank Program in Washington and regional field teams (RWSGs) in Africa and Asia.

The Training Network Centre (TNC) was established in Kumasi, Ghana in 1989 located within the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Science and Technology. The Centre was funded by UNDP from 1989 to 1994 and received later general programme support from Danida. TNC gained gradually a high reputation in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana, and their services in human resource development were needed to follow up the new national strategy for the sector which emphasised community planning and management.

The complete integration of TNC in the University structure caused problems for the Centre from the first start, and with support from major donors and government authorities the TNC Director and staff decided in early 1995 to move out of the University and register "Training, Research and Networking for Development" (TREND) as a national NGO. By early next year, all general donor support ends and TREND will have to be financially sustainable.

The Training Centre for Water and Sanitation (TCWS) was also established in 1989 as an ITN centre within the Department of Civil Engineering, University of Zimbabwe with funding from UNDP and the Norwegian Government. The success of this project and the need to develop an independent institutional home for the further development of the Centre led to the formation in 1993 of a wholly non-governmental organisation called the Training Centre for Water and Sanitation (IWSD). The Institute maintained close links with the University and will first next year move from the University campus. Although the Institute is now independent, it continues to receive funding support on a declining basis from the Norwegian Government through the World Bank.

### **1.2. Purpose of the case studies**

The case studies show that the two ITN Centres are different, but with two important similarities:

- both were originally located in a university setting, and transformed into independent national non-governmental organisations,

- both were initially donor funded projects which increasingly generated their own income in order to become financially self-sustainable.

The purpose of the two case studies is:

- (a) To document and discuss what factors have influenced the transition process from donor-funded projects to independent self-sustainable national NGOs.
- (b) Identify and discuss external and internal factors explaining the performance of the Centres, and how they eventually will contribute to building organisational capacity and long term sustainability.<sup>1</sup>

The questions are broad and complex, but imply that this study is neither an evaluation of all aspects of the two centres, nor an assessment of impact of activities. The study has its focus on the organisational transformation process and the factors that influence performance and long term sustainability.

### 1.3. The cluster model of sustainability

The following model identifies and organises in clusters variables which influence performance and long-term sustainability. Performance is seen as an expression of organisational capacities, and an organisation is sustainable when able to mobilise and allocate sufficient resources to meet individual needs and public demands.

Similar studies indicate that performance and long-term sustainability depend on :


- (a) A group of external contextual factors which explain and justify that there are needs and demands "out there", and that there are clients who are able and willing to pay for services. Even the best quality services could not be sustained without perceived needs and expressed demands in the sector.<sup>2</sup>
- (b) A group of internal factors relating to three principal areas of ability:
  - An ability to be: i.e. to maintain an identity, values and purpose reflecting a comparative advantage and internal structures and systems to fulfil its purpose.
  - An ability to do: i.e. to deliver relevant and high quality services and achieve client satisfaction (performance).
  - An ability to relate: i.e. to manage external interactions while retaining sufficient autonomy and adapt to changing needs and demands among clients and in the country.

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<sup>1</sup> See Annex 1: Terms of reference.

<sup>2</sup> There is later introduced a distinction between sector needs and demands - based on the assumption that the water and sanitation has long term institutional development needs, which are not necessarily reflected in demands - and supported with available funds. The market has its imperfections when it comes to meeting long term human and institutional development needs.

The external factors are most fundamental in determining the potential for long term sustainability. A consultancy group will not survive if their services do not match needs and demands reflecting government policies, donor priorities, social and economic trends, etc. On the other hand only organisations who are able to position themselves in the market and successfully combine the above three abilities will survive over time and play a significant role. But demands do not provide a guarantee of survival. Internal abilities and qualities in the organisations are required to secure sustainable operations.<sup>3</sup>



#### OUTSIDE EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT

<sup>3</sup>Sustainability is too often identified with financial sustainability. The cluster model implies that financial resources is only one component in securing long term organisational sustainability.

The external factors are:

- sector policies and strategies,
- donor priorities and preferences,
- institutional arrangement.

The internal factors which are included in the analysis are the following:

**a. Purpose, values and strategy**

- Why the organisation exist (purpose)?
- What the organisation believes in (values)?
- What the unique contribution and distinctive competence is (strategy)?

**b. Programme profile**

- What range of services are offered?
- How do the services offered match external needs and demands?
- Who are the clients and users of various services?
- Strengths and weaknesses(gaps).

**c. Leadership and management**

- Does the organisation have a leader to provide strategic direction, organise and motivate staff and analyse the market effectively?
- Is the organisation able to reflect critically about itself and respond to new needs and mechanisms?

**d. Human resources**

- What are the skills required to perform the various services?
- Does the organisation have all needed skills for all activities?

**e. Financial resources**

- What are the sources of income?
- What are the cost of services?
- Are clients able and willing to pay for the services?
- What are the prospects to sustain all activities?

#### **f. Systems and structures**

Does the organisation have proven capabilities and mechanisms to plan, set priorities, coordinate, recruit and train staff, share information, budget, monitor and evaluate, relate to the public, etc.

#### **g. Organisational culture**

- Does the organisation offer job satisfaction?
- Are internal conflicts common/uncommon?
- Are purpose and values shared?
- Are incentives and compensations comparable with similar organisations?

#### **h. Performance**

- Does the organisation meet its targets and deadlines?
- Does the achievements compare well with other organisations?
- What is the standing (reputation) of the Centre?

#### **i. Linkages**

- Does the organisation interact effectively with clients and stakeholders in the sector?

#### **1.4. Method of work**

The case studies are based on review of relevant documentation, a 10 days field visit to Ghana and a 15 days visit to Zimbabwe with meetings and interviews with staff of the two centres, major clients, donors and relevant stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector in the respective countries. A visit to RWSG-EA was also included. A questionnaire was prepared based on the cluster-model, and used as a guide and checklist in interviews.

Chapter 2,3 and 4 build partly on inputs from Euan Pearson's report: "From TNC to TREND" (1996), but is reorganised and supplemented with information from other reports and interviews.

The international consultant prepared the introductory and concluding chapter, the Ghana case, and the last part of the Zimbabwe case (9&10). The first part of the case study from Zimbabwe (chapter 6,7 and 8) was prepared by the national consultant

The draft report was submitted to the two centres and to RWSG-WA and RWSG-EA for comments, before it was finalised.

## PART ONE: THE GHANA CASE: FROM TNC TO TREND

### 2. THE EARLY DAYS

#### 2.1. Background and objectives

The Training Network Centre (TNC) was established in Kumasi, Ghana in April 1989. The idea of a centre had been conceived two years earlier as part of the Government of Ghana's contribution to the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade (IDWSSD) and should have started in March 1988 with funding from the Canadian Government. When that source of funding failed to materialise, UNDP adopted the project as a component of its "Low-cost Human Wastes Management Pilot Project in Kumasi." The Ghana Government provided counterpart funding alongside UNDP's initial core funding. The UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program through the RWSG-WA acted as the executing agency.

The establishment of the Centre took place towards the end of the water and sanitation decade when there was increasing awareness about the needs for new approaches to the sector in Ghana. The timing of the Centre coincided also with the intensification of new activities in the country, and provided the Centre with opportunities to be involved in training and materials development for several sector projects.

The Centre, conceived within the framework of the International Training Network (ITN), became located within the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Science and Technology (UST) in Kumasi. UST seemed a natural choice, having acquired a reputation as a centre of excellence for research in water and sanitation. Collaboration with the University in training, and the need to document and disseminate the lessons of the Kumasi Sanitation Project gave the TNC an immediate, practical focus.

The development objective of the Centre was to "*build local capacity to bring about improvements in both the effectiveness of water supply and sanitation investments and the execution of service coverage, particularly in low-income groups in the urban fringe and rural areas.*"

More immediately, the Centre was tasked to "increase the capacity of government and other training institutions to train in low-cost, appropriate water supply and sanitation technologies by:

- conducting workshops for instructors,
- holding specialised courses for sector staff,
- strengthening undergraduate and post-graduate study programmes,
- promoting the use of low-cost WS&S technologies by technical support, training and information dissemination,
- conducting applied research, providing technical assistance and dissemination information and training materials to sector institutions."

The Centre was designed with an in-country perspective, but the project design also encouraged active interaction with other countries in the region, and participation in the activities of the ITN-network in pursuance of the above objectives.

## **2.2. The selection of host institution: looming problems**

The new centre was established as an integral part of the University, specifically within the Department of Civil Engineering and the TNC management was appointed by and reported directly to the Head of this Department. Another important component of the management structure was a Management Board which comprised of high level representation from all related sector ministries and institutions, as well as from the host University and Department. The Board met regularly, but acted only in an advisory capacity.

The selection of host institution and the complete integration of the Centre within the University and a Department with a dominant technical engineering tradition caused problems for the fledgling centre, which continued until the separation between the two in mid-1995.

In the beginning, there were problems especially regarding recruitment of qualified staff. Funding arrangements envisaged staff recruitment and conditions of service to be within the framework of the host University. The expectation was that this requirement would ensure a natural integration of staff into the University at the end of UNDP funding. This situation posed a serious problem to recruiting qualified staff who were put off by the prospect of a short-term project at Civil Service rates of pay. So it was to new graduates hand-picked by the new Manager, then a lecturer in the Civil Engineering Department, who became the nucleus of staff for the Centre.

## **2.3. Initial activities: The Kumasi Sanitation Project**

According to the project design, initial activities should focus on provision of support to the Kumasi Sanitation Project (KSP) including the conduct of a Sanitation Demand Survey for determining willingness of prospective beneficiaries to pay for different excreta disposal options. Centre staff played a role as enumerators and data entry personnel for this study. They also took part in the first study of conservancy labourers that revealed the high death rate among manual workers whose job it was to empty the city's night soil.

The field experiences served to expose the new staff to the realities of the urban water and sanitation sector and provided valuable practical training. At the same time, the Centre conducted workshops in the training needs of user agencies and field tested standard training modules prepared by the World Bank for ITN centres.

### **3. EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRE**

#### **3.1. Key landmarks in the development of TNC**

During the first three years of its existence (April 1989-March 1992) TNC was sustained by GOG subvention and mainly UNDP funds disbursed through the World Bank as the executive agency. After the initial three years a UNDP review mission recommended an extension, and funding continued for another two years, but on a considerable lower scale. Since 1994 the external funding from UNDP terminated, while Danida started to provide some core programme support from 1992.

Funding sources in the period from 1989 have been:

- UNDP funding (1989-1994)
- GOG contributions (1989-1995)
- Danida Core Funding (1992- to date)
- UNICEF(1994-1996)
- Internally generated funds from consultancies

The above are some of the external funding landmarks. When we consider internal development and consolidation, there are reasons to name 1993 as the year when TNC changed, expanded and finally took off from a long and difficult beginning. The following provides a brief review of important events in the life of the Centre before and after this year

The initial support to Kumasi Sanitation Project became an opportunity for TNC to immediately start with specific activities within a project context, but TNC never became the technical support agency it was thought to be for KSP, and gradually the two sister-projects drifted apart.<sup>4</sup>

By mid-1990 the Documentation Centre in TNC was established and a Communication Expert recruited. By end of the second year two more key personnel joined the group. However, the recruitment problems delayed the effective functioning of the centre with at least two years. But the atmosphere was still good. The image was of a handful of enthusiastic, highly-motivated, but inexperienced staff struggling to come to grips with a dynamic and fast-growing field in the rather staid, ivory-tower environment of a provincial university.

The preparation of training manuals and handouts got a boost when a World Bank recruited consultant facilitated in a writers workshop in 1991. Centre staff acquired essential skills from this

<sup>4</sup>Because of lack of qualified staff and experience, the Centre had very little to offer the pilot project, which drew its technical support mostly from the World Bank. When TNC set off to pursue its own projects, mainly in the rural sector, the siblings drifted apart. Hence, TNC was unable to participate in the documentation and dissemination of lessons from the Kumasi project which was later seen as a missed opportunity.

workshop, and set out to revise training manuals as well as guiding future work by the principles learnt. An other workshop focused on participatory skills including the use of role-play, drama, games, etc.

TNC became involved in the UNDP Volta Project from 1991 and an other project in Eastern Region also supported by UNDP from 1992, where the Centre provided training for several groups including District Management Teams, Project Extension Officers, artisans, communities and women's groups.

TNC forged links with other training institutions and made inputs to the training programmes of Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC), the Department of Community Health and UST - in particular to the teaching of third year and final year courses in Environmental Quality Engineering. But the links were, at best tenuous, due partly to the small training budgets of government institutions, low emphasis on low-cost techniques and partly to the Centre's need to generate its own funds and become self-sustaining.

### 3.2. 1993: Beginning of the Volta project

By late 1992, the Danida-funded Volta Rural Water and Sanitation Project was in its formulation stage. Thanks to advocacy from RWSG-WA, TNC became involved in the project formulation and was later identified as the most suitable and competent national institution to carry out training, materials development and institutional development for the Volta Project.

The contract for TNC's involvement also included a general support programme for internal capacity building involving substantial financial and technical support in the form of a part-time expatriate Training Adviser, a wide range of equipment and fellowships for TNC staff. The purpose of this support was to ensure the development of the Centre to a level where it could adequately support the new national sector strategy. This support was subsequently extended into Phase I (over the period from 1994-1997) of the project. The new sector strategy for water and sanitation required a major reorientation in concepts and thinking at all levels - from public service delivery to community based ownership and management of water and sanitation facilities. The new strategy included consequently a large human resource and institutional development component, and both CWSA and major donors were of the opinion that TNC was not the only, but at that time the best qualified and well placed institution to follow up on this component.

TNC became subsequently the main training consultant to the Volta project, designing training and promotional materials, training project managers and extension officers, etc. The Centre produced a variety of materials including a Participatory Tools Kit for use in the field, technical manuals, training videos and designed and supervised the implementation of institutional development schemes for selected sector institutions within the Volta Region.

According to the new Director who took over in 1993, the involvement in the Danida-sponsored Volta Region Project was critical for the development of TNC. The Project started at a time when

UNDP funding was ending and there was increasing pressure for the Centre to find new sources of funding. The project provided opportunities to strengthen TNC's income generating capacity and general entrepreneurial development. The concomitant general support to the TNC provided the needed resources for staff development and enabled the Centre to acquire necessary equipment.

In the next two years, following the inception of the Volta Project, the Centre's fortunes changed dramatically. An intense programme of staff training, together with broad experience in the field, transformed what had been a disparate group of young recruits into an integrated team of professionals: engineers, sociologists, graphic artists, and training experts. The team was able to respond quickly to a fast-evolving sector and learn new techniques that enabled them to become leaders in such areas as community management, gender issues, and participatory training methods.

The Volta project represented also the seed of change that moved TNC further away from the university setting and ultimately to the separation in 1995.

### **3.3. New national training needs**

The maturation of TNC coincided with a great upsurge in the level of investment in the community water sector, reflecting the government's increased attention to issues of rural development. The emphasis in the new water and sanitation strategy followed a demand-driven approach, community ownership and management, and the increased role of private sector in the construction of facilities. Civil servants were to become agents of change rather than administrators. The new approach called for a dynamic programme of training, information dissemination, monitoring and evaluation of field activities. TNC was perceived as the focal point and resource group for the development of human resources in the sector.

This explains the context and rationale for TNC's involvement with the new national "Community Water and Sanitation Programme" funded by the World Bank from 1994. The Centre should play a key role in areas like curricula and materials development, information dissemination, applied research, training of trainers, institutional development and networking among key stakeholders in the sector. To play such a role, TNC could not only rely on past experiences and relative strengths, but had to build competence in new areas - in order to become a resource centre for the sector and "a centre of excellence" in its area. It is currently involved in the implementation of the World Bank (IDA) financed pilot project covering four regions of the country.

### **3.4. Collaboration with UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program**

Coordination and management support from the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program was critical through the inception period, and the Centre would not have survived without such support given the lack of experience among the staff and the constraints within the structure of the University.

The most important contribution came from the Country Coordinators office located in Accra. Through this office, communication and interaction with the Regional office in Abidjan (RWSG-WA) and the ITN HQ in Washington were maintained. TNC participated regularly in the regional ITN network meetings, but their relevance and impact were questioned since the other centres followed other approaches and direction than TNC. TNC was neither part of the electronic information network, and did not benefit effectively from sharing of information between the centres.<sup>5</sup>

The Country Coordinator played the following roles:

- Provided active advise and support with the establishment of TNC and the preparation and formalisation of the Agreement with the Ghana Government.
- As part of a package arranged by the ITN Headquarters in Washington, a link was established with the International Reference Centre (IRC) based in the Hague that led to the supply of needed literature to the Centre's documentation Centre.
- Progress monitoring, financial control and procurement of equipment and vehicles.
- Provision of training for core staff in 1989-1992.

Later, when the Centre was better established, the close liaison of the Country Coordinator with the host University authorities ensured some level of dispensation that enabled the Centre to start consultancy activities. To buttress this effort, the RWSG advocated for a recognition and utilisation of the Centre by sector investors and helped in linking the Centre to its first few clients.

### **3.5. Staffing and financial resources**

The staffing from 1989 to 1996 has been:

Professionals	Software	3	4	4	4	4	8	8	11
	Hardware	2	3	3	3	3	4	4	5
Manager		1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Admin.staff		1	1	1	1	2	2	2	4
Total		7	9	9	9	10	15	15	21

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<sup>5</sup>The University did not allow TNC to install its own telephone and fax-system despite the fact that financial resources were available. E-mail connection was first established in August 1996.

The figures illustrate the evolution and major landmarks in TNC/TREND's history. There are important new recruitments both in 1993/94 and 1995/96. Staff with non-engineering background was in majority from 1994. The Administrative Unit was first established after independence from the University.

In the first phase the Centre was almost completely dependent on UNDP financial support. But TNC managed to increasingly generate more funds through consultancy work. A Danida mission stated in 1994 that "*currently the Centre largely exists as a self-financing consultancy group within the University since the end of UNDP funding in March 1994, where income generated by the TNC is apportioned with 10% to the UST, 20% to the SOE, and varying percentages for the TNC welfare fund, the depreciation fund, and staff at management and operational level. For completed assignments in the first half year of 1994 approx. 45% of gross income was apportioned*" (Danida 1994, p.9).

### **3.6. Achievements and failures**

What were the achievements of TNC from its initial data collection effort within the framework of KSP in 1979 to the establishment of TREND in mid-1995? And in what areas were TNC's major failures or under-achievements? For several reasons the answers are difficult to find:

- Information on achievements is scattered in various documents not easily available, and some are not available at all since the University has denied access to former TNC files.
- Most reports refer to achievements in terms of outputs (seminars, trainees, productions, consultancies and reports), while there have been less efforts to link outputs with outcomes or achievement in terms of long term impact (e.g. training may not lead to changes and improvements in individual attitudes and behaviour nor in organisational or institutional reforms).
- There have been no evaluation (impact assessment) trying to measure outcomes and impact - related to the original project objectives, and TNC has been more eager to implement than record and assess activities and inputs.

The following is a summary of achievements as reflected in available documents and expressed in interviews with staff and clients.

#### **\* Under-achievement**

The Danida Mission of 1994 states that "*TNC has not in its five years of operation been able to achieve all the original objectives and thus fulfil the original vision. Nevertheless, it has succeeded in developing from a less recognised unit with young and inexperienced staff to being nearly a self-sustaining consulting group and is today regarded as a leading resource Centre within the water and sanitation sector with a potential for serving as a pivot of research, information dissemination and networking activities*".

**\* Dominance of project-related training activities**

In the first three years, the scope and type of activities were limited to implementation of specific assignments, most project-related training and technical studies project. Training of target groups under various projects were designed and conducted by TNC staff, training materials were developed and prepared and produced in relatively small numbers.

A TNC Newsletter was initiated in this period and published irregularly with sub-optimal quality.

**\* Limited applied research and imbalance in programme profile**

Research activities were scarce in the first years - a pattern which has remained throughout, because of lack of funds, research expertise, but also because of the focus on income-generating projects. TNC followed the market and went where the money was to be found: in training, materials production, etc. for projects funded by multi- and bilateral donors. Hence, there was an imbalance in programme profile towards training with less attention on and activities in information dissemination, applied research and networking with other institutions, which were more difficult to fund, and if funded with lower rates than project consultancies.

**\* Towards a more comprehensive approach**

From 1993, there was an important conceptual and practical reorientation to training in TNC where focus was increasingly shifted to organisational development and capacity building of training institutions, programme coordination, development of comprehensive tailor-made training programmes and systems, training of trainers, coaching of professional project staff, professional mass production of visual training materials and manuals, provision of technical support, etc. - complementing the traditional project- and technically related training.

The Centre became also increasingly involved in developing sector strategy and networking. In early 1993, it participated in the preparation of a paper on Human Resources Development for the rural water supply and sanitation sector strategy.

**\* High quality of services and standing in the market**

Quality of services were considered to be high and clients expressed satisfaction with TNC's efforts.

**\* Not yet a National Resource Centre**

TNC was recognised as an important resource centre for the water and sanitation sector, but had so far only taken the first steps towards the challenge of being a national focal point, and a "centre of excellence" in its area of operation.

**\* Marginal impact at University level**

TNC had some inputs to the teaching of third year and final year courses in Environmental Quality Engineering at the University in Kumasi, but the efforts were tenuous due to lack of resources, interest and the Centre's need to generate income and become self-sustaining.

The potential constructive interchange with the mother-university remained unfulfilled.

## 4. TRANSITION FROM TNC TO TREND

### 4.1. Events leading up to the transition:

#### (a) The emerging consultancy group at UST

The most comprehensive external evaluation of the Centre's performance was in February 1992, at the end of the first phase of UNDP funding. The key findings of the evaluation were:

That the Centre was firmly established as a resource centre for the sector and due progress had been made in the development of training methods and quality training materials, as well as in the area of documentation and information.

The Centre had however far from realised its full potential. It had effectively suffered a two years delay due to the impossibility of appointing suitable qualified and experienced staff. More staff development, including exposure to practical low-cost water and sanitation situations was required to further consolidate staff ability and performance.

Management had been weak: TNC lacked a vision and had no business plan to guide it. There was a noticeable absence of targets for performance and little forward planning. The Report also pinpointed "*insufficient collaboration with other sector agencies*" and "*inadequate exposure of TNC staff to practical low-cost water supply and sanitation situations*".

The need for TNC to operate on a more commercial basis was also identified, and it was recommended that local consultants should be hired to review operations and propose a business plan that would lead to a TNC that was more responsive to clients' demands and had "*some level of autonomy to manage its own finances and personnel*."

TNC responded to the challenge by further stepping up its consultancy activities in the field. The new clients and contracts for TNC, and the Centre's increasing ability to generate its own income provided additional resources to the University, but contributed also to widen the gap between the two organisations, leading up to the emerging conflict. TNC was in the process of becoming too independent, and required a different and more independent status in order to function effectively.

#### (b) The constraining environment

A second UNDP Final Tripartite Review in March 1994 acknowledged the achievements since the last evaluation in 1992, and commended the efforts made towards financial sustainability, strengthened management and continued staff development. It noted that there were no comparable institution among TNC's potential competitors.

The report identified market opportunities of US \$ 1.2 million for the period 1995-97, but there was a serious reservation and major problem facing TNC: the growing dissatisfaction among

clients and stakeholders with the institutional set up which was "hampering the capacity for growth and expansion". The constraints were:

- Administrative inflexibility causing liquidity problems, delays and operational bottlenecks.
- Constraints on staff mobility resulting in disappointment to clients and a negative perception of TNC's ability to perform.
- Non-competitive rates of pay leading to low staff motivation.
- Inflexibility of recruiting staff and resource persons on contract.
- Inadequate office facilities and equipment.
- Lack of telephones/fax and generally poor communications.
- Advisory Management Board unable to fill its functions.

These drawbacks became larger and more evident as TNC moved out from the UNDP-umbrella in March 1994 to become a self-financing, income-generating unit within UST.

#### **c. Clashes between structures, cultures and personalities**

The structural adjustment policies of the government led to restrictions on recruitment of new University staff which meant that TNC could not be incorporated into the University structure, as was originally envisaged. The only chance for survival (in the absence of continued donor funding) was for the Centre to generate its own income.

It also appeared that the University had a culture making it difficult to accommodate an outreach group whose survival depended on continued income-generation from consultancy activities.

Despite the upsurge in field activities with its potential for increased income for the university, requests to raise even small imprest were routinely turned down, creating acute liquidity problems for the Centre. Field trips were financed on an ad-hoc basis by requests for special advances which had to be individually approved by the Dean, and took weeks to process. The university policy of non-recruitment made it impossible to take on extra staff except on short-term contracts. Staff were disgruntled at the refusal to raise the level of travel allowances to meet rising costs, when the UNDP rate being charged to clients had virtually doubled.

The structural and institutional problems were gradually worsened through the deterioration in communication and interaction between key TNC and University personalities. The fundamental problems were structural, but to some extent the institutional problems became personalised, when the pressure for change became stronger and the conflict more tense.

#### **d. Increasing donor pressure: The role of Danida**

The problems started to affect staff morale and TNC's performance, and the clients became concerned and complained about TNC's lack of ability to deliver services due to the University context, the absence of audited reports of contracts for review and the general lack of transparency in University procedures. There was a large question mark over what happened to

the Government of Ghana's annual subvention to TNC. All of these adversely affected the image of TNC and its ability to respond to clients requests.

During this period Danida had seconded a Training adviser to TNC who became instrumental in keeping Danida informed and aware of the growing dissatisfaction. The situation was perceived as so acute by Danida as the main funder and client, that a Review Mission was initiated to clarify the problems of the Centre and help to formulate a strategy and action plan for the next 3-5 years. The plan had to be supported by key stakeholders and approved by UST which was given a deadline of three months to respond.

#### **4.2.Options available**

The Mission discussed four possible options for TNC:

**(a) Unit within School of Engineering/UST:**

This solution would maintain status quo, and was the model with least autonomy since the Centre was to become fully integrated into the University system. The unit would become accountable to the Head of the Department, who essentially performed as the chief executive of the Centre. All staff were required to be employed on UST conditions, and there was little prospect that they would be permanently appointed. The Unit should not have its own accounts, but be administered by its Schools accounting and financial section.

**(b) Semi-autonomous unit within UST**

Models of semi-autonomous units within UST existed already, like the Technical Consulting Centre(TCC), Land Administration Research Centre (LARC) and Bureau of Integrated Rural Development (BIRD). According to this model, TNC would be accountable to the Executive Council through a Management Board composed of key UST officials.

**(c) Registered NGO outside the University**

In Zimbabwe, TNC's sister organisation, the Institute of Water and Sanitation Development had already been registered as an independent non-profit making NGO in the water and sanitation sector, though, still physically placed within the University of Zimbabwe. According to this model sector needs and interests would be strongly represented in a Management Board, and close links maintained with the School of Engineering with regard to policy development. However, in its administrative and financial operations, the Centre would be completely autonomous from the University, and adhere to its own rules and regulations.

**(d) Commercial consulting group**

The model of establishing a private consulting group was placed at the extreme end on the scale of autonomy.

The Mission recommended that TNC should be established as an independent, semi-autonomous unit directly accountable to the Executive Council of UST through a Management Board. Since

prime activities were long term human resources and institutional development of educational and training institutions, TNC should preferable be placed within a recognised educational and research institution with sufficient technical expertise.

The first option was considered as non-starter even if it turned out to be the only one the University would support. The last option was not viewed as viable given the special needs of the sector. It was also considered as doubtful that TNC with its experience and staffing would be able to sustain itself as a consulting group in competition with similar groups and companies. The NGO model was not favoured for reasons of weak administrative and financial accountability, and the risk of loss of public confidence in the TNC.

#### **4.3. Formation of TREND**

The Danida Report was submitted to the University in December 1994. Despite admonitions by the various stakeholders, including the Directorate of the Community Water and Sanitation Division, the Danish Embassy, RWSG-WA, the Ministry of Finance and various attempts by local and external stakeholders to initiate dialogue with the University based on the Mission's report, the University never responded.

A Joint Review Team, again fielded by Danida, in March 1995, concurred with the view of TNC that the deteriorating situation could lead to mass resignations by the staff and the disintegration of the Centre. It proposed then the establishment of TNC as an NGO with broad sector representation on its advisory board "to avert the total loss of confidence of clients and prevent the potential split up of the group".

In May 1995, the Management Director and all staff made the final decision to register "Training, Research and Networking for Development"(TREND) Group as an NGO, limited by guarantee as a non-profit making organisation. The new organisation came into effect on 1 July 1995. For a while, there was a curious interregnum while the Centre sought new premises and an amicable settlement for the hand-over of vehicles and equipment procured for various projects. Then abruptly, in September 1995, the group was locked out of the University, without warning, and its equipment impounded.

For a few weeks TREND had no fixed premises as its new offices were being fitted out. In October the Group moved into a two-storey building on the southern edge of the city.

With the approval of the Community Water and Sanitation Division, funds from Danida's General Support Programme to the Sector were utilised to help finance the relocation. These funds were also used to buy two new vehicles, photocopier, graphics-, video- and computer-equipment. After protracted negotiations UST reluctantly handed over all project equipment donated by Danida (but not by UNDP and World Bank - including two of its four vehicles). TREND used its own funds to further procure an additional vehicle and computer equipment.

#### **4.4. Who moved the transition process?**

Danida took in 1994 over the role played earlier by the World Bank/UNDP Programme, and was a key external mover of the transition process to an extent that the University management interpreted Danida's concern and activities as illegitimate donor pressure vis à vis a national institution.

In hindsight, the lack of interest or rather reluctance from the University to find a compromise is surprising. It could be caused by vested interests in the existing model, and a belief that status quo would remain after all heated discussions. Or the conflict had reached a stage where key personalities were not willing or able to change without losing face. The only official reason for maintaining status quo is reflected in a letter from the School of Engineering to the Vice Chancellor of the University where it is stated:

*I would like to stress that....TNC was set up as an outreach unit of the Department of Civil Engineering and NOT to function as a consulting organisation.....diverting their attention away from their primary role."*

The World Bank /UNDP Programme played a low key role in the early discussions and negotiations about future TNC scenarios from 1994 and onwards, which partly can be explained by the closing of the Accra office early 1994. However, key staff from the World Bank (Washington) came in at the end, took part in the discussions with the University and supported the option of establishing TREND as an NGO.

Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation and the Community Water and Sanitation Division (GWSD) were also fully supportive of the process of establishing TREND as an NGO in the water and sanitation sector.

It is not correct to say that the transition was only a donor-driven process. Donors played a key role at different stages, but national institutions in the water and sanitation sector were fully in support of establishing TREND outside the University structure.<sup>6</sup> The Director and his staff could not see any alternative and made the final move out of the University setting.

#### **4.5. Why the NGO option?**

The NGO model was not originally the option recommended by the Danida mission, and was chosen after the other options were excluded or found not feasible. The NGO sector is broad and expanding, but TNC/TREND is not among the traditional value-driven membership organisations that constitutes civil society in a country. TREND could be seen more as an independent

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<sup>6</sup> All interviews conducted confirm this statement. There was no viable alternative at that time and all key stakeholders supported the formation of TREND.

*Sought*

foundation placed within a sector, having a non-profit profile. The Centre ~~sought~~ to pursue certain ideas, values and approaches in the water and sanitation sector, like low-cost technologies, emphasis on the rural poor, supporting participatory and responsive strategies, etc.

TREND staff referred to a pragmatic and practical reason for TREND to become an NGO, and not a for-profit consulting group. Continued general support funding from Danida would depend on the selection of the NGO option. As such the NGO option could be seen as the end-result taking place more by default than by design.

We believe that this issue is more fundamental and complex. It relates to the identity and purpose of TREND. CWS and key donors wanted TREND to become a national resource centre for the water and sanitation sector - being more than a new private consulting group. The next chapter discusses what it entails to be a professional resource and networking centre, how it relates to identity, partners, skills requirements, performance standards and roles vis à vis various other consulting groups operation in the sector.

## 5. TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY?

### 5.1. Consolidation

TREND has only been operational for about a year and the consolidation of the organisation is still going on. But TREND made a good beginning. All TNC staff resigned and joined the new group in 1995. They were all enthusiastic and committed to the future of TREND. Continued cooperation from major clients and stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector was assured and precautions were taken to avoid disruption to the implementation of ongoing contracts. TNC had also over the years earned a reputation as a leading resource centre within the sector, and the new independent status of TREND raised expectation about future achievements.

TREND was established with the following objectives:

- (a) Contribute to sector development through human resources development and institutional strengthening.
- (b) Promote and undertake the training of water and sanitation personnel and trainers.
- (c) Develop information support services for providing state-of-the-art information to support the sector.
- (c) Promote and undertake applied research relevant to the sector.
- (d) Serve as a focal point for the coordination of a national network for the development of training and information management in the sector.

TREND should maintain its outlook as an independent resource group and the multi-disciplinary staff would promote the new emphasis of the national sector strategy.

Ownership of TREND was to be anchored in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana, and the operations should reflect a desire to network with other sector organisations, including NGOs and the private sector.

To this end TREND should:

- Continue to focus mainly on supporting activities in the low-cost water and sanitation sector.
- Maintain close contacts with all major stakeholders of TREND through the establishment of a management and advisory board with representation from CWSD, relevant sector institutions, external support agencies and selected individuals.
- Continue to maintain membership and follow the principles of ITN.
- Seek close ties with educational and research institutions, including UST and other Universities in the country based on the needs of the new sector strategy.

Currently, TREND has a total of 21 professional staff: 5 with an engineering background and 11 with "software" training. Under the Managing Director there are four Units:<sup>7</sup>

- Management Training and Information Unit
- Materials Development and Video Production Unit
- Technical and Institutional Management Unit
- Finance and Administration Unit

The Management Group is composed of the four Unit Heads. At the moment, the Technical Adviser to the Director (seconded by DANIDA as part of the General Support Programme) visits TREND periodically, but this arrangement ends next year.

### **5.2. An organisational assessment**

TREND is through a turbulent transformation process. The Centre has established itself as an independent NGO outside the University structure and gained sufficient autonomy to operate effectively. As such the organisational transition has been successful. But at a different level TREND is in the middle of a more fundamental transformation where the Centre used to rely on general financial support from donors, but will soon have to cover recurrent and future capital costs through payment for services. TNC/TREND has for several years generated substantial amounts of income through contracts, but UNDP and later Danida has so far secured a financial basis for the Centre.<sup>8</sup>

Two overall questions will be discussed:

- (a) How TNC/TREND has managed the transformation from a donor supported Centre to an independent self-financed national NGO?
- (b) What external and internal factors explain the relative success and performance of TREND, and how will the same factor contribute to building organisational capacity and long term sustainability for TREND?

The following discussion is organised according to the cluster model introduced in chapter 1. The model is analytical and only used to arrange and discuss a complex situation. We are first addressing the external factors relevant to the water and sanitation sector in Ghana, and proceed then with the discussion of internal variables.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup>The position as Deputy Director was abandoned earlier this year in order to make the organisational structure more horizontal.

<sup>8</sup>The General Support Programme from Danida will end early next year and has consisted of fellowship, technical support and equipment (vehicles and computers).

<sup>9</sup>We are only able to select key variables and issues which are referred to in documents and interviews carried out in a short visit to Ghana. A complete analysis would have required more time and a more in-depth understanding of forces forming TREND's future in the Ghanaian context.

### 5.3. The context: Opportunities in the sector

The situation in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana has provided and still provides TREND with ideal opportunities. The sector is evolving fast. The new national strategy prepared for huge investments both in the urban and rural sector. A few key bilateral and multilateral donors are supportive to the Government's efforts and cover major parts of the necessary investments (more than 90%). The new national policy emphasises decentralisation of services and management leading to a redefinition of roles for government agencies, district authorities and local communities. The new approach and the large investments have created new requirements and needs for reorientation, training, organisational and institutional changes. The sector and in particular CWSD and donors needed a centre like TNC/TREND. If it had not existed, such a Centre had to be established.<sup>10</sup>

TNC was in ideal situation and TREND may still build its future on two basic premises: That there are needs in the sector for TREND's services, and clients who are willing and able to pay. It is critical that TREND matches contextual needs, but it is equally important that TREND provides high quality services (to maintain confidence and support of major clients), be able to maintain a profile, think critically about itself, change and adapt as the needs of the sector and clients change.

The Government is favourable towards the private NGO sector, and does encourage the use and involvement of both private for- and non profit groups. As such the decision to establish an independent TREND did not constrain, but rather support its operations.

What are the future prospects, and who are the potential new clients for TREND? Current investment plans for the sector end early next century. The training- and capacity building needs will change in form and direction, but exist for the next five to ten years. A more relevant question is to what extent there will be clients to demand and pay for TREND's services. TREND is currently dependent on the availability of donor funds for all its contracts.<sup>11</sup> So far there are long term donor commitments. If there are no radical changes in fundamental socio-political factors, there will most likely be a market for TREND services.

The critical factor for sustaining TREND over the next few year is more fundamentally related to

<sup>10</sup> In UNDP Final Report of 1994 the following vision for TNC was expressed: "...In the next decade, the Government of Ghana will make substantial investments in rural water supply and urban sanitation, and while most of the investments will go towards the construction of new facilities, much effort will go towards training the many people required to implement the envisioned programme. In this training, TNC will become the focal point for information on the full range of water and sanitation technologies and the latest training techniques. Network centre staff will also play a leading role in developing the training materials that will be needed to implement large scale water and sanitation programmes.."(p.27).

<sup>11</sup> TREND's financial situation is described later.

The critical factor for sustaining TREND over the next few years is more fundamentally related to how TREND is able to position itself in the sector,<sup>12</sup> how they relate to clients and changing needs and to what extent the Centre is able to deliver high-quality services in an increasingly competitive market.

There are also two other contextual factors which explain the success of TREND. There have been few, if any competitors to TREND in the sector. Both commercial consulting groups and non-profit NGOs are increasingly realising market opportunities for providing training- and capacity building services ("software components"), and may compete with TREND for contracts in the future. If TREND becomes complacent, the Centre may rapidly lose previous dominant market shares.

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There is also another external factor to the success of TREND. Not only needs and demands were in place in a market with no competitors. Key stakeholders in the sector (in particular CWSA and donors) wanted TNC/TREND to succeed and contributed actively to their success. TREND was rooted in the sector. It was first established within a UNDP-World Bank framework to promote new low-cost and people-oriented approaches, and deliberately selected by CWSA and donors as a major instrument in the follow up of the human resource- and capacity building approaches pursued in the new national strategy.

TNC was not conceived and later perceived as "just an other" consulting group. It was designed as a national resource centre with short term tasks, but also with a long term mandate in institutional and sector development. As such, TREND was given positive preferential treatment. UNDP-World Bank introduced TNC to Danida within a national resource building framework, and Danida selected TREND as the main training consultant to their new Volta Water and Sanitation Project because of relevance and quality, but also in order to support and strengthen a national centre.<sup>13</sup> The General Support Programme from Danida to TREND was explicitly designed with the same purpose. TNC would not have become TREND and acquired its current status and position if it had not been conceived and promoted as a national resource centre.


#### **5.4. Programme profile**

What is the programme profile of TREND? What services do they offer and in what areas do they have competence, experience and relative strengths compared with other groups? And in what direction does TREND want to move? What are the new opportunities and what are the constraints?

<sup>12</sup> TNC/TREND were for a long time in an almost de facto monopoly situation.

<sup>13</sup> The well resourced project in Volta Region could have used local expertise (at least after a while) and not depended on consultants from Kumasi - four to five hours drive from Ho - the centre of Volta Region.

The following diagram illustrates some of the options available for a Centre like TREND, and will be used to describe where TREND is today, and in what direction TREND possibly can move.



### Stage 1: School based teaching/lecturing:

The Centre provides teaching/lecturing to colleges/universities in specialised topics relevant to the water and sanitation sector. The main purpose is to convey new knowledge to students in a class room situation.

*Key competence:* Specialised knowledge.

### Stage 2: In-service training:

The Centre prepares and conducts short courses/seminars with participants from various projects. The purpose is to convey "how to do...." knowledge to the students on specific topics (e.g. to train artisans in the construction of new latrines). The Centre develops also written and audio-visual material for the training.

*Key competence:* Training/pedagogical skills.

### **Stage 3: On-service training**

The Centre provides training for project staff and beneficiaries tailored to the needs of the project (project related training). In the first phase, the Centre is directly involved in the training of both extension staff and local communities. Later the emphasis is to train the trainers(TOT), and leave the direct training of beneficiaries to local staff.

Two types of training also emerge: First, the topic oriented "how to do..." , but increasingly training in process-skills and the human and social dimensions of development are included. The training includes participatory techniques, community organisation, communication skills, gender awareness, etc. The materials production continues as before, but includes other topics and requires different approaches.

*Key competence:*      Process-oriented training skills with emphasis on community involvement and management.

### **Stage 4: Organisational development**

Capacity building, organisational and institutional development are often used interchangeably, and with loose operational definitions, if any at all.<sup>14</sup>

In organisational development, the Centre is involved in organisational assessments, coaching of individual staff, curriculum development, work with the management group (leadership development), etc.

*Key competence:*      Strategic, analytical and communication skills (process consultants).

### **Stage 5: Institutional (sector) development**

The Centre is not only involved with individual projects or with specific organisations, but with the entire sector. It takes an active part in networking - linking groups in the sector through seminars and workshops, coordination (joint meetings and discussions), sharing of information (newsletter), documentation (evaluation) and applied research and dissemination of international experiences in order to keep key stakeholder in the sector informed about "state-of-the art".

*Key competence:*      Networking, communication/presentation, analytical/research.

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<sup>14</sup> The term organisational development refers to the strengthening of individual organisations, like a school, an NGO, an enterprise etc. Institutions represent broader sets of norms and values that regulate certain parts of the society - and we may here define the water and sanitation sector as an institution. Institutional development involves efforts to strengthen the entire sector and not only individual parts. Capacity building may be used for both organisational and institutional development.

### **Stage 5: Regionalisation**

The next two steps are on different level than the previous. Regionalisation implies broadening of ongoing activities to other countries in the region, either by inviting regional participants to training in Ghana or through regional sub-programmes.

*Key competence:* As before, but most likely new language (French).

### **Stage 5: Internationalisation**

The Centre participates in international networks through meetings, seminars and exchange of information. It may also include that senior staff takes part in the international consultancy market.

*Key competence:* In addition to the former: high technical reputation, international contacts and personal networks.

Where is TREND today? It is basically where it was four to five years ago - at stage two and three - providing a combination of skills- and process-oriented courses to individual projects. Their major clients are projects who demand project-related services. TREND's key competence is still in training and materials production.

There are also new dimensions: TREND has been involved in organisational development in the Volta project, and carried out an institutional assessment of a training school with a view of strengthening the capacity of the school in areas like curriculum development, training of personnel, etc. But this is a relatively new area for TREND where they have scarce in-house expertise, and draws on consultants from the University.

TREND is further involved in sector building through networking and coordination, but it is difficult to assess the scope, quality and impact of these activities. TREND has also through the Director and the ITN network an international link, but so far not any regional outreach. There are some examples where TREND has played a role in documentation, sector studies and dissemination of information. The research component is and has always been weak.

TREND has maintained its original idea: promotion of low-cost technologies in the water and sanitation sector through community based planning and management, and has inserted new components in its work which has gradually expanded the scope and mandate of the Centre.

#### **5.5. Purpose, values and strategy in transition?**

The preceding presentation of alternative options for a future TREND, addresses the more fundamental issues about TREND's purpose, values and status as a national NGO and resource centre in the sector.

TREND has to answer at least three questions:

- \* *Purpose* - why does the Centre exists?
- \* *Values* - what are important to the Centre?
- \* *Strategy* - what is its unique contribution and distinctive competence?<sup>15</sup>

TNC could have become a commercial Consulting Inc. in the water and sanitation sector as "any other" consulting group. A few people interviewed seemed not to make any distinction between TREND as a national non-profit resource centre and a commercial firm.

But, there are important differences. As an NGO TREND is still "owned" by the water and sanitation sector and governed by a Board of Directors representing key stakeholders.<sup>16</sup> A private firm is owned by its shareholders and could not easily be anchored in the sector itself - representing a broad group of interests .

A private group would neither have been a National Resource Group,nor taken on the broad range of activities envisaged for stage 5 (sector building):

- networking
- coordination
- documentation/information sharing
- research

A private group would be less able to meet the broader and long term institutional developments needs of the sector. Such groups would primarily serve expressed demands and work for clients who are able and willing to pay.

TREND could still become a private consulting group and concentrate on services at stage one to four. Would TREND then have been able to survive? With the existing opportunities in the water and sanitation sector in Ghana such an approach could have been viable, but would have involved dramatic changes and slimming of staff.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>15</sup> In other words: a comparative advantage/relative strength which explains what only this Centre can do or can do better than others.

<sup>16</sup> The Board is in the process of being established.

<sup>17</sup> The Volta project is the main client for TREND, and brings in more than 70% of its income. This project collaborates deliberately with TREND in a broader sense - to strengthen the national resources base. The project may not use TREND in the future from a purely market oriented perspective - at least not at the same level as before and such a decision will have serious negative short term implications for TREND.

A more acute dilemma is that TREND will not be financially sustainable as a National Resource Centre focusing on long term development needs, unless such activities are externally funded. In a purely demand driven market, long term sector needs tend to suffer. Such needs are however expressed in the national strategy, and key donors to the sector seem willing to cover the cost.

TREND has to focus its direction. As a National Resource Centre, TREND has to adopt a future strategy which express and reflect its distinctive contribution.

### **5.5. Leadership and management**

The Director represents the Centre among clients, ensures professional credibility and legitimacy, provides direction and strategic leadership and makes sure that the Centre has a motivated and competent staff able to deliver high-quality services.

From interviews it appears that TREND has a Director - professionally well respected within the sector and able to recruit and build a multi-disciplinary team of dedicated professionals. He took a lead in moving TNC out of the University and has been able to establish TREND to what it is today.<sup>18</sup> Effective leadership of TREND has definitely contributed to the Centre's performance and current standing in the water and sanitation sector.

A different question is to what extent TREND is too dependent on its current Manager, making the Centre vulnerable and less sustainable if a change of top-manager would be necessary. Several NGOs tend to depend too much on strong and influential leaders. This seems also true for TREND. Current staff is young and there is a lack of more senior staff in the new areas of work.

The challenge will be to negotiate a future strategy with TREND's major clients in close consultation with the staff and make sure that the Centre has a viable financial basis. TREND has managed to broaden its scope of activities, but the idea of a National Resource Centre requires translation of intentions to programmes.

### **5.6. Human resources**

TREND's mission is to facilitate human development in a hardware dominated sector. The Centre is still involved in technical designs and issues related to technology options, construction manuals etc., but has increasingly placed the technological dimension in a human and organisational development perspective. It is difficult to confirm to what extent TREND has been able to merge the engineering and social science cultures, and gained from a positive cross fertilisation - or just kept the two traditions separate. There are still a Training and a Technical Unit working on different assignments, but there seems to be minimal professional orthodoxy on both sides.

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<sup>18</sup> Donor funded projects often recruit the good number two's - workers of high calibre, but not the typical entrepreneurs who are willing and able to take risks. TREND is here an exception.

TREND has young and dedicated staff - excellent trainers, experts in materials- and video-productions and engineers with "state-of-the art knowledge" in low-cost water and sanitation technologies. Few have experience in applied research or more specialised areas. The Centre has more training expertise than competence and background in organisational and institutional analysis and development. TREND may consequently not have sufficient competence in areas where they now intend to move. An institutional assessment was recently carried out of Ho Institute of Technology using consultants from the University.

TREND has a core staff in current priority areas, but may have to strengthen its capacity in the areas of applied research and institutional development - if they decide to give more priority to these areas. Otherwise, TREND would most likely benefit from keeping a relative small core staff with the ability to cultivate and utilise a network of technical experts and draw on these experts when required.

### **5.7. Organisational culture**

At the end of the TNC period, staff morale started to disintegrate and key staff looked for other job opportunities. But the struggle with the University system also brought staff together, and it was a united team that started TREND in 1995. TNC had previously been donor-funded, but the staff was never "spoilt" by favourable and special working conditions. The terms and conditions had on the contrary been poor - and in particular staff without technical background failed to be recognised within the Department of Civil Engineering.

The conditions could only be better. Staff seem currently satisfied, optimistic about the future, hard working and willing to put in the extra efforts required to complete an assignment or improve quality of a product. There seems to be no major conflicts or tensions in the organisation and the team spirit is good.

The financial compensation of staff is not yet up to expected standards, but staff has agreed to modest pay in the period when the Centre is establishing itself. The staff is young (an average of 26) and most have no attractive alternatives to TREND. Qualified and competent staff is however always in demand. A Centre like TREND may easily end up training people and then loose them to other organisations. The turn-over has been low providing stability for the Centre. The staff played a supportive role in the transition of TNC to TREND, and is a major asset in their future work.

### **5.8. Systems and structures**

The University was previously responsible for all major organisational, administrative and financial systems and procedures. The Technical Adviser provided inputs on organisational questions. Within the General Support Programme financed by Danida a technical team assisted TREND in February this year in organisational and administrative streamlining, and a team has just prepared and established administrative and financial systems and routines.

TREND is technically equipped to take care of all major administrative and financial tasks, but it is too early to assess to what extent TREND has the sufficient administrative and financial discipline and proven expertise to satisfy clients and donors.

TREND's self-presentation and marketing are below standard. There is no brochure describing the purpose and activities of the Centre. A record of previous assignments with activities and products does not exist. What is called the library consists of a limited number of reports and almost no books.

Danida funds a Sector Networking Initiative, but we are unable to assess the quality and impact of these efforts.

All staff are employed on two-year project contracts which are renewed based on assessment of staff performance. Staff are using time-sheets and are expected to work on paid contracts for not less than 60% of their time. Time and resources are set aside for staff training, but there is no fixed training plan.

There was no annual workplan with a complete list of assignments, planned activities, expected incomes and expenditures for each assignments. The financial system allows for aggregate financial monitoring, but did not seem to operate with each assignment as a "cost centre" enabling Unit Heads and staff to monitor projects where they are involved.

This is not an administrative audit, but it is our impression that TNC's strengths came more despite of than because of effective administrative structures and systems. And TREND will have to follow up and consolidate systems and structures which are recently introduced.

### **5.9. Financial sustainability: A new donor dependency?**

Financial resources contribute to secure long term sustainability, but is in the analytical model only one factor among several determining organisational capacity. As described in Chapter 2 TNC generated already in an early phase considerable resources through consultancies, but the Centre received also general support first from UNDP and then from Danida. From next year the situation is changed and TREND must not only generate sufficient resources to cover recurrent expenditures, but also the depreciation of vehicles, electronic equipment, etc.

Information from the visiting management consultants indicates that this is feasible. Based on available financial data, it seems that TREND will achieve a small positive result this year. For the

period April 1995 to June 1996, there has been an excess in income over expenditure of cedis 52.5 mill. which represent about 14% of total income.<sup>20</sup> But what are the sources of income? Where does the money come from? Looking at the figures for expected income for the period April 1995 to June 1996, the following trends emerge:<sup>21</sup>

SOURCE:	AMOUNT: (Cedis)	% OF TOTAL
1. Danida		
a. Volta Rural Water Supply and Sanitation	289.670 mill	61%
b. Sector networking	50.194 mill.	11%
Sub total Danida	339,864 mill.	0,72
2. World Bank	101.600 mill.	0,21
3. CIDA	3.700 mill.	0.8 %
4. UNICEF	7.700 mill.	1.6 %
5. UNEP	11.900 mill.	2.7 %
6. KMA	5.000 mill.	1.0 %
7. UNDP	4.100 mill.	0.9 %
TOTAL	473.900 mill.	1

Source: TREND Finance Unit<sup>22</sup> (1 US \$= 1600 Cedis)

<sup>20</sup> Total income was 376, 2 mill. Cedis (against 422,4 mill. budgeted). Expenditure amounted to 323.5 mill. Cedis (also below budget). Source: TREND Finance Unit.

<sup>21</sup> The total expected income is so far higher than the actual income for this period, which may be explained by certain uncompleted assignments.

<sup>22</sup> See complete list of assignments in Annex 5.

- (a) The source of funds for all assignments are foreign donors reflecting the donor dominance of the water and sanitation sector in Ghana.
- (b) TREND depends on one single donor - Danida for 72 % of its income.
- (c) The source for 93% of TREND's total income is two major donors: Danida and the World Bank - even if some of the contracts are signed between CWSD and TREND.

How to interpret these figures? TREND does not depend on general donor support, but generate its revenue from payment of services from the same donors. Does this mean to go from one type of donor dependency to another? And is the new financial basis for TREND more sustainable and less dependent than before? It still depends on external resources and the long term sustainability may be questionable since all contracts are financed by donors. On the other hand, it is financially viable as long as major donors provide funds to the sector, and TREND is then in principle as donor dependent as several consulting groups in Western countries.

The problem is that there will be a need for TREND's services also after the aid-period in Ghana's water and sanitation sector, but then donors have most likely inflated the national consultancy cost to a level impossible to sustain with local government funds. In practice, if TREND survives to a post-donor period it will have to reduce its budget dramatically, or follow the donors to other sectors.

### **5. 10. Performance and linkages**

TNC managed despite its constraining environment to establish a high standing in the sector which has been further consolidated through the TREND period. For planning and training in low-cost community based and demand-driven approaches in the water and sanitation sector, TREND is considered as "a centre of excellence". There is no other group with the same level of knowledge and experience, close contacts and contracts with so many donors and support from major stakeholders.

The overall positive recognition of TREND is based on informed judgement after several interviews with a sample of clients, donors and representatives of the water and sanitation sector, and not an assessment of quality, relevance and impact of services and products delivered by TREND. Annex 5 provides an overview of activities and products.

It is also difficult to know if TREND has reached its optimum level of production since we have not reviewed annual workplans for the various units and then the expected production for each staff member. Our impression is that production is high, but with significant variation in quality and output.

There is a worrying signal that Danida and the Volta Project express a concern that TREND has taken on too many new assignments and over-stretched its capacity. The Volta Project is by far the most important client for TREND, and in general the project has been satisfied with its

services. However, in recent cases TREND has not been able to meet agreed deadlines, and has also been less available - maybe due to new assignments in other parts of the country.

That TREND is trying to over-stretch its capacity, is most likely a deliberate strategy from the management who needs to secure new contracts and diversify its funding base. TREND has to strike a difficult balance between providing timely and high-quality services to its major clients and its efforts to diversify and find new clients. TREND has so far performed well and new consultancies come as a result of satisfied clients who tell potential new clients, etc. A consultancy group is losing clients in the same way, but much more rapidly because negative statements travel faster than good news.

TREND has in general good links with government authorities, donors and other stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector. The links to CWSN seem excellent and the technical and social interaction with clients and other groups the same. Through its background in the sector, active involvement over a period of time in several projects and the networking activities TREND has established a unique position and taken on important roles to play in the future as a national resource centre.

## PART TWO: THE ZIMBABWE CASE. FROM TCWS TO IWSD

### 6. THE EARLY DAYS

In Zimbabwe, a feasibility study was conducted in 1984, and this produced a project proposal to set up a Training Centre for Water and Sanitation (TCWS) based at the University of Zimbabwe, Department of Civil Engineering. In the same year, the Government had just completed a multi-volume National Master Water Plan (NMWP) to address rural water supply and sanitation.

The University approved the TCWS proposal in 1987, and a project agreement was signed by the Government (with UNDP and World Bank) in 1989. A project manager with extensive experience in the management of rural water supply and sanitation programmes in Zimbabwe, was recruited; and he soon recruited other staff with similar experiences.

The TCWS project aimed to build national capacity in the provision of water supply and sanitation services by (a) providing relevant training of staff active in the sector, (b) disseminating information necessary for effective management, and (c) conducting applied research.

The TCWS was to be financed through a trust of US\$571,500 administered by the World Bank using funds from the Norwegian Ministry of Development Co-operation (US\$433,000) and the UNDP (US\$138,500) using its Zimbabwe allocation. The Government of Zimbabwe provided office accommodation, lecture facilities, and telephone. A three year programme commenced in July 1989.

Although, the concept of an International Training Network (ITN) Centre as promoted by the UNDP-World Bank initiative emphasised the need to promote low-cost technologies for rural water supply and sanitation, the TCWS adapted this into the national policy framework. The National Master Water Plan of 1985 had already standardised low-cost technologies around shallow and deep wells for water, and Ventilated Improved Privy latrine for sanitation. In Volume 7 of the NMWP, it had been recognised that the rural water supply and sanitation sector needed *specialised training; [and] specific skills in the planning, monitoring and evaluation of water and sanitation programmes require to be developed*<sup>23</sup>. The Plan had also recommended the expansion of the sector's training capacity, establishment of links with the University of Zimbabwe, and the establishment of a "Water Development Staff Training School" for sub-professionals.

Under the leadership of the National Action Committee (NAC), the rural water supply and sanitation sector developed an elaborate institutional network. By 1989, when the TCWS was

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<sup>23</sup> National Master Water Plan (1985), volume 7, page S/1.

formed, NAC had already set up five sub-committees<sup>23</sup> with the National Coordination Unit (NCU) as a Secretariat. In 1990, the NAC Sub-committee on Training and Education commissioned a consultancy to prepare a National Training Plan to consolidate the wide range of training activities undertaken in the sector at the time.<sup>24</sup> The outcome of this consultancy was "not a national training plan and while providing a lot of useful information on training the sector only addresses inter-ministerial training in a national way" (Taylor, P. et al., 1992).<sup>25</sup> It was nevertheless the main document used to define and implement training activities in the water sector during the period that the TCWS, forerunner of IWSD, has been in operation. The inter-sectoral collaboration fostered under the NAC promoted an integrated approach where planning, implementation and managing the Integrated Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme (IRWSSP) took into account the inter-related aspects of safe water, safe sanitation, and health and hygiene education. Under the integrated approach, the development and modification of technologies in the sector were handled by the Ministry of Health, the Department of Water, and the District Development Fund. All the participating agencies in the programme required training, but there was no single agency responsible for training, and the TCWS fitted the profile required by the integrated approach.

## 7. EVOLUTION OF THE CENTRE (1989-1993)

### 7.1. Major characteristics of the centre

The Centre was able to recruit staff with experience in the management of rural water supply and sanitation programmes. This made the Centre a logical extension of the network of institutions responsible for supporting the sector, and it was put on the NAC Sub-committee on Training and Education. As a result, the Centre was not only able to respond to the on-going training activities in the rural water supply and sanitation sector, but also to influence future training strategies and identification of needs.

The budget available to TCWS did not include funds for participants to attend courses, and it decided to charge fees for the courses (covering at least 50-60% of the costs) to ensure that training activities became sustainable right from the start. The two priority areas identified for

<sup>23</sup> The committees were Planning and Budgeting, Training and Education, Hand pumps and Technical, Donor Co-ordination, and Information Management.

<sup>24</sup> "National Training Plan for the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Sector, 1990-95", Produced in January 1991 by Inter-Consult A/S, and issued under the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development.

<sup>25</sup> Taylor, P. Mudege, N.R., and Kaseke, E. (1992) "Human Resource Development and Capacity Building". Training Centre for Water and Sanitation, University of Zimbabwe, prepared as part of the Rural Water Supply and Sanitation in Zimbabwe Sector Review.

training were (a) planning, and (b) operation and maintenance. The Centre responded by mounting an integrated four month diploma course, complemented by a number of short training courses.

As a way of gaining legitimacy and in response to articulated sectoral needs, the Centre right from the start concentrated on training activities (in-service and the more formal diploma course). It also became active in the inter-sectoral management of rural water and sanitation programme, and regularly attending the NAC Sub-committee on Training and Education.

Training activities at the Centre commenced in February 1990, when a two weeks course on "Management and evaluation of water and sanitation projects - training of trainers" was conducted for six Zimbabwean personnel. This was the only course funded by the Centre. Courses held after that were attended by participants who had secured financial sponsorship from various agencies (mainly donors involved in the implementation of programmes in Zimbabwe and in the region).

Although most participants to the short courses were Zimbabweans, there were participants from Botswana, Mozambique, Malawi, and Zambia. In this period, regional training gradually became quite significant, accounting for one third of the 485 person-weeks of training provided by the Centre as its reputation spread in the region. The Centre received requests from organisations that wanted courses, but its policy was to train trainers rather than competing with institutions that already offered training.

In 1990, the Centre applied for Associate Status with the University of Zimbabwe. During the first tripartite meeting later that year, it was decided to commission a study into how the Centre might develop into a sustainable institution, the most favourable location, and to make recommendations. The study was commissioned and executed in 1991.

Although project funding was for three years (1990-1992), there were significant savings right from the start because (a) the Centre recruited the cheaper national rather than international staff, (b) a senior projects officer could not be recruited, (c) training was focused on Zimbabwe rather than being regional, (d) participants were charged fees, and (d) the Zimbabwe dollar depreciated significantly against the US\$ on which the TCWS budget was based. Local consultants were used to fill gaps created by the failure to recruit a suitably qualified projects officer and to meet special needs of training programmes and assignments.

In this period, the Centre developed working relations with the Department of Civil Engineering, which provided the Centre with a permanent teaching room and offices. The Centre also secured inputs into its teaching programme from a number of University Departments. Thus, the Centre became an important actor in the water supply and sanitation programme in Zimbabwe and regionally, and forged good working relationships with the University Civil Engineering Department, donors, and government departments.

## 7.2. TCWS objectives.

Objectives of the TCWS in the 1989-92 period are listed below. These are compared with the goals it stated when a project proposal for a second phase was formulated in 1992.

Box 1. Objectives for the TCWS, Phases I and II.

1. To offer training in appropriate water supply and sanitation technologies. 2. To carry out research on priority areas related to safe water and appropriate sanitation services. 3. To provide an information service for the water and sanitation sector.	1. To build capacity through training and education programmes. 2. To act as an information centre and endeavour to provide state of the art information on request. 3. To provide technical and advisory support to sector agencies and development institutions. 4. To develop a strong applied research programme to support decision making and policy formation in the sector.
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In Phase I, the TCWS emphasised on activities and tasks needed to support the implementation of programmes. This contrasts with the ideas it had on Phase II, concentrating on institutional capacity building and consolidating itself as an institution that could support water supply and sanitation activities in Zimbabwe.

## 7.3. Activity profile and achievements

### *Training*

In the period 1990-91, the Centre held twelve short courses and two intakes of four-month diploma courses. Of the short courses, only two ("Monitoring of Water Quality", and "Communication Skills for Community Motivation and Health Education-for trainers") were regional. The first diploma course on water and sanitation was held in late 1990.

During its first year of operation, the Centre trained a total of 259 persons (19 being non-Zimbabwean). At the end of 1991, the Centre decided that its future activities would shift away from direct training to the "strengthening of existing training programmes". The Centre adopted a strategy of training trainers from existing institutions and implementing agencies rather than competing with on-going training programmes. In addition, capacity building support to the whole sector was identified as an important activity, and this took the form of consultancies, production of handbooks, and execution of operational research.

In line with its new training strategy, the Centre produced a manual on "Communication Skills" in 1991 for use in training programmes by agencies active in the sector.

In the period 1990-93, the Centre held a total of 22 courses - eight of them for regional participants - in participatory methods, project planning, implementation, and evaluation, community motivation and health education, and water supply and sanitation technologies, etc. Many of these courses were open to participants from any agency and country in the region. A few of the other courses were mounted in response to needs identified by agencies, and such courses were therefore not open to participants outside the commissioning agency.

**Box 2: Summary of activities 1990-93**

Trainees attending regional courses	149
National trainees	286
International meetings and workshops	20
Number of reports produced	26

The Centre experienced an over-subscription to courses, and the charging of fees did not reduce demand - an indication that demand for training opportunities in Zimbabwe and regionally could not be fully met.

The IWSD, and the TCWS before it, has had three major areas of operations as reflected in the reports produced:-

- (i) training in the diploma and short courses, and the production of training materials.
- (ii) carrying out programme evaluations for a number of agencies, and
- (iii) preparation of project proposals for district water supply and sanitation activities.

Regional activities have mainly been covered in items (i) and (ii), while several districts in Zimbabwe have been assisted in the preparation of district water supply and sanitation project proposals. Consultancies outside these three areas have been few, but are expected to grow as the Institute seeks to participate in more research and capacity building activities in the sector.

#### *Consultancies*

The Centre provided advisory services for NGOs and Government programmes. In particular, it became a member of the three sub-committees of the National Action Committee. In this first phase of its operations, the Centre undertook a number of consultancies; in particular project evaluations in Lesotho, Malawi, and Zimbabwe.

The main management and training tool produced during the first year of its operation was a "Handbook on Evaluation of Water and Sanitation Projects", produced for the National Co-ordination Unit in Zimbabwe.

The Centre forged links with national and international agencies working on water supply and sanitation. Staff from the Centre attended twenty international meetings and workshops where they contributed to debates on the sector. Personnel from the Centre also facilitated in at least six national and regional policy review and formulation workshops during this period.

#### *Research and information dissemination*

Staff from the Centre supported research (post-graduate and programme-related) and collaborated with IDRC and NAC in financing a number of operational research activities. Collaborative research with Blair Institute in the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health, and with the Swiss Tropical Institute commenced. Using funds from the IDRC, the TCWS supported operational research by implementors of programmes in Zimbabwe under a programme of small research grants. The Centre was also commissioned to undertake a number of studies (contributing to policy review, and improved programme management).

In the same period, the Centre established a library on water and sanitation using documents and reports acquired in the course of its work.

The Third Africa Regional Meeting on the ITN for Water and Waste Management was hosted in Zimbabwe by the Centre during 1991. Its staff contributed to regional policy and programme management dialogue through such meetings.

By 1990, the NAC had added Research and Information Management to the work of the Manpower and Training Sub-committee, and the Centre remained a very active member and facilitator on the new Sub-committee.

#### **7.4. Clients/users**

In the area of training, most clients for the Centre were organisations and agencies who sponsored and sent trainees to the various courses run at the Centre. Subscription to training courses as well as their commissioning was done by Government ministries, local authorities, and non-governmental organisations in Zimbabwe and other countries in the Southern African region.

In the consultancy field, the National Action Committee for Rural Water Supply and Sanitation have been major clients for the Centre. In addition, the Centre provided consultancy services to the Ministry of Health in Malawi. These consultancies were mainly evaluations of programmes.

#### **7.5. Organisational capacity**

At the end of 1993, the TCWS had a staff complement of six, one Project Manager, three Project Officers, a Consultant, and an Administrative Secretary. In recruiting its staff, the Centre tried to balance engineering, social, and management aspects of water and sanitation programmes. Thus, a

multi-disciplinary approach characterised recruitment in response to needs in sector agencies and their activities.

The Centre was able to use local experts with experience from Government and extensive contacts in the water and sanitation programme. This kind of staff made it possible for the Centre to become active in the sector as soon as it was established.

By remaining a project under the management of the World Bank, but still located at the University with local personnel, the Centre was able to remain relatively autonomous of management at the University, while accessing various local agencies and institutions.

#### **7.6. Critical issues and how they were resolved**

The TCWS could not recruit a Senior Project Officer, citing the conditions of service as being unattractive for those who had shown some interest in the post. The Centre overcame this problem by utilising local consultants who could provide support to training and consultancy activities.

Tripartite meetings had expressed interest in regional programmes, but the Centre advocated a gradual growth in this area - with most initial emphasis being to national programmes. The need to support regional activities was raised on several occasions, but there was little funding for such activities since most donor funds were in bi-lateral programmes. The Centre responded by running national programmes, and inviting regional participants who could attend using their own source of funds. Similarly, the Centre encouraged countries to design their training programmes, invite TCWS as facilitators, and thus utilise bi-lateral funds for in-country training.

There was concern that trainees from the Centre should be followed up and the impact of training of their work evaluated. The Centre in 1990 proposed to design and send out such an evaluation questionnaire.

The balance between commercial and non-commercial activities was faced by the Centre right from the start as its staff received invitations to undertake consultancy assignments. The Centre dealt with this by trying to restrict its involvement to those consultancies directly related to the issues of capacity building and training in the water supply and sanitation sector.

The Centre wished to remain well-informed on developments in the water and sanitation sector, to provide training and advice, but not become involved in programme implementation. The Centre shifted its work to the training of trainers and execution of consultancies on capacity building as a way of maintaining this balance between knowledge and activities.

Although the Centre concentrated on rural water and sanitation issues, it became aware of the need to support the management of urban water and sanitation systems, but its capacity to respond was quite limited.

As the project phase came to an end in 1992, the TCWS started exploring future options for sustainability. The question of transforming World Bank funding into a fee for service in exchange for a set of agreed activities was raised with the Bank by the TCWS Director in 1992. It was noted that the first phase of the TCWS had been a success, and phase two would try and consolidate project success. A project proposal for Phase II was then prepared and submitted to World Bank and UNDP for discussion with potential funding agencies.

The TCWS's proposal for phase two sought US\$655 000 over three years to cover the costs of core staff, consultancy support, development of training materials, information support and regional outreach activities. This was the first response to the challenge of transition from a project to a sustainable institution.

## **8. TRANSITION FROM CENTRE TO INSTITUTE**

When the TCWS project was set up, it was expected to end in 1992, with possibilities for extension after an assessment of how the Southern Africa region might benefit from its activities. By the end of 1992, the project had made substantial savings from its funds, and its life was extended for another year.

### **8.1. Factors explaining the transition**

Although the TCWS project had identified training as an immediate need in the sector, termination of the UNDP-World Bank Project meant that this need was going to be left un-met unless a successor to the project could be found. Furthermore, it had been recognised that both information dissemination and research take a long time to realise results, and time frames for projects are too short to facilitate the attainment of goals in these areas.

The success of this project built up its own momentum as Zimbabwean and regional water supply and sanitation programmes came to rely on the Centre for training and opportunities. There was support from World Bank offices in Nairobi and Washington, as well as from the Harare UNDP office, for the head of the TCWS to explore future options. In addition, a number of government departments involved in the water supply and sanitation programme were supportive of the transition.

The need for sustainability was recognised when the Centre started, and the exploration of sustainability strategies started almost immediately (See chronology of events in Annex 4). During the first tripartite review meeting in 1990, it was recommended that the TCWS and World Bank should "prepare proposals for the long-term viability of the Training Centre in time for the tripartite review in 1991", and the TCWS was asked to be ready for a consultant to look into these long-term viability and sustainability issues.

When the Centre in 1991 commissioned a consultancy to look into its future status, it anticipated that the report would not only confirm the success of the Centre, but "endorse the positioning of

the centre within the University, and propose a phased plan for the full incorporation of the TCWS into the University" (Annual Report, 1991).

At the 1992 Tripartite Review Meeting, the TCWS Project Manager outlined two issues relevant to the future of the Centre:

- (a) The anticipated growth in the need for training in community-based planning, implementation, operation and maintenance as soon as Zimbabwe Government's policy on decentralisation was implemented. It was therefore not only important to continue the project for a fourth year using savings so far made, but also to prepare for a permanent institution; and
- (b) The 1991 consultancy had identified the need to either consolidate the Centre within the University, or making the Centre a regional institution to meet the demand for training and support in water supply and sanitation programmes.

The Tripartite Review Meeting recommended that the future institutional framework for the Centre should be resolved during the extension period. This constituted an endorsement from the Government of Zimbabwe, UNDP, and the World Bank to embark on a programme to produce a permanent institution.

### **8.2. Transition to what?**

At the end of 1991, the Centre was looking forward to differentiate national from regional functions, and hoped the 1991 consultancy would "present options for undertaking the regional mandate of TCWS". The Centre had experienced funding difficulties for regional activities, and its strategy had instead relied on national activities with some regional participation.

After the 1992 Tripartite meeting, the Centre submitted a proposal to the Department of Civil Engineering seeking support for the transition of the TCWS into either:

- a department or institute within the University of Zimbabwe, or
- as an NGO.

In exploring the options available to it, the TCWS also wished to overcome problems it had faced during its time. The proposal noted that the establishment of an institute under the University would have the following advantages:

- assured funding, and
- high degree of stability.

The disadvantages of this option were given as:-

- staff appointment and promotion procedures at the University do not recognise experience (important to the TCWS) and mainly rely on qualifications,
- financial constraints were facing the further expansion of the University,
- the University bureaucracy is not sufficiently flexible and responsive to the needs of a centre dependent on external funding, and one needing to be responsive to programme demands.

The proposal concluded that disadvantages outweighed the advantages, and this option was "neither the most favourable or the most feasible to implement".

Then the most relevant options were:

- (a) Affiliating TCWS with the Scientific, Industrial and Research Development Centre (SIRDC), but this seems not to have been pursued.
- (b) The idea of private consulting firm registered under the Company's Act, or even a partnership of consultants, was an option which was deemed inappropriate because the goals of a development agency were seen to be in conflict with the profit motives of firms and partnerships.
- (c) An NGO in the form of a Trust registered by a lawyer under the Registrar of Deeds.
- (d) An NGO in the form of a welfare organisation (independent or attached to the University of Zimbabwe) registered under the Welfare Act with the Department of Social Welfare was also considered.
- (e) The attachment of a Centre with an international organisation in Harare or even the creation of a regional institution with the Southern Africa Development Community Secretariat in Gaborone were mentioned, but thought inappropriate because of the difficulties of regional programmes and the time it would take to establish such mechanisms.

### 8.3. Why the NGO option?

In the 1992 proposals, the option of an NGO was noted to be "the most suitable institutional arrangement in ensuring the sustainability and growth of the centre in the medium and long-term". The main advantages listed for an NGO status were that the Centre would :

- have the freedom to develop in response to demand for its services, without being dependent on University funds,
- become self-financing and provide service to all clients, including the University,
- avoid the uncertainty associated with government financial allocations to the University,
- build its own facilities to meet its rising demand for space.

Disadvantages of the NGO option were given as:-

- loss of ties with the University and thus lose access to teaching and other support "facilities which are valuable to a specialist water institute".
- financial insecurity.
- the likely shift away from education.

It was recognised that existing demand for services would provide work for staff in the centre, and programmes had funds to pay for services. In order to over-come the first disadvantage, the NGO could establish formal agreement with the University, which would "demonstrate the commitment of the University to an outreach programme in an area of national and regional importance and assist the development of a water institute".

The management of TCWS discussed the various options, and recommended the establishment of a non-profit making organisation. This recommendation was discussed and adopted by the Department of Civil Engineering in October 1992, and submitted to the University Senate in December 1992.

The goal had been to create an autonomous Institute under the University, but this could not materialise due to administrative delays within the University system of decision making. It took two years for the University administration to approve the idea of an autonomous Institute.

The speed of getting the institutional mechanism set up was an issue, as experience with University and Government processes of setting up institutions, was negative. Furthermore, the implementation of an Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the country during 1991-95 meant that Government and its agencies (including the University) was involved in a programme of cost reduction. It was therefore recognised by the management of TCWS that the setting up of an Institute within the Government system would face insurmountable obstacles.

The Centre decided in 1993 to proceed with the registration of an Institute of Water and Sanitation Development as a Welfare Organisation under the Department of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. As Welfare Organisation, the activities of the IWSD would be open to scrutiny by its members, who would elect a Management Board.

Independence, credibility, transparency, less bureaucratic red tape, ability to raise funds, participation of its members in management, etc. became the main justification for the choice of a Welfare Organisation.

#### **8.4. Ideas, plans and strategies for the new centre**

The goal was to establish "*a specialist non-profit organisation providing training, consultancy, information services and research in the field of water and waste management*".

In its Mission Statement and the 1996 Business Plan, the IWSD has identified five areas where it will concentrate its efforts:- training, consultancy, research, information, and management. It has also organised itself along these five areas of work by identifying one of its staff members as responsible.

The Centre has also consolidated its activities from the TCWS era, and its budget projections for 1997 indicate a strategy of reducing dependence on core support while increasing funding for projects and training.

### *Finances*

When planning the transition period in 1993, the IWSD expected to reduce its reliance on core support quite significantly. By 1995, the Institute had negotiated with the World Bank to convert core support into a fee for service for pre-agreed activities (table below). Although the Institute was able to utilise the amounts set aside in 1995, this has not been possible in 1996 since some of the agencies the IWSD was expected to support have not implemented the various activities. Thus, it is estimated that of the 1.2 million planned for, only half will be utilised by the end of the year. The balance will most likely be reprogrammed for next year.

Source of income	1995	%	1996*	%
Institutional management	551.000	14	578.000	29
Consultancy	1.851.000	48	715.000	35
Training	912.000	24	691.000	34
Research	450.000	12	0	0
Information	67.000	2	35.000	2
Total	3.831.000	100	2.019.000	100

\* Only for January-August

There was an increase in contributions from consultancies from 35% to 48%, while training declined from 34% to 24%. In 1995, the UNEP project alone contributed to 41% of consultancy income. Research and information remain quite small, as the Institute seems to be moving away from training to consultancy as a mechanism to strengthen the water and sanitation sector.

Plans by IWSD for 1993/94 to 1996/97 were to maintain Core Funding around the Z\$1 million mark, while increasing the total financial turn-over from just over Z\$1 million to over Z\$3 million.

### Income distribution in 1993 and projections for 1997 (%)

Source	1993	1997	1995
Core support	61	32	
Training	19	24	
Projects	10	34	
Consultancies	10	10	

*Value*

### 8.5. Achievements to date

Successful transition from a donor funded project to an independent institute with NGO status. The IWSD has constituted a Management Board and membership for the board is drawn from individuals with an interest and commitment to the water sector. Although members of the Board do not represent the institutions for which they work, they nevertheless occupy influential positions in agencies that implement water and sanitation programmes. The IWSD has also acquired a house off-campus to locate its offices, and this will further consolidate its identity as an independent agency.

The IWSD has increased its commercial activities by way of carrying out consultancies. Training, evaluations and development of training materials have all been done. In 1995, the IWSD carried out assignments for sixteen agencies, ranging from regional governments, multi-lateral agencies, bi-lateral programmes, and NGOs.

The IWSD has maintained and expanded its training activities during the two years it has operated (1994 and 1995). In particular, it has maintained a core of scheduled regular course, the four-months diploma programme and at least three short courses.

Sample of training activities

Activity	1994	1995
Scheduled courses		
Diploma course participants	13	11
Application of research methods in water and sanitation	23	7
Control of water and sanitation related diseases		6
Community management of water supplies & sanitation	34	15
Totals	70	39

In 1995, the IWSD trained a total of 189 participants in eight different unscheduled courses. The IWSD has also maintained its staff complement of five professionals, and hired a Research Manager in 1996. There is nevertheless concern that the IWSD should not expand its staff complement too rapidly unless there is assured funding of salary costs.

In this period, the IWSD has provided advise on training and management to national and regional programmes. It has produced 25 reports in 1995 detailing the range of work it undertook during that year.

The IWSD has expanded its research activities, and its training on Research Methods led to the development of seven research proposals by the middle level managers trained. There are also two major research projects being implemented in the districts. In addition, the Institute is conducting research on (a) "Rapid Assessment of Health Impact of Water Supplies and Sanitation" so that

participatory methods can further be developed; and (b) "Treatment of waste water using Duckweed" in collaboration with the City of Harare.

The IWSD has also been active in the dissemination of information, first by establishing a library in 1990, and then producing a newsletter in 1995. In the period 1991-95, the Institute has also collaborated with the University of the North in South Africa in establishing a centre similar to the IWSD. It has also developed collaboration programmes with (a) the University of Zimbabwe Civil Engineering Department, and the International Institute of Hydraulic, Infrastructure and Environmental Engineering in Netherlands; and (b) with the Southampton Institute of Irrigation Studies, and the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry in South Africa to conduct training.

#### **8.6. Some shortcomings**

The IWSD has ran most its courses by bringing together trainees in a classroom situation. Although trainees have been taught using examples from field and have participated in field visits as well as group discussions, there are some who consider the training courses 'too theoretical'. Keeping courses relevant and practical while giving the largest possible number of participants a chance to benefit will remain a challenge for the Institute.

During the first year of its operation, the TCWS was expected to strengthen the capacity of some training institutions to conduct training in water and sanitation. A number of Public Service Training Schools, those under the Ministry of Health, and the Zimbabwe Institute of Public Administration and Management were given as examples of training centres whose curricula and training programmes might require some strengthening. Over the years, the TCWS, and later the IWSD, has not been able to address this need as demand for direct training has been high.

Although the Institute had planned to engage in and promote research, this has not been very successful. The situation is expected to change with the employment of a Research Manager at the Institute.

The staff available is already undertaking a large number of assignments, and a number of clients are finding it difficult to secure support at short notice. The use of programmed World Bank funds to support activities in the sector has been low primarily due to this shortage of staff to respond to all the requests coming to the Institute.

## 9. TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY OF IWSD?

### 9.1. Consolidation

Compared to TREND in Ghana the Institute of Water and Sanitation Development (IWSD) went through a smooth and gradual transition process. The Institute was already from the outset established as a relatively autonomous donor-funded centre attached to the Department of Civil Engineering, but with considerable operational flexibility and with staff recruited on World Bank local contracts. The transition from a University Centre to a national NGO took place in 1993, but the new Institute has remained at the University Campus. The challenge for IWSD was not in the past, but could be in the future when the Institute will establish itself outside the University, and make important decisions about the future profile and approach for the Institute.

This chapter will cover three issues:

- What factors explain the performance and standing of the Institute?
- How do the same factors affect future sustainability?
- What future strategic options are available and considered by the Institute?

Chapter 1.3 and parts of the Ghana case explain what factors are selected and why, and will not be repeated here.

### 9.2. Multiple and changing opportunities

The Training Centre for Water and Sanitation (TCWS) was in 1989 given major training tasks within the new sector programme. The role of TCWS was defined in the programme document and funding was available for Diploma and short term courses. There were both needs for training and orientation of sector personnel and a defined role for the new Centre which partly explain the focus on pre-set in service training courses. There were few competitors in the sector who could do what the TCWS was going to do. The Centre was practically in a monopoly situation.

Gradually, other opportunities emerged like provision of inputs to policy discussions and formulation, documentation, specific evaluations and studies and more tailor made training. The Centre thrived on favourable opportunities in the sector.

Future opportunities within the sector are so far not clear, and in particular what implications the decentralisation of government services to District Councils will have for the Institute. There will certainly be a huge demand for human and institutional capacity building in the decentralised implementation of water and sanitation programmes, but the role of the Institute is yet to be clarified.

There seems to be increasing opportunities in the region, and given the relative strengths of Zimbabwean expertise and experience, the Institute is well placed to offer relevant services to the water and sanitation sector in other countries.

People interviewed were convinced about the future opportunities for IWSD, and that the challenge for the Institute is to prepare and position itself vis à vis these opportunities. IWSD will have to strike a balance between regional and national activities, and discuss expansion of staff and new areas of operation in terms of financial risks and opportunities.

### **9.3. Programme profile matched sector needs**

TCWS focused initially on in-service training of personnel in the water and sanitation sector given the high demand for basic training and orientation of staff. The Centre was less involved in project related training, and was to some extent involved in organisational development , but only in the form of training of trainers from these institutions.<sup>27</sup> The Centre and later Institute carried out a number of research projects. These projects were never critical to the work of the Institute, and there is no evidence of active cross fertilisation of experiences between research and the other activities, while there was active exchange between training and consultancy work.

Given its reputation and proven capabilities of senior staff, the Institute is also increasingly asked to participate in and carry out various evaluations and studies in Zimbabwe and in the region.

The Institute has in some instances been characterised as "too academic or school like" - meaning that they provide theoretical concepts and knowledge which are not grounded in practical experience. The in-service training has represented a major pillar in the work of the Institute, but it seems unfair to conclude that the training has been detached from sector realities. The Centre and later Institute designed training courses which have been judged as relevant and appropriate for staff working in the sector, and most of the trainers were well conversant with the issues and realities "out there". On the other hand it is correct that the training has been based in class room situations, including field visits and orientation.

The Institute presents itself with five "business areas": training, research, advice, consultancy and information, but so far the training and consultancy areas have dominated over the other three. The majority of their clients also perceive the Institute as primarily a training centre. The Institute will in the future,have to find an appropriate balance between the five areas, and reach a compromise between being a Resource Centre which addresses long term sector needs, and a consulting group which pursues market opportunities.

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<sup>27</sup> The Institute provided training and has not operated as internal management consultants.

### **Regionalisation**

The regional participation in training courses and the increasing number of regional assignments have not changed the programme profile, but contributed to exchange of information and experiences across countries, and broadened the market for the Institute. However, the regional profile does not seem as an important factor to explain performance of the Centre. It has added a window of opportunity, but not replaced the national basis.

The future issue for IWSD is to what extent it should prepare itself for increased regional activities in addition to or at the expense of national activities. The challenge is to find an appropriate balance between a national and regional focus, and assess how the mix might affect future sustainability. Based on available information we believe that a firm national basis for the majority of activities, represents the most viable long term strategy. The regional outreach represents an attractive supplement, but is both more vulnerable and susceptible to changes. Systematic regional marketing is difficult and regional assignments will vary and depend to a large extent on individual contacts.

### **9.4. Leadership and management**

Interviews revealed certain characteristics which seem to explain a considerable part of the standing and performance of the Institute:

- (a) The Director and other core staff are nationals with a background in the water and sanitation sector. They know and are also well known by key personnel in the sector.
- (b) The Director followed a low key approach in building up of the Centre. No groups were threatened by the new Centre, and there were no efforts to build any new empire. Negotiations with the University raised some questions, but the Director managed to maintain the identify of the Institute within the University structure, and has now succeeded in establishing an independent Institute maintaining good working relationship with the University.
- (c) There has been continuity in the management of the Institute from the beginning providing stability and direction.
- (d) The Institute has managed to maintain strong links with national institutions and donors.
- (e) The Director and core staff have been respected professionals within their areas of work and the Institute is today recognised as an important and competent centre by the government, donors and NGOs.

It is a dilemma that these same strengths also represent threats to future sustainability. The Institute has a small staff and depends to a very large extent on its current Director and senior staff. A small staff makes the Institute vulnerable to turnover in personnel. The building of a broader base of core senior staff would have strengthened institutional sustainability, but also increased pressure on financial sustainability.

### 9.5. The "neutral" resource centre

IWSD is perceived as a professional and "neutral" resource centre. With its non-profit profile and relatively low rates it has not been accused for pursuing commercial interests. The Institute has been looked upon as a service-institution relevant to and supportive of the sector, and as such been placed in a different category than other consulting groups.

The background as a donor-funded initiative has also contributed to the national service oriented image, which has implied preferential treatment from donors and government. Because of its special status, the Institute has been awarded contracts for training and consultancies without competition from the private consultancy market.

The establishment of an independent self-financing NGO may gradually change the special image, and force the Institute into a different role where it increasingly will be perceived as "a commercial consulting group". The Institute may also have to enter into new roles in order to cope with pressures and demands to achieve financial sustainability. A few clients expressed a concern that the Institute sometimes had too many hats, and that they had to choose side in a potential conflict between donor- and sector interests.

TCWS was originally established to promote low-cost technologies in the water and sanitation sector, and placed this objective in a broad human and institutional development context. The Centre was supposed to create a demand which did not exist at that time, because it was considered relevant to poor, low-income groups in rural and peri-urban areas. The Institute seeks currently to pursue a demand driven approach to service-delivery which is well justified because of a long series of supply-driven failures. But there are limitations in such an approach. A consulting group may follow a purely demand driven approach, and provide services only to clients who are able and willing to pay. But if the Institute wants to maintain a broad sector approach as a national resource centre, there are certain theoretical and practical limitations.

The demand driven approach needs to be supplemented with a proactive definition and clarification of the long term purpose and values. A strategic resource centre should not only be driven by a sector, but also drive the sector based on its values, intellectual knowledge, research, international networks and experiences. The Institute has defined its mission or purpose, but has to find acceptable compromises in order to survive. There are different opinions to what extent the Institute has become too much driven by external demands -unable to play an active and innovative role within the sector. At any rate, it will be increasingly difficult for IWSD to strike a balance between mission and market, and there is also a limit to how much freedom the Institute will be allowed in a more competitive market.

### **9.6. A competent multi-disciplinary team**

IWSD has a multi-disciplinary team focusing on capacity building in a broad sense. Core staff has acquired broad experience and knowledge, and the Institute is currently recognised and respected as a training centre, as evaluation experts and partners in policy discussions. With the recent recruitment of a research manager an important gap was filled at the Institute.

### **9.7. A business-like organisation**

The Institute was characterised by some of its users as an efficient and "business-like" organisation. Its overhead costs are modest and its operations prudent. Deadlines are met, agreements and contracts are negotiated effectively, and clients are satisfied with quality products - in particular in training.

To maintain the image of an efficient Institute providing quality services is a condition for future sustainability. But this image represents also a threat - or at least a challenge. Core staff has to work hard to assure quality and efficiency in all its work, and can only afford minimal failures. Pressure on staff is high and will most likely increase when the Institute becomes independent. The Institute offers working conditions which are comparable with similar institutions, and has been able to recruit competent and committed staff. But trained qualified staff are always in demand, and the high pressure on its current staff may affect its long term human sustainability.

### **9.8. Systems and structures**

The Institute seems to have all the systems and procedures which are required for long- and short term planning, financial management, monitoring of contracts, etc. The two weak areas which increasingly will be more critical for the Institute are:

- (a) To have internal quality assurance mechanisms to follow up the work of junior consultants and consultants sub-contracted for special assignments.
- (b) With an increase in staff, there will also be a need for more formalised internal fora to discuss strategies, incoming projects, allocation of work, etc.<sup>28</sup>

### **9.9. Flexible funding and programme support**

The flexible funding from UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme supported the establishment of TCWS, and the considerable core funding helped the Institute to generate a surplus. There has also been timely inputs from RWSG-EA in Nairobi as the executing agency -

<sup>28</sup> It seems that all major decisions are taken by the Director after consultation with senior staff. The Board has played a marginal role. The decision to establish the Institute as an independent NGO and move from the University campus was taken by the Director - without any objections!

This whole document is not exactly the proposal made regarding NGOs status was (decided) approved by the Tripartite review as well as the Dept. of Legal Panel. The other proposal to create another office was approved by the Mayor Panel

in particular in the first phase of the project. The Regional Group and HQ have functioned as sounding boards for the Director and also provided strategic inputs throughout.

Since all staff were on World Bank local contracts the Centre was at some stage perceived as an extended arm of the World Bank. This special status secured sufficient autonomy within the University system when that was required, but the Institute has later benefited from a gradual de-linking with the World Bank, and is now seen as entirely a national Institute

#### **9.10. The selection of host institution**

The relation to the University system has been discussed several times in the report. People interviewed confirmed that the selection of the School of Civil Engineering at the University of Zimbabwe represented the most appropriate host for the initial phase of the project. It is difficult to determine how the selection of host institution has contributed to strengthen the Institute. The University has hardly made any impact on performance.

Gradually, the system and structures at the University constrained, more than enabled, effective functioning of an Institute contracted by external agencies to carry out services. All people interviewed for this study supported the transition process and the decision by the Institute to establish itself as a national NGO outside the University, but there are mixed reactions to what the Institute might gain and lose in the future.

One group argued that the change would not have any negative consequences. The University is currently not able to provide any legitimacy and supportive environment for the Institute. If the Institute is able to maintain an affiliate status with the University, the NGO option would represent a win-win situation for IWSD.

Another group argued that the Institute will now gradually be perceived as a commercial consulting group, unable to keep its privileged status among donors and in the government. The NGO option is also the most vulnerable when it comes to maintaining institutional continuity and stability. An NGO depends on its Director and staff and is accountable to its Board of Directors, but is not anchored and supported by a broader institutional base.

### **10. STRATEGIC OPTION FOR THE INSTITUTE**

Future sustainability will depend on a set of dynamic factors external and internal to the organisation. It is our impression that there will be favourable market opportunities for the Institute in the next five to ten years. If that is a valid assumption, future sustainability will to a large extent depend on strategic direction taken by the Institute, e.g. on internal factors. The following diagram presents some of the options for the Institute and possible scenarios. There is no correct option, but there are roads which represent higher risk and more opportunities, and others which are less challenging, but safer.

Institutional setting would have been a relevant variable to consider, but this analysis is based on the decision to move the Institute from the University campus and establish an independent NGO. Nevertheless, the Institute is still able to control and direct three important variables:

- the thematic (area) concentration of its operation, e.g. to what extent it can concentrate on one or two areas of operation or cover all areas included in their business plan, and eventually the balance between the selected areas,
- the composition and size of staff,
- the geographic area of concentration, e.g. to what extent the Institute should "go regional", and eventually the balance between the national and regional work.

The diagram uses the first two variables and assumes that the third is an underlying option in most of the scenarios.

	AREAS OF WORK		
STAFF OPTIONS:	One area	Two-three areas	Four -five areas
Individual consultants	1. The individual consultant	2. The consulting group	3. The large consulting firm
Small core staff	4. The training centre, - focus only on training	5. Current situation. - small core staff in - training and - consultancy	6. The network: + research + information, but through networking
Same core staff + project staff	7. The training school	8. As today + more project staff + research	9. The Resource Group: + research + information More networking
More core and project staff	10. The specialised training centre	11. as 8. but more projects and larger staff	12. The Resource Group: Most expansive strategy: - all areas -more core and project staff

All options will not be discussed and are not immediately relevant. Options 1-3 represent the commercial consulting group, and is in theory ruled out with the decision to become an NGO.

Options 4,7 and 10 mean that the Institute will focus on training and see its major role as a training institution in a national and increasingly regional context.

Options 8 and 11 represent a continuation of current profile, more of the same with larger number of staff and research as an additional area.

Option 6 extend the current capacity of the Institute by including new areas without increasing staff. It would however be possible to take on new areas through networking with similar centres.

Options 9 and 12 suggest the most expansive strategy by adding both more staff and including new areas of work.

What are the most relevant options and their implications:

The Director wants to move into option 8 or 9 by expanding and establishing the Institute in the area of applied research in order to provide a solid knowledge base for training and consultancy work in Zimbabwe and in the region. New staff will primarily be recruited on contracts. This is a viable option if research funds are available, but if there is a freeze on recruiting more senior consultants the long term institutional continuity and stability will not be strengthened. While the Institute has not experienced any competition in the area of training, it might experience more direct competition if its work becomes more focused on research (e.g. from the Blair Institute in the Ministry of Health).

Options 9 and 12 represent the most expansive strategy. With success, these options will make the Institute less vulnerable to internal turnover and sudden changes in the market, but carry also most risk in terms of financial sustainability.

The training centre (4) and training school (7) are also viable and relatively safe if the Institute gains a special status as a training centre within the new decentralised water and sanitation programme.

## 11. LESSONS LEARNT FROM TREND AND IWSD

### 11.1. Similarities and differences

The model which was introduced in chapter 1.3 and used in the two case studies sought to identify and isolate internal and external factors critical to the understanding of performance and sustainability of organisations.

The model is analytical and was only used to arrange a complex set of variables. In the real world of organisations, such variables do not exist in isolation. They are all closely interrelated. A general lesson from the two case studies is that it is not one single explanatory factor, but the dynamic interaction of several variables which makes a difference. It is not feasible to secure future sustainability of ITN centres in a mechanical way through replication of certain conditions in a new context. There are no simple and "quick fix" solutions. It is possible though for similar centres to use the model and the case study experiences in discussions and reflections on what factors seem to make a significant difference on performance and sustainability. The learning from experience has to be contextual.

The most critical factors are external and outside the control of TREND and IWSD, like changes in needs and demands, government policy and donor funding. But the two cases have illustrated the importance of internal factors and their impact on sustainability. Given the current long term market opportunities in both Ghana and Zimbabwe the future of the two Centres will to a large extent depend on their ability to position themselves, build on and use the available opportunities.

The following chapter place the emphasis and build on the similarities and shared experiences between the two centres. TREND and IWSD share similar transformation process (from donor funded project to sustainable national NGO) which is described and analysed in this report. They were also planned and initiated within the ITN ideological and organisational framework and share several common features as national resource centres. The decentralised strategy followed by the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program in setting up ITN centres resulted however in genuine national centres shaped by specific country realities.

TREND went through a much more turbulent transformation process and had to break away from its host institution and establish itself as an independent national NGO. IWSD was much more independent of the University from the start and has only gradually established itself as a national NGO, and will first next year move from the University campus.

TREND has primarily focused on project related training and materials production while IWSD became an in-service training centre. Both have taken up new opportunities (consultancy, policy advice, networking, etc.), but the original focus has remained. It is only IWSD which has a significant regional outreach and participation in its courses.

TREND has followed the most expansive strategy and recruited new staff to meet the demands of new clients, while IWSD adopted a more cautious approach and has kept a relatively small core staff.

The following seeks to extract issues and factors which appear critical in the two case studies. We are highlighting common success- and risk factors based on the analysis in the report. There are several general lessons to be learnt from a critical review of factors as long as they are analysed contextually. Recommendations build on and are closely linked to the lessons learnt and are integrated in the summary.

### **11.2. Factors contributing to success**

#### **1. Appropriate timing and matching needs**

Both Centres were established at the "right" time when significant changes in the water and sanitation sector were discussed and implemented. The services matched effectively changing needs and opportunities. Both centres responded to expressed needs emerging from changes in policies and strategies. External donors provided in both cases most of the funds to the sector.

*Lessons: Appropriate timing proved to be the most important external factor for ensuring sustainable operations. Similar centres have to base on an analysis and match defined needs and opportunities in the sector. There has to exist strong national capacity and commitment to action and changes.*

#### **2. Preferential treatment**

Both Centres were given special status as sector training institutions by governments and donors. They were perceived as integral parts of the water and sanitation sector, and not as external consulting groups. The Centres benefit still from a special status in the sector, but will increasingly have to compete and interact with NGOs, commercial consulting groups and other relevant institutions.

*Lessons: The Centres depend on stable and long term political support from key stakeholders. Positive preferential treatment could be necessary in establishing national ITN centres. It will take time for a centre to establish itself, and there are long term needs and tasks which might require special attention and treatment by donors. The Centres have, however, to prepare themselves for increased competition, and address the need to secure long term financial sustainability.*

#### **3. Strong national leadership and ownership**

The two centres recruited national leadership and expertise with intimate knowledge of the sector. The Directors were both able to represent and effectively negotiate the interests of the Centres. They were also recognised as technically competent within their areas of work.

*Lessons: National leadership proved to be one of the most crucial internal factors to explain performance. For institutions which are expected to become locally sustainable, competent national leadership and a sense of national ownership are critical.*

#### **4. Stabile and close links to key stakeholders**

The Centres maintained stabile and close links and interactions with key stakeholders in the water and sanitation sector (government, donors, NGOs, etc.) Interaction and communication were based on shared knowledge, interests and background.

*Lessons: It was important for the Centres to be anchored in a special sector and maintain close links with its key stakeholders. The Centres benefited from diversification within the sector (new clients and areas of work), but should remain within one sector.*

#### **5. Keep the focus on long term capacity building**

The Centres have considered themselves as national resource centres committed to short- and long term capacity building, and have not changed into commercial consulting groups focusing on only short term demands or just profitable assignments.

*Lessons: It became important during the transition process to differentiate between a resource centre pursuing a broad national strategy and a for-profit consultancy group working on short term assignments. ITN centres will have to accept the realities of the competitive market, but should maintain a clear identity and research and development capacity in order to stay at the cutting edge of technical development.*

#### **6. Maintain a flexible and adaptable programme profile**

The ITN centres were planned with a special purpose, but the two Centres adopted different and flexible programme profiles in line with national needs and demands, and did not adopt pre-designed programme approaches.

*Lessons: ITN centres should be firm on overall principles and strategies and flexible and pragmatic when it comes to programme profile and national adaptation.*

#### **7. The multi-disciplinary staff and capacity building approach**

The Centres recruited a multi-disciplinary staff and focused on human and institutional capacity building within the sector. Technical issues and technological development have played a less significant role.

*Lessons: The focus of ITN centres should be on human and institutional capacity building within the water and sanitation sector. The comparative advantage of the Centres was in the broad sector development. Other groups should address technical issues.*

### **8. The initial selection of legitimate host institutions**

Universities were initially selected as host institutions for both Centres and this caused considerable problems, but seem also to have provided the optimal option for the start up of the centre. It might not have been feasible to establish independent centres from the beginning.

*Lessons: The initial selection of credible and well known host institutions facilitated the establishment process, while it constrained operational flexibility.*

### **9. Transition to more flexible institutional structures**

As the Centres matured and changed they required more operational autonomy and flexibility which bureaucratic University structures could not provide. Autonomous Institutes or Centres at the University could have been a solution. In both cases it was not feasible to negotiate compromises with the Universities, and the Centres decided to establish themselves as independent national NGOs.

*Lessons: The "best" host for an ITN centre would be a like-minded R&D-institution where it could have a relatively autonomous operational status. The independent NGO option was not the preferred alternative, but was for TREND and IWSD the option of last resort.*

### **10. The importance of demonstrated success and performance**

Both Centres acquired a reputation and proven capability to perform and deliver high-quality services.

*Lessons: Preferential treatment may be required in setting up a centre, but one of the most crucial factor to ensure long term sustainability is demonstrated performance - proven ability to deliver quality services.*

### **11. The need for flexible funding and strong network-support**

The Centres received flexible funding and support from donors. Strong and timely support from network institutions (RWSG's) and donors played a critical role in the first phase of the Centres and during the transition process. TREND and IWSD would not have been established and survived without support from the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program and the East and Southern and the West Africa Offices, and other key stakeholders.

*Lessons: The Centres have benefited from the decentralised implementation strategy adopted by the UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, which has led to empowerment and commitment of national resources, and to responsive local adaptation. Effective decentralisation did not imply non-involvement, but on the contrary provision of clear guidelines, flexible funding, active and continuous technical support from regional and HQ levels.*

## **12. The national programme focus**

The Centres have benefited from keeping a national focus. Most of their activities have been anchored in the water and sanitation sector in the respective countries. This approach provided national legitimacy and formed a basis for regional outreach. TREND is almost completely a national centre while IWSD has always allowed regional participation in courses, and is increasingly involved in regional training and consultancy activities.

*Lessons: The national programme focus has represented a strength for both centres while regional activities added a new dimension. The Centres have to find an appropriate balance between national and regional activities, ensure cross-fertilisation between the two, and sufficient capacity to carry out both.*

### **11.2. Risk factors**

#### **1. Lack of long term institutional continuity**

The NGO option faced both centres with complex dilemmas when it comes to long term institutional continuity and sustainability. The Centres are currently dependent on a few individuals and vulnerable to rapid internal and external changes. As NGOs the Centres depend legally on their members and Board of Directors. There are weak institutional backing or structures to ensure continuity when change occurs.

*Lessons: The host institution should ideally provide long term institutional continuity. The Centres should as NGOs ensure that key stakeholders are represented and have a sense of ownership of the organisation. They should also have a "critical mass" of senior consultants to be less vulnerable to staff turnover and strengthen long term sustainability,*

#### **2. Potential undermining of long term sector needs**

The current focus on a demand driven approach for the operation of self-sustaining Centres may gradually undermine or distort the National Resource Centre concept which includes focus on both short- and long term sector needs. Where the Centres have to secure financial sustainability, they might concentrate too much on short term financially profitable assignments. Research and development, networking, information and documentation for the sector may consequently suffer, since these activities are less financially sustainable than training and consultancies.

A Resource Centre operates differently from a commercial consulting group. All Centre activities are not necessarily financially sustainable. It is not advisable for the Centres to subsidise under-financed activities from more profitable assignments. Key stakeholders may have to secure funding of activities addressing long term sector needs which are not necessarily reflected in short term demands.

*Lessons: IN centres should work towards for financial sustainability, but simultaneously pursue a mission and make sure that long term sector needs are met.*

### **3. Lack of innovative research and development**

A National Resource Centre has to stay "at the cutting edge" of intellectual development - not only to meet demands, but promote and create needs for new approaches and services based on research and knowledge. Research and innovation have been weak areas for both Centres. They have to a limited extent been involved in research and development with marginal cross-fertilisation between R&D functions and other activities. Too much training or consultancies may have had a negative impact on the Centre's research capacity. It has been difficult for the Centres to find an acceptable balance between research, training and consultancy activities.

*Lessons: IN centres have to protect and strengthen innovative research and development efforts in order to be at the cutting edge of technical development. The market defines to a certain extent opportunities and funding, and does not easily support long term R&D activities. But the scope for research should be actively pursued.*

### **4. The Centres depend on external funding of sector programmes**

The general programme support of the Centres will soon come to an end, and all income will in the future be in the form of payment for services. This is a major change and achievement for both centres. In Ghana and Zimbabwe, however, the water and sanitation sector is to a large extent dependent on external donor support, and both centres are as such indirectly financed by donors.

The sector dependency on external resources does not seem to represent a risk or threat to sustainability in a short term perspective for any of the centres. It might represent a problem when it comes to long term sustainability of national sector centres like TREND and IWSD since donor priorities may change, and governments will most likely be unable or unwilling to pay the current rates for services without donor support.

*Lessons: The centres may rely on external sector support for a period of time, but should diversify their sources of income and also start activities which are not financed from external donors.*

### **6. Weakening of government systems**


Centres like TREND and IWSD depend on a sector and a government system with capacity and initiative to coordinate, facilitate and utilise their services. In both Ghana and Zimbabwe, the government partners to the centres have so far provided sufficient support. However, symptoms of weakening government systems may represent a threat to long term sustainability.

*Lessons: Effective IN centres depend on strong government systems, and all strategies and programmes should seek to strengthen and not undermine the governments ability and capacity to coordinate the sector.*

### 11.3. Relative significance of various factors on performance and sustainability

We have only listed and discussed a number of variables which make an impact on performance and sustainability. It is more difficult to measure or assess the relative significance of the various factors. Based on discussions and findings from the two case studies, we will briefly present two diagrams which provide tentative conclusions about relative importance of fourteen factors.<sup>29</sup> All the factors are grouped in four clusters according to the analytical model presented in chapter 1.3.

Each variable is rated twice: 1. impact on current performance, 2. impact on future sustainability.<sup>30</sup> We will first consider the diagram with the four clusters: Contextual factors, Internal factors, Linkages and Performance.



<sup>29</sup> The rating is based on a systematic use of the analytical model in all interviews, but the findings are impressionistic and open for discussion and alternative interpretations. The diagram can at best be used as a tool to discuss tendencies and future strategy.

<sup>30</sup> The exercise was carried out using IWSD as an example, but there are obvious similarities with TREND.

<b>CONTEXTUAL FACTORS</b>
1. High demand (availability of funds)
2. Specific sector needs (policy changes)
3. Preferential treatment
4. Hosting institution
<b>INTERNAL FACTORS</b>
5. Purpose/values
6. Programme profile (types/mix)
7. Leadership
8. Human resources (skills/staff)
9. Systems and procedures
10. Organisational culture
<b>LINKAGES</b>
11. Interaction/links with donors
12. Interaction/links with government
<b>PERFORMANCE</b>
13. Efficiency (deadlines)
14. Quality services


- Contextual factors and linkages were critical in the setting up and consolidation of the centres, which mean that there have been external needs and demands in the sector, and that the centres were able to interact efficiently with both donors and government and respond to their needs.
- Contextual factors seem, however, to play less significant impact on future sustainability, which means that the special status the centres were given in the beginning will be reduced, and that the centres would have to accept increasing competition.
- Two other key messages are that future sustainability will increasingly depend on internal factors (staff quality, programme profile, etc.), demonstrated success and ability to perform.

Looking at individual variables some key findings are:

- Leadership has been the single most important factor to explain current performance, while a broader base of senior consultants is considered more important for future sustainability. In other words, the Directors were critical in the establishment of the Centre, but future sustainability will depend more on demonstrated success, collective efforts and "a critical mass" of senior consultants.
- Performance (quality services) is an important reason for current status, but becomes the critical factor in the years to come.
- The programme profile(selection of activities) has been important and will be more important.

- The purpose (identity) and values of the centres are not significant factors in explaining current performance, but will be increasingly important to ensure future sustainability. The Centres should be driven by both demands and values.
- It is important for the centres to have effective internal systems and procedures, but they are not critical success factors.
- Contact and interaction with a broader base of clients (donors) together with demand for services will become increasingly important.
- The host institution or the institutional structure has played a relatively minor role, and will be less critical when it comes to sustaining activities - at least for the next few years.

**Relative significance of sub-factors influencing current performance and future sustainability.**



**ANNEX 1**

**TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR CASE STUDY ON  
TRAINING CENTRE FOR WATER AND SANITATION  
UNDP PROJECT NO. ZIM/88/006**

**Background**

The Training Centre for Water and Sanitation (the Centre) was established as a UNDP Project Executed by the World Bank through the UNDP/World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme (the Programme) with funding from the Norwegian Government and UNDP.

The Centre was established to build capacity within the water and sanitation sector in Zimbabwe through training, research, technical assistance and other sector development support to the Government and other supporting agencies.

Established in 1989, the Centre operated as a UNDP project until the end of 1993 when it was transformed into a national NGO by the name of Institute of Water and Sanitation Development (the Institute). The Institute is managed by a board of local directors, active in the sector, and continues to carry out similar functions - training, research, technical assistance.

Although the Institute is now independent, it will continue to receive funding support on a declining basis from the Norwegian Government, through the Programme for a period of 3-4 years after which it will become self-sustaining.

**Objectives**

The objectives of the case study are to document:

- the process by which the Centre was established under the UNDP project
- the transformation of the Centre into a locally established NGO - the Institute
- the challenges, and issues faced by the Centre and Institute
- recommendation for ensuring sustainability of institutes - such as IWSD

**Terms of reference**

The case study will review the process of establishing the Centre and its transformation into a local NGO in order to determine what factors contributed to the success and sustainability of this UNDP project. In particular, lessons learned from this project should be drawn out and the relevance for other institutional development/strengthening projects assessed. Outputs from the case study should be relevant to other upcoming institutional development and strengthening projects such as the Centre.

The case study will be carried out by two consultants - one regional/international and one local - in order to ensure that a general/global and a country specific perspective are maintained. One of the consultants should have broad knowledge of UNDP projects, particularly institutional development projects such as ZIM/88/006.

The case study will take place over a period of 6 weeks during which interviews will be conducted with relevant actors in and outside Zimbabwe. These will include the Government of Zimbabwe, UNDP-World Bank-Zimbabwe Office, UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme, RWSG-EA, University of Zimbabwe and other major clients.

#### **Specific activities include:**

- Brief review of documentation leading up to the establishment of the Centre, and particularly those describing the process by which the Centre was staffed and housed.
- Assessment of the successes and achievements of the Centre against initial project objectives and expectations.
- Descriptions of key steps (landmarks) in the development of the Centre.
- Assessment of factors leading to, or influencing, the success of the Centre (personnel, national framework, etc.).
- Discussion of the core challenges, problems and issues faced during the establishment of the Centre, and after it was established.
- Explanation of how these challenges, problems and issues were resolved.
- Review of the transitional phase from Centre to local Institute and discussion of the challenges faced.
- Assessment of the current status and achievements (and their sustainability) of the Institute and challenges currently being faced, particularly as regards payment of services, notably what the market is willing and able to pay for services (with/without external support).
- Lessons learnt from this experience and recommendations for ensuring sustainability of institutes - such as IWSD.
- The role of RWSG-EA in the above and identification of future areas of collaboration.

The assignment should be carried out over a period of 60 days for a maximum of 20 days per consultant. In addition to the above, the international consultant will prepare a comparative review of IWSD and TREND (ITN Centre in Ghana). He will consult with RWSG-EA in Nairobi, and be responsible for editing/completion of the report. The local consultant will spend a higher proportion of time on "field work" in Zimbabwe and will provide timely inputs to the report. The two consultants will agree on the detailed division of tasks between themselves, however, RWSG-EA may be asked to be informed about the agreed workplan.

The consultant will submit a draft report for review by RWSG-EA and IWSD by the 40th day of the assignment, and submit the final report on diskette (Word for Windows or WordPerfect) and four hard copies by the 60 day of the assignment.

#### **OUTPUTS**

The consultant will prepare:

1. A comprehensive report, including annexes of not more than 40 pages, and
2. an executive summary, or synthesis of the main report, of about 10 pages for wider circulation.

**ANNEX 2****People met****Ghana**

Mr. R.K.D. Van-Ess, Technical Coordinator, Community Water and Sanitation Dision  
 Mr. Peter Sievers, Carl Bro International (Management consultant to TREND))  
 Mr. Isac Adjei Doku, Head of Technical Division, TREND  
 Mr. Richard Ananane, Public Relation Officer, TREND  
 Mr. Eugene Larbi, Managing Director, TREND  
 Ms. Safuratu Mohammed-Tahiru, Training Unit, TREND  
 Mr. Lukman Yahya Salifa, Deputy Director, Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly (former staff of KSP)  
 Mr. Anthony Tekyi, Financial Manager, TREND  
 Mr. Vincent Tay, Head Materials Development Unit, TREND  
 Mr. Mike Adjei, Regional Coordinator, CWSD Kumasi (client)  
 Ms. Elisabeth Afiba Yankson, Head Training Unit, TREND  
 Mr. Atsu Dartey, Personnel Officer, CWSD  
 Mr. Emmanuel Bawa, Programme Officer WATSAN, UNICEF  
 Mr. Mawuena Dotse, Project Coordinator IGIP (former Coordinator UNDP/GWSC)  
 Ms. Else Møller Nielsen, First Secretary, Danish Embassy  
 Mr. Thomas O'Brien Kirk, Senior Adviser CWSD  
 Mr. Ernest Doe, Regional Co-ordinator CWSD Volta Region  
 Mr. Jens Vad, Project Manager, Volta Region Water and Sanitation Project  
 Mr. Festus K. Kwadzokpo, Training/Management Officer, Volta Region Water and Sanitation Project  
 Mr. Emmanuel Fragbe, Training/Management Officer, Volta Region Water and Sanitation Officer

**Zimbabwe**

Dr. Paul Taylor, Executive Director IWSD  
 Mr. N.R.Mudege, Manager, Technical and Information Services, IWSD  
 Mr. E.Masendu, Technical Officer, IWSD  
 Mr. David Proudfoot, Manager, Training and Research, IWSD  
 Mr. Johan de Waard, First Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy  
 Mr. Samuel Mawunganidze, Project Officer Water Environment & Sanitation Sector, UNICEF  
 Eng. M.P. Grant, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Zimbabwe  
 Mr. Ramson Mbetu, Coordinator, Capacity Building Unit, Ministry of Local Government  
 Dr. Peter Robinson, Zimconsult  
 Mr. George Nhunama, National Coordination Unit, Ministry of Local Government  
 Mr. Denis Nkala, Programme Officer, UNDP  
 Dr L. Ndlovu, IWSD Management Board Member.  
 Mrs. Gata, IWSD Administrator,

Mr Muzamindo, Chief Water Engineer, DDF.

Mr Magombedze, Urban Engineers Forum, Norton Town.

Mr Waterkyn, Mvuramanzi Trust.

Mr Musingarabwi, Chief Environmental Health Officer, Ministry of Health.

Ms. Inger Stoll, Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Counsellor

## ANNEX 3

### REFERENCES

#### Ghana

- Pearson, Euan (1996), TNC to TREND - A Case Study  
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida), (1994), Preparation of a Development Strategy and Action Plan for TNC.  
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#### Zimbabwe

- UNDP-World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme (1993), Terminal Report, ZIM/88/006, Training Centre for Water and Sanitation  
 IWSD, Information brochure  
 TCWS, Report on Activities 1991  
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 IWSD, Minutes of the third planning meeting held at Brondesbury Park Hotel, 1996.  
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 Taylor, P., Mudege, N. and Kaseke, E., Human resource development and capacity building, 1992.  
 Coopers & Lybrand Associates, Organisation and salary structure report, 1993.  
 Inter-consult, National training plan for the rural water supply and sanitation sector, 1990-95, Volume 1, 1991.  
 NAC, District Coordination Handbook, Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development.

**ANNEX 4****Chronological landmarks for TCWS - IWSA, 1987-1994.**

- 1987 Approval by University Council for TCWS to be set up. University declined to be executing agency; hence the World Bank took on the responsibility. July 1989 TCWS starts with recruitment of Project Manager (three staff members by end of 1989).
- June 1990 Application for Associate Status with the University for TCWS.
- August 1991 Outline proposal for the next phase for TCWS prepared, and shared with SIDA as potential funder.
- Nov. 1991 Consultancy report on future options.
- March 1992 Project Proposal for Phase II on TCWS was prepared and submitted to World Bank and UNDP.
- April 1992 Second Tripartite Review Meeting recommends extension of TCWS, and resolution of future status and institutional arrangements.
- October 1992 Department of Civil Engineering adopts the proposal for an NGO.
- November 1992 Faculty of Civil Engineering accepts recommendation for NGO.
- December 1992 Proposal for NGO submitted to University Senate.
- January 1993 Adoption of constitution for NGO, and first Management Board for IWSA elected.
- February 1993 Application for registration of IWSA as Welfare Organisation
- September 1993 Letters of support for the IWSA secured from Government departments to support registration application.
- December 1993 Assessment of suitability of the South African Mvula Trust Constitution for the proposed IWSA.
- December 1993 Registration of IWSA as a Welfare Organisation.
- December 1993 End of TCWS Project extension.
- January 1994 Terminal Tripartite Review Meeting over the TCWS.
- January 1994 IWSA formally takes over project staff from TCWS.
- February 1994 First Annual General Meeting of the IWSA, and election of new Management Board.
- May 1994 University Planning Committee informed by the Dean of Engineering of the existence of IWSA commencing activities in January 1994.
- April 1994 Senate turns down the idea of an NGO within the University mandate.

**ANNEX 5****PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES AND PRODUCTS 1989-1996 FOR TNC & TREND**

This is a list of activities and outputs for the period 1989 to 1996 collected from reports and available documents. The information is incomplete in particular for the first years, and exact output data are either missing or not available for certain activities also in the last years. The original intention was to present activities for each year, but the only way has been to list activities and outputs (seminars, workshops, trainees, reports etc.) for each major assignment from 1979 to 1996.

DONOR	ASSIGNMENT	DURATION
1. UNDP/World Bank	Kumasi Sanitation Project (KSP)	1989-1992 3 years
2. UNDP	a. Rural Water and Sanitation Project, Volta Region b. Water and Sanitation Project, Eastern Region	1991-1993 (2 years) 1992-1996 (4 years)
3. UNICEF	Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation Eastern Region	1993-1998 (5 years)
4. UNEP	Freshwater Augmentation Study (with other ITN centres)	1995
5. World Bank	Community Water and Sanitation project Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Regions	1994-1998 (4 years)
6. Danida	a. Volta Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project b. Donor conference c. Sector networking d. Water Sector Rehabilitation Project (with Krüger Consult)	1993-2003 (10 years) 1995 1996-1998 1996
7. CIDA	Community Water Project (COWAP)	1996

## 1. UNDP: Kumasi Sanitation Project 1989-1990

**Purpose:** Carry out baseline surveys of sanitation situation in Kumasi, train and prepare training materials for line managers, organise workshops and disseminate information.

TRAINING/ COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES/ OTHERS
Participatory Techniques Workshop organised for Programme Officers of the Department of Community Development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Promoting community participation Through Adult Education</li> <li>2. Participatory Techniques for Planning Water Supply and Sanitation Projects</li> <li>3. Participatory Techniques in Data Gathering and Analysis</li> <li>4. Workplan Design and Organisation for Water Supply and Sanitation Projects</li> <li>5. Elements of Feasibility Studies</li> <li>6. Water, Sanitation and Health</li> <li>7. Preparation of Courses On Low-Cost Water Supply and Sanitation</li> <li>8. Management of Communal KVIP Latrines - A Guidebook for Management</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Effective demand survey</li> <li>2. Septic tank designs</li> <li>3. Conservancy Labourers Study</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Description of Training Programmes for GWSC</li> <li>2. Inputs to teaching EQE courses at Dept of Civil Engineering, UST</li> </ul>

## 2.a. UNDP: Water and Sanitation Management, Volta Region

Purpose: Train extension officers, latrine artisans and develop construction manual for hand dug wells.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT-ANCIES
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Orientation District Mgt. Committee Members</li> <li>2. Workshop Project Extension Officers</li> <li>3. Workshop WATSAN committee members</li> <li>4. Workshop VIP-latrine and hand-dug well construction artisans</li> <li>5. Trained women groups representatives</li> <li>6. Follow up workshop District Mgt., Committee Members</li> <li>7. Follow up workshop extension officers</li> <li>8. Follow up workshop artisans</li> <li>9. Follow up workshop WATSAN committee members</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Communication strategies and skills in health and hygiene delivery messages. Hand out.</li> <li>2. Construction of Mozambique slab</li> <li>3. Construction of Rectangular Type Latrine</li> <li>4. Manual on Improved hand dug well.</li> <li>5. How to prepare a Session Plan and a Training Needs Assessment. Hand out</li> <li>6. Action planning. Hand out</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Participated in study on the sanitation component of the project</li> </ol>	<p>Organised a series of training workshops for</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WATSAN committee members</li> <li>- District management Committees</li> <li>- Latrine and hand-dug well construction artisans</li> </ul>

## **2.b. UNDP: Water and Sanitation Management, Eastern Region**

Purpose: Train extension officers, latrine artisans and develop construction manual for hand dug wells.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT-ANCIES
<u>1995</u> 1. Workshop for hand pump caretakers 2. Follow up workshops for latrine artisans	1. Role of women in water and sanitation projects. Handout 2. Team building. Handout		Sensitised women on their role as managers of health and hygiene.
<u>1994</u> 1. Workshop for female WATSAN leaders 2. Training workshop hand pump caretakers 3. Workshop WATSAN Committee leaders 4. Workshop VIP construction artisans 5. Workshop management committees and extension teams	3. Conflict identification and Resolution. Handout 4. Water Supply Technology. Hand out 5. Excreta Disposal Technologies. Handout 6. Health Education. Manual		
<u>1993</u> 1. Workshop District Mgt. Committee and Extension Officers (11 partic.) 2. Workshop Female WATSAN committee members (30 partic.) 3. WATSAN Committee members (160 partic.) 4. Workshop latrine construction artisans (40 partic.) 5. Workshop Area Mechanics ((10 partic.) 6. Workshop Community Hand pump Caretakers (66 partic.)	7. Construction of Mozambique Latrines. Manual 8. Maintenance of Community Hand pump for hand pump care takers. 9. Video Documentary. Role of Women in Water and Sanitation		

### 3. UNICEF: Water Supply and Environmental Sanitation, Eastern Region

**Purpose:** Train district project managers, extension staff etc. and prepare training materials and educational videos. Capacity building of District Assemblies.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES
1. Workshop for latrine construction artisans Jan. 1994 2. District Mgt. Committee Nov. 1993 (26) 3. Workshop Project Extension Officer			1. Participated in Project Mid-Term Review

### 4. UNEP: Freshwater Augmentation Study

**Purpose:** Carry out field work for the anglophone West African countries in cooperation with other ITN centres in Africa.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES


I am sorry for the  
 trouble you are having with your  
 equipment. Please let me know  
 if you need  
 any help for your project.  
 I am sorry for the  
 trouble you are having with your equipment.  
 Please let me know if you need  
 any help for your project.  
 I am sorry for the  
 trouble you are having with your equipment.

12/12/93

## 5. World Bank: Community Water and Sanitation Project (Brong Ahafo and Ashanti Regions)

**Purpose:** Carry out training and prepare relevant materials for Regional and District Water and Sanitation Teams, artisans, etc. and information dissemination to relevant users and decision makers.

TRAINING COURSES/SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/STUDIES	CONSULTANCIES
<u>1994-1996</u> 1. Regional start-up and orientation workshop 2. Training of trainers workshop 3. District orientation workshop 4. Training of trainers workshop for DWS teams 5. Workshop for latrine construction artisans	<u>1994-1996</u> 1. Project Information Brochure 2. Project Information Booklet 3. Latrine Construction Manual		1. Prepared selection criteria for private contractors/artisan s and WATSAN teams 2. Reviewed training programmes for partner organisations 3. Designed application and contract forms for the household latrine component



## 6. a. Danida: Volta Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project

Purpose: Prepare and implement the training component of the project.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES
<p><u>1994- 1996</u></p> <p>1. Prepared training programme for WATSAN committees I&amp;II      2. Trained Project Extension Officers      3. Trained Extension Supervisors in use of audio-visuals      4. Workshop in presentation skills and image building for Regional Project Office      5. Workshop for WATSAN trainers      6. Participatory skills workshop for EHAs      7. Trained of trainers workshop for School of Hygiene Tutors      8. Community management workshop for School of Hygiene Tutors      9. Workshop on Water, Sanitation and Hygiene education for School of Hygiene Tutors      10. Regional workshop Hygiene Education Materials development</p> <p><u>1992-1993</u></p> <p>1. Regional start up workshop      2. Trained extension officers (10)      3. Trained Project Field (Assistants (29)      4. Trained extension Supervisors (20)      5. Trained Environmental Health Assistance (19)</p>	<p><u>1994-1996</u></p> <p>1. Hygiene Education Posters      2. Materials for WATSAN Programme:      a. Community Management Handbook      b. Trainers Guide      c. Technology Choice Package for Water Supply Systems      d. Follow up Guide for WATSAN trainers      3. Project Information Booklets      4. Participatory Tool kit      5. Sanitation Poster      6. Hygiene Education Flip Overs      7. Community Management Handbook      8. Manuals and technical support literature:      a. Construction Manual for Household Latrines      b. Construction Manual for Communal Latrines      c. Construction Manuals for Hand-dug wells      d. Handbook for pump caretakers      e. Construction, O&amp;M Manuals for Spring, Surface Water and Rainwater Harvesting Systems</p>		<p>1. Prepared IDP for School of Hygiene in Ho:      a. Carried out assessment study      b. Prepared in service training programme      c. Training courses (ongoing)      d. Curriculum development (ongoing)</p>

1. 5 8 8 ~~new~~ new form

new form & new 8-+

new form & new

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### **6.b. Danida: Donor coordination/conference**

Purpose: Organise donor conference Nov. 1995

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES
1. Seminar on effective donor participation for the Community Water and Sanitation programme	Produced final report		

### **6.c. Danida: Sector networking**

Purpose: Organise networking among partners in the water and sanitation sector.

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES
	Newsletter (not yet published) P.R.Audit Electronic inventory		

### **6.d. Danida: Water Sector Rehabilitation Project (with Krüger Consult)**

Purpose: Develop a comprehensive Human Resource Development Plan

TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS	MATERIALS PRODUCED	RESEARCH/ STUDIES	CONSULT- ANCIES
	Design of tools for use for questionnaire and interviews. Report: TNA document and training plan		Conducted TNA/HRD Training Plan

## **7. CIDA: Community Water Project (ongoing)**

**Purpose:** Train partner organisations to facilitate the conversion of hand pumps to community ownership

<b>TRAINING COURSES/ SEMINARS</b>	<b>MATERIALS PRODUCED</b>	<b>RESEARCH/ STUDIES</b>	<b>CONSULT- ANCIES</b>
Participatory Training for Community Ownership and Management of installed systems.	Roles and responsibilities of a PO. Hand out		

## **OTHERS**

1. TNC Newsletter. Issued three times.
2. Participated in consultations in the preparation of the new national strategy for the water and sanitation sector.
3. Situation analysis of Waste Management in eleven secondary cities.
4. Occasional lecturing of undergraduate students at UST in low-cost water and sanitation.

# Drinking Water Environmental Health Services Musinga Sabu

3 areas → Water Development - main sectors → different

shallow well - impervious strata. water which has not passed through soil depends.

deep well, bore, dams., springs

Monitoring helps the community to develop the wells & sustain it.

Health & Hygiene aspect to the community to explore the safe water from unsafe wells.

Health - disease & safe -

1 bore - 250 person.

1 deep well →

Quality → ground water moves from place to place.

zero E.Coli. → 1-10 E.Coli. →  $> 10$  → 20  
Investigate

Bacterial -

1 Fecal E.Coli. → start investigation.

Chemical → Fluoride

Ministry of Health - visit all these water works -  
water sample surveillance.

Local Authority

(PAE)

W.D Control.

Health.

Surveillance.

①  
+  
for  
poly clin

②  
+  
household  
surveillance

③  
④  
⑤  
⑥  
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⑪  
⑫