The use of official development assistance (ODA) to support country leadership: analysis and recommendations for Burkina Faso

Published on: 04/12/2014

In Burkina Faso, the study on aid effectiveness conducted by IRC is based on the following two sources: 1. an in depth analysis of the national WASH programme, or Programme National d'Approvisionnement en Eau Potable et en Assainissement, PN-AEPA (covering the years 2007-2013) and 2. an exchange workshop gathering the main funding agencies and the national authorities. Key messages are summarised below:

• As aid money has clearly been used to increase water and sanitation access rate, one can consider this objective achieved. With only 34% of development aid expected for 2008-2015, 80% WASH related planned infrastructures have been achieved, despite major inconsistencies in hardware quality.
• The sanitation and hygiene sub-sector has run the biggest deficit in terms of aid in Burkina Faso; with 73,9% and 45,5% of budgeted expenditures actually spent in urban and rural areas respectively, disappointing results were achieved with access rates of 62,8% and 13,9% access rates in urban and rural areas in 2013. The infrastructure-based approach did not succeed in monitoring health improvement in populations. Moreover, there is a need to integrate sanitation and hygiene implementation modalities to the health sector.
• The urban water provision sub-sector (under the Office Nationale de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement - ONEA's responsibility) is the big winner; ONEA's capacity for resource mobilisation is strong and its governance mechanisms are now self-funded. 99% of urban population has access to a proper water service today. ONEA works at the relevant scale and is no longer dependent from development aid.
• By investing only 3% of public capital and 17% of development aid in governance, the sector has not succeeded in developing capacities and mechanisms required to ensure sustainability. Moreover, this component has been greatly underestimated, and no indicators have been designed to monitor the sectors' self-management.
• Although the Burkinabè State is responsible for the sector's governance, it has fail to develop the corresponding management modalities and the financing mechanisms.
• Despite attempts to pool resources (through mechanisms like the sector-wide budgetary support and basket funding) 80% of aid funds are still distributed through projects, resulting in random distribution of resources at the expense of long term strategies. Such failure is explained by factors such as trust (and transparency) and questionable priority settings in resource allocation.
• Even though aid highly contributed to improvement in access to water in rural areas, it has not influenced the sector to consider dimensions such as water quality and quantity over time, distance to water points and reliability; dimensions which set the basis of a proper water service. Said differently, indicators other than access rates have not been developed to monitor water quality and water service sustainability provided to rural populations.

All in all, the Burkinabè State is not in a position to play its leadership role; it has failed to meet its financial commitments for the PN-AEPA and to define a strategy and a timeline to get over development aid. The rural domain for which it is responsible (alongside municipalities) is fragmented and does not constitute an optimal intervention scale. As a result, the State is still heavily depending on aid. In the light of the above state of affairs, recommendations for post 2015 include:

1. Revisit the functions of governmental departments involved in the WASH sector (MEAHA, General and Regional Directorates) and redefine responsibilities to strengthen the following roles: the formulation, coordination and monitoring of sector policies; the facilitation of sector dialogue; the supervision of private operators; and the legal oversight and conformity control of operations. Such reforms would result in changes in functions, profiles, procedures, etc. Based on the current arrangement and the findings of this study, the MEAHA does not seem to be the correct public entity to implement public investments. Instead, the MEAHA and its directorates should carry out strategic functions. Further, an institutional and organisational audit should also be conducted at Ministry level.
2. Set up a national agency for water and sanitation for rural areas and small towns to manage infrastructure delegated to the municipalities; ensure operation and maintenance of infrastructure; enhance service delivery through public-private partnerships (PPP); supervise and manage private operators; ensure service quality monitoring and assess private operators performance; and coordinate with ONEA to consolidate and produce nationwide data and statistics. The setup of a national agency is an obligatory transition to professionalise the sector and make service more efficient and sustainable. Mainly because of their legal status, public bodies such as the DGRE, DGAEUE, DREAHA, etc. are not in a position to react swiftly and be pro-active in addressing sector expectations in and effective manner.
3. Set up a national water and sanitation investment bank for the whole country to manage sector funds. Each funder (via loans and subsidies) would enter into a contract with the State, who in turn, delegates fund management to the bank. The bank would be responsible for the financing of viable public investments, in line with national policies and strategies and in collaboration with ONEA, its (new) rural counterpart, local private operators, NGOs, municipalities and other interested parties. The bank would link up available funds with implementers, and its board would be constituted by representatives from the MEF, MEAHA, municipalities, etc. Financial and technical partners would be involved in supporting the bank to monitor resource allocation and spending. More information on such a bank can be found on Dr Pezon's previous blog on the topic.
4. Establish a mechanism that transfers (to the investment bank mentioned above) VAT expenses linked to WASH service provider activities. Development of professional services in rural areas and small towns offers interesting benefits for VAT generation. VAT collected would contribute to internal income generation and would compensate for the inevitable reduction of external donations. Resulting professionalism and increased financial viability from suggested institutional reforms would contribute to increasing the sector's attractiveness to external funding (through loans).
5. Set up a nationwide tariff policy that fosters solidarity between urban and rural areas. The recommendation is to contribute a percentage of profits from water sales in urban areas to the development of water services in rural areas. Tariff policy setting based on solidarity is inspired by current practices in ONEA (i.e. sanitation tax) or by the national electric company as a measure to increase electricity coverage in rural Burkina Faso. A certain amount will be transferred to the investment bank for financing of the sector.
6. Plan for an independent analysis of the sector's effectiveness every three years to institutionalise sector reflection on performance and use learning to update policies and strategies.

Of course these recommendations need to be further detailed. However, in order to get a real chance to ensure water and sanitation provision for all before 2030, we do believe the Burkinabè WASH sector needs to think outside the box and innovate.

Facts presented in this blog are extracted from the full report produced by Mr. Juste Hermann Nansi, Mr. Koalga P. Saïdou and Dr. Christelle Pezon and available below in French.