Title | World Bank incentives for harmonisation and alignment : final synthesis report |
Publication Type | Miscellaneous |
Year of Publication | 2006 |
Authors | Coyle, E, Lawson, A |
Pagination | 48 p. : boxes, fig., tab. |
Date Published | 2006-11-01 |
Publisher | Overseas Development Institute (ODI) |
Place Published | London, UK |
Keywords | development agencies, development aid, funding agencies, government organizations, policies, programmes, triple s harmonisation |
Abstract | This synthesis report was written on the basis of two case studies in Cambodia and Ghana and additional research in Washington DC. A 2005 ODI study examined the internal incentive systems of six donor agencies, including the World Bank, and identified elements which both support and militate against staff compliance with alignment and harmonisation objectives. The study drew attention to a range of positive and negative incentives facing Bank staff, but its focus on the headquarters level of the agencies meant that insufficient attention could be given to the incentives shaping operational engagement at country level, including those specific to the local context. The present study builds on the earlier work by examining the incentives facing Bank staff engaged in country-level operational work. The study draws out more detail on the incentives on country level staff for harmonisation and alignment. This document presents the synthesis report of the study. The objective of the study is to identify both positive and negative incentives shaping engagement by operational staff in alignment and harmonisation. The study aims to draw out lessons from the country experiences and use these as the basis for practical recommendations on how the Bank might encourage staff to implement its commitments under the Paris Declaration. The country case studies are not evaluations of the work of the World Bank at country level with respect to harmonisation and alignment, but are rather an opportunity to draw inspiration from the field in order to inform headquarters level policymaking. Following a very brief overview of the conceptual framework in Chapter 2, the country-level incentives facing operational staff, asking to what extent government, civil society, or other development partners in country have driven the process of harmonisation and alignment are examined in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 examines the role of corporate incentives in the World Bank in relation to the country office, while Chapter 5 examines the relevance of individual staff incentives. Chapter 6 outlines the implications for the World Bank, identifying some issues that could be addressed at headquarters level and presenting the study’s recommendations. |
Notes | 18 ref. |
Custom 1 | 122 |